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Chapter 1
Introduction
Globalization has become one of the most widely used buzzwords of the late 20th and early
21st centuries. People discuss it with passion, concern, and sometimes disappointment.
Globalization can take numerous forms, from wider coverage of trade to deeper foreign
direct investment; however, and despite the hype and excitement, globalization (from an
economic perspective) simply means economic integration. Accordingly, the main concern
of this thesis is the integration of world capital markets, which is an issue that lies at the
top of the agenda for international macroeconomists, since nancial markets perform an
important function in economic development, particularly by providing information to in-
vestors, international diversication, and allocating nance to various productive activities.
By taking a historical look at the evolution of nancial integration (see Figure 1.1)we can
discern, for example, that the 1900-1914 ratio of foreign investment to output in the world
economy was not equaled again until 1980s, but by now it has more than tripled. As Ob-
stfeld and Taylor (2002) discuss, the ow of international capital since the 19th century
illustrates recurring di¢ culties as well as the alternative perspectives through which poli-
cymakers have tried to confront these capital ows. However, throughout the rst decade
of the 21st century, the merits of international nancial integration are under more forceful
attack than at any previous point in time; where the resurgence of concerns over interna-
tional nancial integration is understandable in light of the nancial crisis of the 1990s and
early 21st century. According to the IMF (2007), there have been two great waves of private
capital ows (especially to emerging market countries) in the past two decades (see Figure
1.2) mainly impelled by the reduction of capital controls in many countries. The rst began
in the early 1990s and ended abruptly with the 199798 Asian crisis.
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Figure 1.1: Foreign Capital Stocks; foreign assets/World GDP
Figure 1.2: Net Private Capital Inows
3The most recent wave has been building since 2002, with cross-border nancial ows
among industrial economies and between industrial and developing economies in the rst
half of 2007 already far exceeding the total for 2006 (see IMF, 2007). Looking at the nature
and composition of the inows reveals interesting di¤erences between the current wave of
capital inows and the one in the 1990s. In particular, the current wave is taking place in
the context of much stronger current account positions and a substantial acceleration in the
accumulation of foreign reserves (Figure 1.3). The gures show that surge in private capital
inows has also been accompanied by a sharp increase in outows, in line with the global
trend toward increasing diversication of international portfolios (IMF, 2007).
Figure 1.3: Gross Private Flows, Current Account Balance, and Reserve Accumulation
The aforementioned reduction of capital controls has been put into practice based on
the expectation that cross-border capital movements can bring a better allocation of capital
and an improvement in international risk-sharing possibilities. The strong supposition (i.e.
the textbook perspective) has been that these benets are large, especially for developing
countries that tend to be relatively capital-poor. However, with the increased ow of capital
came a string of currency and nancial crises, especially in the 1990s. These insidious side
e¤ects of capital movements has led to the perception that developing countries, which
allowed (all types of) capital ows, were more susceptible to crises, and in turn are much
more adversely a¤ected. These developments have led to a erce debate among economists
on the costs and benets of nancial globalization. For example, some economists view the
unregulated movement of capital ows as a serious impediment to global nancial stability
(see for example Bhagwati, 1998; Rodrik, 1998; Stiglitz, 2000)1, leading to calls for capital
1Stiglitz (2000, 2002) argues that short-term capital ows are the ones that should be regulated.
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controls (i.e. Tobin taxes)2 on international nancial transactions. Other economists
argue (e.g. Prsasad et al., 2006) that increased openness to capital ows is essential for
economies that want to evolve from lower to middle-income economies, while signicantly
enhancing stability among the industrialized countries (Fischer, 1998; Summers, 2000).
Although the rapidly growing empirical literature is tilting toward supporting a sig-
nicant positive role for nancial globalization, there remain many unanswered questions
vis-à-vis the pace, rhythm and scope of nancial globalization. The fundamental point to
keep in mind is that the main benets from nancial globalization are most likely indi-
rect in nature, rather than simply consisting of improved access to nancing for domestic
investment (Kose et al., 2006). Of course, this perspective di¤ers from the standard neo-
classical model, which views the key benet of integrating nancial markets as arising from
the ow of long-term capital from industrial to emerging and developing economies. More-
oever, as the textbook argument goes, this would produce economy-wide improvements for
types of economies, since industrial countries are capital rich while emerging and developing
economies are relatively capital poor. However, Eichengreen (2001) concludes that there is
no empirical corroboration of the conventional theoretical model about the growth benets
of capital account liberalization. More recent surveys by Prasad et al. (2003) and Kose et al.
(2006) on the broader dimensions of nancial globalization intensies the puzzle. That is,
they still conclude that the fast-growing empirical literature provides little evidence of a
causal relationship between nancial openness and growth, even after taking into account
the distinction between de jure and de facto nancial integration. Moreover, they show that
among developing countries, the volatility of consumption growth relative to income growth
appears to be positively linked with nancial integration (openness), which is in opposition
to what the canonical theoretical models would predict (Agenor, 2001).
The literature has also argued that the ability of capital ows to generate a number of
what Kose et al. (2006) label the potential collateral benets of nancial integration, is
even more important than the direct growth e¤ects of access to more capital. For example,
they show that there is now evidence that nancial openness can promote the development
of the domestic nancial sector, compel macroeconomic discipline, engender e¢ ciency gains
among domestic rms by exposing them to competition from foreign entrants, and unchain
forces that lead to better government and corporate governance. The collateral benets
perspective proposed by Kose et al. (2006) also ties in with the literature on thresholds
in the e¤ects of nancial globalization. That is, it has become a deep-seated belief in
academic and policy circles that nancial globalization can be good for any country in
2The tax, as originally intended, is to place a penalty on short-term speculation in currencies.
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terms of delivering the benets and minimizing the risks, but that the benets-to-cost ratio
is much more absorbing for countries with strong institutions and good macroeconomic
policies. Obviously, most developing and emerging economies do not (yet) live-up-to a wish
list of preferred policies, and for many of them, the length of any such laundry list makes
things look discouragingKose et al. (2006).
However, does this mean that developing and emerging economies are better o¤by shield-
ing themselves from the world economy, while trying to improve their rules of the game to
attain a "suitable" level? In my opinion, the answer is clearly no; however, the academic
literature does not seem to o¤er a simple answer, in part because the relationship runs both
ways. In theory (and with some supporting evidence as we will see later in the book), -
nancial openness can play an important creatively-destructive role in improving institutions,
allowing for the transfer of good governance practices, strengthening macroeconomic disci-
pline, and more importantly to enhance economic growth, just to name a few items on the
aforementioned list.
1.1 Costs of Financial Integration
The experiences since the 1980s has led economists and policymakers to recognize that in
addition to potential benets (discussed later in the Introduction), open nancial markets
can also engender signicant costs. Such potential costs (see Agenor, 2001; and IMF, 2007
for further elaboration) include; (a) the high degree of concentration of capital ows and a
lack of access to nancing for developing economies, either permanently or when they need it
most; (b) inadequate (domestic) allocation of capital inows; (c) macroeconomic instability;
(d) the risk of "abrupt reversals" of certain types of capital ows; (e) herding and contagion
e¤ects; and (f) risks associated with foreign bank penetration.
1.1.1 Lack of Access to Capital Flows
As the IMF (2007) has discussed (and as Chapters 2 and 3 show), there is ample evidence
that suggests that cross-border capital ows tend to gravitate towards a small number of
recipient countries. However, as the World Bank (2001) highlights, the share of total private
capital ows going to the top recipients increased signicantly during the last decade of
the 20th century, whereas the share gravitating towards developing economies actually fell
during this same period. Moreover, it should be noted that although many countries have
received a comparatively tiny proportion of ows in absolute terms, some of them have
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received substantial inows after adjusting for country size. By and large, the reality is such
that "many low-income countries simply do not have access to world capital markets"(see
World Bank, 2001).
Moreover, many emerging and developing economies are hindered in their ability to
access international nancial markets, since are only able to tap into these markets in good
times (this implies an asymmetry of accessibility since in bad times these economies tend
to face credit rationing); this implies that access to world capital markets is pro-cyclical as
has been elaborated by the IMF (2007). Clearly, in such conditions, one of the supposed
benets of accessing world capital markets (i.e. the ability to borrow to smooth consumption
in the face of temporary adverse shocks), is non-existent (see World Bank, 2001). This "pro-
cyclicality" of borrowing in world capital markets can have vicious e¤ects by, for example,
reducing macroeconomic stability3(see World Bank, 2001).
1.1.2 Entry by Foreign Banks (Risk of)
Although foreign bank entry can yield many types of benets (see Section 1.2), it also has
some potential drawbacks that need to be considered. First, foreign banks may ration credit
to small rms largely than domestic banks, and concentrate instead on larger and stronger
ones (see for example Beck et al., 2007). As Beck et al. (2007) argue, if foreign banks do
indeed engage in "credit rationing", then their presence will be less likely to contribute to
an overall increase in e¢ ciency in the nancial sector.
Second, entry of more e¢ cient (foreign) banks can stimulate mergers of domestic banks
in order to remain (or become)competitive. This process of concentration can lead to banks
that are "too big to fail"; that is, leading to an extensive apprehension by monetary au-
thorities that the failure of a single large bank could seriously disrupt nancial markets.
Although these potential problems could be mitigated through "prudential supervision",
these may lead to moral hazard problems. That is, domestic banks may increase their risk
appetite vis-à-vis their operations, especially when it comes to allocating credit and screen-
ing potential customers, stemming from the existence of a safety net. Concentration in
the banking sector can also lead to an increase in the mark-up over marginal cost, thereby
putting downward pressure on the e¢ ciency of the banking system and the availability of
credit. Moreover, the increase in the mark-up over marginal cost may adversely a¤ect out-
put and growth by yielding both higher interest rate spreads and a lower amount of loans
3Economically speaking, this simply means that favorable shocks can draw large capital inows, promote
consumption and spending at levels that are unsustainable; thereby forcing economies to over-adjust to
adverse shocks due to sudden (and perhaps unexpected) capital reversals.
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than in a more competitive system (World Bank, 2001).
1.1.3 Misallocation of Capital Flows
Although capital inows may increase domestic investment, their impact on long-run eco-
nomic growth can be limited if such inows only nance "low-quality" projects. For example,
as economic theory suggests, low-productivity investments in the non-tradables sector may
weaken an economys capacity to export, which in turn can lead to mounting external im-
balances. However, the mismanagement of capital inows vis-à-vis their misallocation may
be the artifact of pre-existing distortions in the (domestic) nancial system (Agénor, 2001);
that is, in countries with weakbanks and "weak" supervision of the nancial system, the
direct (or indirect) intermediation of large amounts of funds by the banking system may ex-
acerbate the moral hazard problems associated with the insurance of deposits (as previously
mentioned). That is, through moral hazard creditors may engage in practices that are more
speculative. An example of how asymmetric information problems can a¤ect the benets of
capital inows is provided by Razin et al. (1999), who focus on the impact of FDI ows.
1.1.4 Macroeconomic Instability
The large inows of capital brought about by nancial openness policies can, have unwanted
macroeconomic e¤ects such looser monetary policy, inationary pressures, appreciation of
the real exchange rate, and amplications of current account decits (see IMF, 2007). As
we know, under exible exchange rates, growing current account decits bring about a
depreciation of the dmoestic currency, which may eventually lead to a realignment of relative
prices, thereby a¤ecting the terms-of-trade. By contrast, under a xed exchange rate regime,
losses in competitiveness and higher current account imbalances can erode condence in the
viability and sustainability of the peg and thus hasten a currency crisis and increase nancial
instability, as argued in "rst generation" type models.
1.1.5 Crisis and Contagion
A "high-degree" of nancial openness may also contribute to volatility in capital movements,
leading to large capital ow reversals (i.e. of short-term capital), and as Chang and Velasco
(2000) argue, this possibility raises the probability that borrowers face "liquidity runs". That
is, for a debtor country, the higher the amount of short-term debt relative to international
reserves, then the higher the risk that "liquidity runs" will pose (Agenor, 2001). Moreover,
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high levels of short-term liabilities intermediated by the nancial system also creates the
possibility of bank runs and systemic nancial crises (see deBandt and Hartmann, 2004).
In general, the volatility of capital ows is related to movements in economic fundamen-
tals (both actual and perceived), as well as exogenous movements in world interest rates
(Agenor, 1999). More generally, the fact that investor sentiment is constantly changing in
response to new information, creates the potential for markets to overshoot, thereby gen-
erating nancial crises. Financial contagion can also a¤ect the volatility of capital ows.
That is, when a country experiences considerable capital outows prompted by a perceived
increase (by international investors) in the vulnerability of a countrys currency or when
investors loose condence in an economiesprospects as a result of developments elsewhere,
then nancial contagion may occur (see Dornbusch et al., 2000; Masson, 2000). Moreover,
nancial contagion may also occur through: (1) macroeconomic and nancial similarity, (2)
trade links; (3) nancial sector links, and (4) cross-market rebalancing; that is, by indirectly
e¤ecting the volatility of capital ows as previously mentioned.
1.2 Benets of Financial Openness
Economic theory suggests a number of benets that may accompany nancial liberalization.
For example, an open capital account can advance a more e¢ cient allocation of resources,
provide opportunities for risk diversication, and help promote nancial development. While
analysis of the costs of nancial openness has slow-growing, there is a large and growing
literature that tests the benets of nancial liberalization and its inuence on long-run
growth and development. The basic procedure in almost all of these studies (see Kose et
al., 2006 for an overview) is through the augmentation of a basic growth model by including
variables such as human capital (i.e. the level of schooling), investment, and the level of GDP
in the initial year, with a measure of nancial openness (or capital account liberalization).
Theoretical arguments supporting nancial openness (or an open capital account) revolve
around the following main arguments: (a) the benets of international risk sharing; (b) the
inuence of capital ows on investment and growth; (c) macroeconomic discipline; and (d)
increased e¢ ciency, and greater stability of the nancial system.
1.2.1 Consumption Smoothing
Theoretically speaking, access to world capital markets allows an economy to borrow in dire
times (e.g. during a crisis) and to lend in "good" times. In other words, nancial openness
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enables households to smooth their consumption over time, thereby increasing welfare. As
Obstfeld (1994) has argued, this counter-cyclicalrole of world capital markets allows for
international risk sharing.
1.2.2 Investment and Growth
As previously mentioned, nancial openness gives access to international (economic) re-
sources that may a¤ect (domestic) investment and growth. For example, in many low-income
developing economies the capacity to save is (almost) non-existant due to their low-income
status. Therefore, as long as the return from investment is lower than the cost of capital,
then net foreign resource inows will never be able to complement domestic savings, and will
actually decrease the levels of physical capital per worker, and decrease the rate of economic
growth. These potential risks can be particularly large for some types of capital inows,
most notably short-term inows. In addition to this direct e¤ect on growth, FDI may also
have signicant indirect long-run e¤ects ss emphasized by Berthélemy and Démurger (2000);
Borensztein et al. (1998); Grossman and Helpman (1991). That is, FDI may smooth the
transfer of know-how(e.g. managerial and/or technological). In addition, as suggested
by Markusen and Venables (1999), although increased competition (brought about by FDI)
may reduce the prots of domestic rms, the spill-over e¤ects generated by FDI may reduce
costs, raise prots, and encourage domestic investment.
1.2.3 Macroeconomic Discipline
Since the early beginnings (see for example Fisher, 1998), the literature has argued that by
rewarding good policies, the unfettered ow of capital can actually stimulate economies to
undertake a more disciplined approach vis-à-vis macroeconomic policies (see Obstfeld, 1998).
A related argument put forth by Bartolini and Drazen (1997), is that the liberalization of
the capital account can act as a signal that an economy is ready to undertake "proper"
macroeconomic policies. From this perspective, a "free" capital account may also encourage
macroeconomic and nancial stability, ensuring a more e¢ cient allocation of resources and
higher rates of economic growth.
1.2.4 Banking System E¢ ciency and Financial Stability
A progressively more common argument in favor of nancial openness is that it may increase
the depth and breadth of domestic nancial markets and lead to an increase in the degree
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of e¢ ciency of the nancial intermediation process by lowering costs and excessiveprots
associated with monopolistic or cartelized markets, thereby lowering the cost of investment
and improving resource allocation (Levine, 1996). For example, Levine (1996) shows that
foreign bank penetration may; (a) improve the quality and availability of nancial services
in the domestic market, by increasing the degree of bank competition; (b) serve to stimulate
the development of supervisory and legal frameworks; (c) contribute to the stability of the
domestic nancial system.
1.3 The Road Ahead
International macroeconomics is alive with great practical questions, as highlighted in this
introduction. Accordingly, this dissertation will evolve around most of the above-mentioned
issues by rst looking into the drivers of (long-term) capital ows, and then by investigat-
ing the positive e¤ects and possible down-side risks to an economy of pursuing "nancial
openness" policies. Therefore, this book will proceed as follows4:
Chapters 2 looks at the drivers of long-term capital ows, as proxied by mergers and
acquisitions. Therefore, one of the hypothesis we test is whether M&A activity (as measured
by the number of cross-border deals) increases with more nancial openness, which includes
a more open capital account. The neoclassical model suggests that nancial openness will
increase FDI inows (Kose et al., 2004); however, this might not be the case if the neoclas-
sical assumptions of perfect information and competitive markets are relaxed. Developing
economies, with their weaknancial markets, lack of transparency, and propensity to large
exchange rate movements, might be particularly susceptible to perverse impacts of nancial
openness, and in particular to low levels of cross-border M&As. By using a large dataset for
the period 1986-2005, we analyze nancial openness in explaining FDI and more specically
the number of cross-border mergers and acquisition (M&A) for 210 acquiring countries and
210 target countries. The results of our gravity model t the data well, and these results
suggest that nancial openness increases M&A activity; that is, a one standard deviation
increase in nancial openness implies (for those that are active in M&As) a 10% increase
in the number of expected M&A deals for the target country, and a 12% increase in M&A
activity for the acquiring country. Moreover, nancial openness reduces the probability of
remaining inactive in M&As by 21% for the acquirer and by 10% for the target. In addition,
our results indicate that M&A activity tends to cluster in particular "close-by" locations.
4The respective co-authors are: Ch2 - Charles van Marrewijk; Ch3 - Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen,
and Charles van Marrewijk; Ch4 - Leon Bettendorf; Ch5 - Chen Zhou.
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That is, M&A activity depends on a countries past ows of FDI; for example, countries that
have been successful in attracting M&As in the past are more likely to do so in the future
(the wave e¤ect). Last but not least, the results also suggest that several broad categories
of factors inuence cross-border M&As. These are a countrys macroeconomic performance,
the investment environment, the quality of institutions and global factors.
Chapter 3 is a follow-up to chapter 2, but now the focus shifts to the value of cross-border
M&As. Accordingly, this chapter deals with the puzzle, rst identied by Neary (2007a, b),
that most FDI takes place between the relatively rich countries. The goal of the chapter is
twofold. First, we want to establish whether our gravity approach can help us understand
the value of cross-border M&As. To date, and despite its quantitative importance, the
recent surge in gravity studies has focused on trade or on FDI in general, and has ignored
cross-border M&As (for exceptions see Evenett (2004) and di Giovanni (2005)). Second,
and related to the above observations, by focussing on the distance variable and also on
nancial openness, we seek to nd out if our gravity model can help us to improve our
understanding of the relationship between nancial integration and exchange rate volatility
on the one hand and the value of cross-border M&As on the other hand. Our main results
are that the market-seeking motive is important and that market size variables related to
the target stimulate M&As, and also that the data seem consistent with the prediction of
Neary (2003, 2007, 2004), as far as economic integration is reected by the distance variable.
With regard to variables indicating nancial integration the results are less unambiguous.
Having discussed the drivers behind long-term capital ows, the point of departure of
chapter 4 is the link between de jure and de facto nancial openness and economic growth,
where the empirical literature (thus far) suggests that this link is weak. However, our results
indicate that for developing economies, nancial openness and FDI have a positive direct
e¤ect on economic growth, in addition to an indirect e¤ect through capital accumulation.
Furthermore, M&As stimulate economic growth through capital accumulation. The results
for developed economies are markedly di¤erent; for example, nancial openness does not
have a signicant e¤ect on growth, either directly or indirectly. However, FDI and portfolio
inows, both contribute directly to economic growth. Moreover, portfolio inows also have
an e¤ect on growth through capital accumulation. The one similarity between developed
and developing economies is that FDI positively a¤ects TFP in both cases.
Last but not least, chapter 5 looks at the possible downside risks to an economy from
pursuing "nancial openness" policies. As we know, throughout the 1990s, developed and
developing economies alike experienced severe nancial di¢ culties, including balance-of-
payments crises and systemic banking failures. For example, the 1994 Mexican peso crisis
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and the Asian crisis were likely a mixture of both. In this light, a common approach in
the "crisis and contagion" literature is to analyze the probability of a currency crisis. The
basic idea is rst to sort di¤erent countries and time-periods into two discrete episodes, that
is, into a crisis period and a "tranquil" period. However, due to the non-normality of the
statistical distribution of any EMP index, caution is warranted vis-à-vis relying too much on
parametric assumptions in identifying the statistical threshold. In accordance, this chapter
employs an alternative statistical method known as extreme value theory (EVT) to identify
large values of an exchange market pressure index.
The results in this chapter indicate that the probability of a currency crisis in a given
country increases signicantly by a crisis elsewhere in its own region. As far as Asia, we
have seen that higher exchange market pressure is associated with a stronger acceleration of
CPI ination, and expansionary scal policy. Moreover, these economies tend to experience
high levels of exchange market pressure stemming from "too much of a good thing"; that is
they experience high levels of pressure from high levels of GDP. This indicates that Asian
economies should really be wary of "overheating". Western Hemisphere economies, behave
slightly di¤erent from Asian economies in relation to the impact of GDP growth. These
economies can reduce the probability of a currency crisis by actually increasing their GDP
growth in a more stable fashion. Furthermore, lack of international reserves and higher
levels of CPI ination can have quite damaging e¤ects as far as excessive pressure in their
respective currencies. As far as African countries, we nd that when it comes to ination,
the government budget balance and international reserves, African economies can certainly
benet from improvements in these policy areas. The major di¤erence between Africa the
other two regions, is that GDP growth does not a¤ect the probability of a currency crisis.
When it comes to capital ows, we nd that all regions benet from "persistent" FDI inows,
and that Asia is the only region that benets from a steady increase in portfolio inows.
Chapter 2
Countries of a feather ock together...
2.1 Introduction
The1 extent of nancial integration around the world (see Figure 1.1 in introduction) has
increased signicantly, especially since the 1980s, where a key driver has been the increased
movement of capital ows seeking the opportunity to diversify risk, while earning a higher
return. At the same time, and as shown by the World Bank (2001), many developing
and transition economies have moved away from regimes of "nancial repression", by for
example, removing restrictions on international nancial transactions. That is, policies have
been aimed at increasing the openness of domestic nancial markets to foreign investors, by
phasing-out capital controls (e.g. on capital outows) and the liberalization of restrictions
on foreign direct investment. Furthermore, the increase in the degree of integration of world
capital markets has been accompanied by a marked increase in private capital ows to
developing and emerging economies (see IMF, 2007 and/or Figure 1.3 in the introduction).
Ask an economist about nancial openness and he/she will tell you that it provides
important benets. That is, access to world capital markets expands investorsopportunities
for diversication and provides a potential for achieving higher risk-adjusted rates of return.
From the beneciarys point of view, there are potentially large benets as well since, as
has been discussed on many occasions throughout the literature (see for example, Agenor,
2001; and World Bank, 2001), the smoothing of consumption made possible by borrowing
possibilities through the access to world capital markets, in addition to potential growth
and welfare gains resulting from international diversication, can be large (Obstfeld, 1994a).
Furthermore, the positive impact of capital ows on domestic investment and growth enables
1This chapter is co-authored with Charles van Marrewijk.
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countries to draw upon international resources allowed by nancial openness. For example,
in many countries, the growth rate of savings is constrained by low levels of income; therefore,
as long as the return from investment is at least equal to the cost of capital, then foreign
capital inows can: (i) complement domestic savings, (ii) increase the physical capital per
worker level in an economy, and (iii) help the recipient economy increase the economic growth
rate (Agenor, 2001). These potential benets can be particularly large for some types of
capital inows, most notably foreign direct investment (FDI). In addition to this direct
e¤ect on growth, FDI may also have signicant indirect long-run e¤ects. As emphasized by
Berthélemy and Démurger (2000), Borensztein et al. (1998), and Grossman and Helpman
(1991), FDI may smooth the transfer of know-how(e.g. managerial and/or technological).
In this respect, the most important issue is to identify the institutional prerequisites
that can allow economies to utilize the gains, while curtailing the risks associated with the
openness of nancial markets. In this context it is important to di¤erentiate between short-
term (i.e. portfolio) and long-term capital ows (i.e. FDI). As previously mentioned, the
latter type of investment brings with it not only resources, but also technology, access to
markets, and knowledge. Furthermore, FDI is also not as volatile, and therefore not as
troublesome as short-term ows that can quickly come in and out of a country.2 Therefore,
we take the decomposition of capital ows a step further, by looking only at FDIs largest
component; that is, M&As (see section 2 for a discussion). In this light, we employ a gravity
model, which has been widely used to analyze trade data and to estimate the impact of
various policies since its inception into mainstream economics by Tinbergen (1962).
Even though some critique emerged early on for its lack of theoretical underpinnings,
nowadays the gravity model rests on solid theoretical foundations (see Anderson, 1979;
Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). In its simplest form, the model simply assumes that
the ow of capital between two economies is a positive function of their economic size, and
a negative function of the distance between them; however, these core variables are most
often than not complemented by other explanatory variables. Although the gravity model
was initially conceptualized for trade ows, it has been subsequently applied to capital
ows (see Eaton and Tamura, 1994; de Menil, 1999; Portes et al., 2001; Portes and Rey,
2005). However, to date it has not been readily applied to M&As (with the exception of
Ashcroft et al., 1994; Evenett, 2004; di Giovanni, 2005; Delannay and Meon, 2006). The
main hypothesis we test in this paper, is whether M&A activity increases with more nancial
openness, which includes a more open capital account. The neoclassical model suggests that
nancial openness will increase FDI inows (Kose et al., 2004); however, this might not be
2See Stiglitz (2000) for a further development of this argument.
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the case if the neoclassical assumptions of perfect information and competitive markets are
relaxed. Developing economies, with their weaknancial markets, lack of transparency,
and propensity to large exchange rate movements, might be particularly susceptible to
perverse impacts of nancial openness, and in particular to low levels of cross-border M&As.
Therefore, one of the goals of this paper is to examine macroeconomic data to investigate the
relationship between nancial openness policies and the inows of foreign direct investment
(as measured by mergers and acquisitions).
By using a large dataset for the period 1986-2005, we analyze nancial openness in
explaining FDI and more specically the number of cross-border mergers and acquisition
(M&A) for 210 acquiring countries and 210 target countries. The results of our gravity
model t the data well, and these results suggest that nancial openness increases M&A
activity; that is, a one standard deviation increase in nancial openness implies (for those
that are active in M&As) a 10% increase in the number of expected M&A deals for the
target country, and a 12% increase in M&A activity for the acquiring country. Moreover,
nancial openness reduces the probability of remaining inactive in M&As by 21% for the
acquirer and by 10% for the target. In addition, our results indicate that M&A activity
tends to cluster in particular "close-by" locations. That is, M&A activity depends on a
countries past ows of FDI; for example, countries that have been successful in attracting
M&As in the past are more likely to do so in the future (the wave e¤ect). Last but not
least, the results also suggest that several broad categories of factors inuence cross-border
M&As. These are a countriesmacroeconomic performance, the investment environment,
the quality of institutions and global factors.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 elaborates on some of the key issues that
will be considered, and describes some of the underlying theoretical background. Section
3 describes the data and the econometric methodology. Section 4 discusses the empirical
results of our benchmark specication, while section 5 augments our benchmark model and
conducts various sensitivity analysis. Last but not least, section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2.2 Motivation and Theoretical Background
During the past thirty years, foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown in importance
(especially for developing economies), especially for a select few being able to attract FDI
in larger amounts. As we know, theoretical FDI models identify a number of mechanisms
through which FDI can be valuable to an economy. However, empirically, the literature has
lagged behind and has had tremendous di¢ culty identifying these mechanisms in practice
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(see Durham, 2004; Li and Liu, 2005). The consensus that is slowly emerging is that FDI is
benecial when compared to other types of capital inows, though there are economists who
maintain that even this benecial e¤ect is limited. Additional research has been done to
identify features that are "unique" to FDI, such as its relative durability and/or the positive
spillovers that it can generate (see Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Fernadez-Arias and Montiel,
1996; Sarno and Taylor, 1999).
Despite these mixed academic conclusions, most economies continue to implement
policies in order to encourage more FDI inows. Multilateral organizations such as the
OECD, the WTO, and the IMF have also been vocal supporters of FDI promotion policies,
and one of their more common prescriptions within this context is the liberalization of the
capital account. Hitherto, and perhaps quite surprisingly, little empirical work has been done
to examine the link between nancial openness and FDI inows, and especially the link with
cross-border M&As. Table 1 presents trends in FDI inows (over the last 25 years), both as
a percentage of GDP and as a percentage of xed capital formation.3 A close examination
of Table 1 reveals the worldwide increase in the importance of FDI throughout the 1980s
and 1990s, with FDI inows after the turn of the century (i.e. in 2000) increasing several
times from the level experienced during the 1980s. However, it is also worth pointing out
that several regions of the world (i.e. Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin American and Caribbean,
and East Asia & Pacic), net FDI ows peaked in 1995-1999 period.
3Fixed capital formation measures net new investment in the "domestic" economy in xed capital assets
during an accounting period (WDI, 2006).
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Table 2.1: World Distibution of FDI
FDI net inows (% of GDP)
1980-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 1980-2004
World 0.86 3.32 3.58 2.65 1.35
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.07 0.72 2.61 2.54 1.28
South Asia 0.09 0.23 0.68 0.86 0.39
M. East & N. Africa 0.46 0.88 0.55 1.04 0.68
L. America & Caribbean 0.80 1.17 3.26 3.20 1.84
European Monetary U. 0.54 0.98 2.19 5.07 1.86
Europe & Central Asia 0.07 0.49 2.31 3.09 1.24
East Asia & Pacic 0.74 2.89 3.81 2.64 2.16
USA 0.77 0.60 1.68 1.45 1.05
FDI as % of Fixed Capital Formation
1980-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 1980-2004
World 2.63 3.67 8.96 13.11 5.91
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.18 4.05 11.01 16.10 7.11
South Asia 0.43 1.06 3.12 3.71 1.75
M. East & N. Africa 1.81 2.81 2.02 3.86 2.46
L. America & Caribbean 3.69 6.00 16.20 16.58 9.23
European Monetary U. 2.45 4.51 10.60 24.44 8.89
Europe & Central Asia N/A 1.87 10.68 15.18 8.68
East Asia & Pacic 2.67 8.94 11.99 8.27 6.91
USA 4.01 3.53 8.85 8.22 5.62
Source: WDI 2006
2.2.1 M&A and FDI
Theoretical developments in international economics are sometimes motivated by empirical
ndings. The new trade theory, for example, was to a large extent inspired by empirical
work on intra-industry trade (Neary, 2004), and this also holds for the recent outburst of
research on foreign direct investment (FDI) as one of the driving forces behind the current
wave of globalization. Many economists have noted that FDI grows much faster than mer-
chandise trade (see for example Navaretti and Venables, 2004), which leads to a stylized fact
in search of an explanation. For years, economists have relied upon the OLI-categorization
scheme (see Dunning, 1993) in order to understand the underlying reasons behind a rms
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decision to engage in FDI. However, and notwithstanding its usefulness vis-à-vis FDI, a
"categorization scheme" is not a model. Therefore, new theories are being developed in
which the rms decision to engage in FDI is determined in a full-edged micro-economic
model.
Figure 2.1: Distribution of di¤erent types of FDI
Interestingly, looking at FDI as a broad category obscures the fact that most FDI is in
the form of cross-border mergers & acquisitions. Figure 2.14 shows a recent decomposition
of FDI, from which it is clear that M&As constitute the bulk of FDI; whereas greeneld FDI
is considerably less important. The main di¤erence between these two forms of investments
is that in an M&A control of assets and operations is transferred from a local to a foreign
company, the former becoming an a¢ liate of the latter(UNCTAD, 2000), and only recently
have models in international economics been developed that allow us to understand M&As
(Neary, 2004). Nearys model takes the standard explanations for M&As a step further;
that is, his model combines general-equilibrium trade theory with imperfect markets and
strategic behavior between rms. A moments thought will show that this is di¢ cult, since
pricing decisions of large rms not only directly a¤ect prots, but their market (pricing)
behavior also a¤ects national income and the real income of their customers; furthermore,
large rms can also inuence factor prices. All of these e¤ects combined imply that rms
have to . . . calculate the full general equilibrium of the whole economy in making decisions
(Neary, 2003).
4Source is van Marrewijk (2007); 78%-22% in value terms, other % in # of deals.
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Nearys (2003) General Oligopolistic Equilibrium (GOLE) model avoids some of the
standard drawbacks of modeling oligopolistic markets, while it simultaneously allows for
strategic interaction between rms. Interestingly, by allowing for M&As in his model, one
can derive straightforward conjectures on cross-border M&As; that is, rms that have a cost
advantage have an incentive to merge or acquire a weaker rm. If these cost di¤erences are
felt economy-wide, then the model explains cross-border M&As. Furthermore, the model
also explains the stylized fact of M&A waves; that is, an initial M&A makes the next one
more attractive, which leads to more M&As (i.e. waves).
Figure 2.2: Cross-border M&As; # of deals, percent of total, 2000-2005
Usually two motives are mentioned to explain M&As: (1) a market seeking or strategic
motive, and (2) an e¢ ciency motive (i.e. a factor cost motive); however, an explanation of
cross-border M&As also has to explain the cross-border part of the deals, and in this light,
trade theory suggests that comparative advantage could be included in full explanations
of M&As (see Neary, 2004; Brakman et al., 2008b). A di¤erent, and equally novel line of
research in international economics seeks to understand the conditions under which rms
decide to locate (part of) their production abroad, that is, through an o¤-shoring decision
(see Navaretti and Venables, 2004; Helpman, 2006). When rms decide to o¤-shore, some
rms do so under the FDI umbrella, while other rms go for straight outsourcing. The down-
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Figure 2.3: International Trade Flows; percent of total ows
side of this literature, and in contrast to the empirical relevance illustrated in Figure 2.1,
is that the role of cross-border M&As is largely ignored. The World Bank identies seven
global regions, namely (i) East Asia and Pacic (EAP; including China and Indonesia), (ii)
(East) Europe and Central Asia (ECA; including Russia and Turkey), (iii) Latin America
and the Caribbean (LAC; including Brazil and Mexico), (iv) Middle East and North Africa
(MNA; including Egypt), (v) South Asia (SAS; including India), (vi) Sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA; including Nigeria and South Africa), and (vii) the high-income countries. Following
van Marrewijk (2002, 2007) we subdivide the group of high-income countries into three
subgroups, namely North America (NAm), Western Europe (EUR), and AustralAsia (AAs,
including Japan and Australia), leading to a total of nine global regions.
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Table 2.2: Regional Distribution of Cross-border Mergers, 2000-2005 percent of total
a. Number of deals (% of total)
from AAS EAP ECA EUR LAC MNA NAM SAS SSA sum
AAS 5.7 2.7 0.1 1.8 0.1 0.0 2.2 0.4 0.1 13.1
EAP 0.7 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 2.2
ECA 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.4
EUR 2.5 1.3 3.4 26.5 2.6 0.4 9.7 0.8 0.6 47.8
LAC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.6 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 2.1
MNA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
NAM 3.1 1.2 0.8 11.2 2.1 0.1 12.1 0.4 0.3 31.2
SAS 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.9
SSA 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 1.2
sum 12.2 6.3 5.5 40.6 6.6 0.6 25.0 2.0 1.3 100
b. Value of deals in (constant 2005 dollars, % of total)
from AAS EAP ECA EUR LAC MNA NAM SAS SSA sum
AAS 3.0 1.5 0.0 1.9 0.1 0.0 2.1 0.1 0.0 8.7
EAP 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.0
ECA 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
EUR 2.0 0.5 2.2 38.1 2.7 0.3 15.8 0.2 0.6 62.4
LAC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 1.5
MNA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4
NAM 1.8 0.4 0.4 10.5 1.2 0.0 9.9 0.1 0.1 24.3
SAS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2
SSA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.4
sum 7.1 2.9 3.5 51.3 5.0 0.4 28.6 0.4 0.9 100
c. Ratio of value of deals (% of total) to number of deals (% of total)
AAS EAP ECA EUR LAC MNA NAM SAS SSA sum
AAS 0.5 0.6 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.1 1.0 0.2 0.2 0.7
EAP 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.9 0.3 5.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4
ECA 0.7 na 0.8 0.6 na 0.2 0.4 na 1.3 0.7
EUR 0.8 0.4 0.6 1.4 1.0 0.8 1.6 0.2 1.1 1.3
LAC na 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.2 1.6 na na 0.7
MNA 3.7 na na 6.3 na 0.4 na 0.2 0.1 2.6
NAM 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.8
SAS 0.2 0.1 1.8 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.3
SSA 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.4
sum 0.6 0.5 0.6 1.3 0.8 0.7 1.1 0.2 0.7 1
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Focussing our attention on intra (inter)-regional M&As gives us an indication of the
extent to which di¤erent global regions interact with one another. Figure 2.2 graphically
depicts the intra (inter)-regional cross-border connections for the most recent ve-year period
(2001-2005) in our sample, rounded to the nearest integer; while Table 2.2 shows the regional
distribution. Since there are 9 global regions (as classied by the World Bank) there are
81 di¤erent inter-regional connections. Only 22 of these are actually shown in Figure 2.2
because the remaining 59 are rounded to 0 per cent. First, we note that by far the largest
inter-regional M&As are from North America to Western Europe (11 per cent of the total),
and vice versa (10 per cent of the total). Together these two regions account for almost
60 per cent of all M&A activity (including intra-regional activity) and clearly dwarf the
importance of all other inter(intra)-regional connections. Second, we note that Western
Europe is substantially buying up rms in Eastern Europe (3 per cent), which highlights a
common border e¤ect. Third, M&A activity toward East Asia and the Pacic is still rather
small, certainly compared to the attention this receives in the popular press. Fourth, it is
quite interesting to note that Western Europe is the only global region with connections
to all other regions. Fifth, and nally, the only region that is completely left out of M&A
activity is the middle east and north Africa. By looking closer at panel C of Table 2.2,
we notice that a ratio bigger than 1 implies that the value of M&As is larger than the
number of deals, and we can discern this pattern for regions (countries) that are "far" from
each other. A ratio smaller than 1 implies a pattern for countries that are "close" to each
other (e.g. the diagonal is smaller than 1, except for EUR-EUR). Therefore, it seems safe
to conclude with the observation that indeed most M&A activity takes place between the
relatively wealthy, and the more developed and stable parts of the world; between economies
that possess better institutions, and a less uncertain business environment. In other words,
M&As take place between the parts of the world that are closer together (i.e. countries of
a feather ock together).
2.2.2 International Capital Flows & FDI
What drives international capital ows and what explicates their cyclicality is a question
of utmost importance for both academics and policymakers. Early contributions to this
literature analyzed pull and push factors in total capital ows (see Agénor, 1998),
stressing the important role of U.S. interest rates as a push factor (see also Fernadez-
Arias and Montiel, 1996; Calvo et al., 1996). A more recent strand of literature has focused
on the "push" and "pull" factors of specic types of capital, namely portfolio equity (Gri¢ n
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et al., 2004), and FDI (Albuquerque et al., 2005). In particular, Albuquerque et al. (2005)
emphasize the increasing importance of a global factor (a correlated push factor) in driving
FDI. Our paper aims to contribute to this literature by looking in more detail to M&As,
which are by far the most important component of FDI (see Figure 2.1).
Evenett (2004) presents evidence that the value of American M&As directed abroad
depends on the targets GDP, the distance from the United States, the targets corporate
tax rate, the targets average tari¤ rate, and whether the target was once a British colony
(Evenett used this dummy to proxy for the use of a common-law system, and whether
business costs were minimized by using English as a business language). In addition, Evenett
(2004) also nds that the presence of merger review laws in the target economy actually
reduces the amount of American M&As received. In a related study, Feliciano and Lipsey
(2002) examine FDI into the United States (for 50 sectors over the period 1980-1990).
By using the share of U.S. corporate assets acquired by non-US rms and the share of
U.S. corporate assets as reported by new foreign ventures. They nd that a strong U.S.
dollar discourages M&As, whereas the exchange rate does not play a role vis-à-vis foreign
investment in new establishments. Moreover, they nd that higher stock prices in the US
exert a stronger positive inuence vis-à-vis foreign investment in new establishments than
on foreign acquisitions; however, acquisitions and establishments of new rms tend to occur
in periods of high growth in the United States. More recently, Rossi and Volpin (2004),
with reference to location-specic determinants of international M&A activity, nd that
rms in countries with weaker investor protection are more likely to be acquired than those
in countries with stronger investor protection, whereas acquirersare more likely to come
from countries that possess strong investor protection. They also nd that countries with
more concentrated ownershipexperience more M&As (including international M&As).
2.3 Data & Econometric Methodology
Our overview of the structure and developments of cross-border M&As is based on Thom-
sons Global Mergers and Acquisitions database, which provides the best and most exten-
sive data source for M&As to date. Thompson gathers information on M&As exceeding
one million US dollars. Our Thompson data set begins in 1979 and ends in 2006; however,
Thomsonsinitial focus was on American M&As, implying that systematic M&A data for
almost all countries is available since 1986. Therefore, in presenting the data we focus on
the period 1986 2005.
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2.3.1 Cross-border M&As: basic characteristics
We collected information on all completed / unconditional cross-border M&As with a deal
value of at least $10 million. In the period 1986 2005 this provided us with 27,118 cross-
border M&As (see the overview in Table 2.3 and Figure 2.4 for the distribution). Moreover,
Table 2.4 shows the countries that are most active in the merger and acquisition game.
Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics; value in constant 2005 (million) dollars
Mean 292:1 Kurtosis 7731
Median 61:5 Skewness 71:5
Std. Dev 1887 Minimum 10:0
Obs 27; 118 Maximum 225; 454
Table 2.4: Most Active Countries; number of deals
Most Active Acquirers Most Active Targets
Country No. of deals % Country No. of deals %
USA 6; 921 25:5 USA 6; 218 22:9
UK 4; 576 16:9 UK 3; 386 12:5
Canada 1; 600 5:1 France 1; 374 5:1
France 1; 383 5:9 Canada 1; 341 4:9
Germany 1; 160 4:3 Germany 1; 273 4:7
Australia 994 3:7 Australia 1; 235 4:6
Japan 956 2:3 Spain 784 2:9
Netherlands 907 3:3 Netherlands 689 2:5
Hong Kong 737 2:2 Italy 682 2:5
Sweden 677 2:7 Hong Kong 613 2:3
Sum 19; 911 71:9 Sum 17; 595 64:9
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Figure 2.4: Frequency Distribution of cross-border M&As (1986-2005)
2.3.2 Merger Waves
A historical look at the data reveals a remarkable characteristic of M&As. Figure 2.5 depicts
the evolution of all cross-border M&As over the last twenty years, both measured as the
number of deals and the value of deals (in constant 2005 $ bn., using the US GDP deator).
Clearly, there is substantial variation over time, with periods of rapid increase followed by
periods of rapid decline. Five merger waves have been identied during the 20th century,
three of which are recent (Andrade et al., 2001). The 3rd wave took place in the late 1960-
early 1970s; the 4th wave ran from about the mid 1980s until 1990; the 5th wave started
around 1995 and ended in 2000 with the collapse of the new economy. However, Figure
2.5 also shows that a subsequent (still ongoing) 6th merger wave started around 2003.
While substantial research has been devoted to understanding what drives U.S. domestic
merger waves (see Evenett, 2004), not much has been done to understand the driving forces
underlying the global (i.e. cross-border) merger waves that have taken place over the past few
decades. The literature classies merger waves into three categories: neoclassical, strategic
and mis-valuation. Neoclassical theories emphasize the role of deregulatory and technological
shocks at the industry level. These theories predict that, in an environment with fully
rational agents, industry level shocks lead to a reallocation of capital or ownership from
lower to higher productivity rms, thus generating a merger wave (Jovanovic and Rousseau,
2002). Strategic theories (see Toxvaerd, 2007), focus on the relative scarcity of targets with
a relationship to the acquirers. That is, acquirers compete (imperfectly) over time for scarce
targets, thus leading to an equilibrium in which all the potential acquirers bid for targets
26 CHAPTER 2 COUNTRIES OF A FEATHER FLOCK TOGETHER...
Figure 2.5: Cross-Border M&As 1986-2005; # of deals (LHS) and value of deals (billion
constant 2005$, RHS)
simultaneously. Mis-valuation theories focus the perception of the value of the traded assets
by the agents (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Rhodes-Krop and Viswanathan, 2004).
Recent empirical work seems to point to the relevance of neoclassical theories to explain
merger waves. For example, Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Harford (2005) argue that
industry-specic shocks lead to industry waves. Harford (2005) shows that industry merger
waves are a necessary but not a su¢ cient condition to induce an aggregate merger wave;
that is a macroeconomic factor must be at play. Building on recent work on capital reallo-
cation and liquidity by Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006), Harford (2005) shows that a proxy for
high liquidity - low cost of capitalreallocation correlates strongly with aggregate merger
waves. Although the empirical literature has long recognized the importance of the loca-
tion determinants of FDI ows across countries, it has largely ignored the determinants
of cross-border FDI ows through M&As. For example, Gugler et al. (2003) argue that
merger waves can be understood if one acknowledges that M&As do not boost e¢ ciency
and hence do not increase shareholderswealth. Instead, they nd that M&A waves are
best understood as the result of overvalued shares and managerial discretion. For the case
of the USA and restricting their sample to rms that are publicly traded, Andrade et al.
(2001) show that with each merger wave the value of the M&A deals (measured by rms
market capitalization) increases strongly.
During the 5th merger wave, European rms engaged in a number of (mega) M&As
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with the cross-border take-over of Mannesmann (Germany) by Vodafone (UK) for $203bn.
in 1999-2000, as to date the largest M&A. It turns out that especially this part of M&A
waves is di¢ cult to model. First of all, an M&A wave must start at some point in time; that
is, a reduction of competition makes an M&A protable, which implies that it is rational to
wait for other M&As to "go rst" because this reduces competition and makes the next M&A
more protable than the rst one. Second, an M&A wave must stop at some point, and
both elements should be incorporated into a full M&A model. Luckily for current research,
Neary (2007) does just that: waves have to start at some point in time or else M&A prots
are foregone. Moreover, since it is a general equilibrium model, the excess supply on the
labor market following an M&A (lower wages resulting in higher prots) nally stop the
wave.
Figure 2.6: Merger and Acquisition Waves
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Therefore, to get an indication of M&A waves, we let Ms;ij denote the number of M&As
in the S year period immediately preceding time t. We denote their sum by Mt k, that is
Mt k =
t kP
s=t 1
P
ij
Ms;ij. Figure 2.6 depicts the evolution over time of Mt 1, and Mt 2; that
is, the number of M&As in the previous one, and two years. Figure 2.6 conrms that there
have been two clear waves in the 1990s; one around 1990-1991, and the other one around
1999-2000. Furthermore, the gure also shows that there is an ongoing third wave, which
started around 2003 as previously mentioned.
2.3.3 Financial Openness (Chinn-Ito Index)
The literature has long recognized that it is remarkably di¢ cult to gauge the degree of the
openness of the capital account (see Eichengreen, 2001; Edison et al., 2004). As Chinn and
Ito (2005) argue, although there has been considerable e¤ort aimed at capturing the extent
and intensity of capital account controls, the consensus in the literature is that any such
measures fail to capture (in its entirety) the complexity of capital controls for a number
of reasons5. First, usual measures of measuring capital controls (or nancial openness)
fail to account for the intensity of capital controls, where the most prominent example of
such measures include dummy variables based upon the IMFs Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Second, the IMF dummy variables
are too aggregated to illustrate the complexity of actual capital controls (see Edison et al.
2004); that is, capital controls can di¤er depending on the direction of capital ows as well
as the type of nancial transactions targeted. Thirdly, it is almost impossible to distinguish
between de jure and de facto controls on capital transactions, since capital control policies
are often implemented without explicit policy goals to control the volume and/or type of
capital ows. On the other hand, the private sector has the incentive to circumvent any
capital account controls (and in many occasions they succeed); thereby cancelling out the
expected e¤ect of this type of regulation (Edwards, 1999). Therefore, researchers often talk
about nancial integration among economies and interpret it as de facto restrictions on
capital transactions (Chinn and Ito, 2005).
In the research herein, we rely on the nancial liberalization index developed by Chinn
and Ito (2002). This index is the rst principle component of the four IMF binary variables
discussed above. One of the qualities of their index is that it measures the intensity of
capital controls insofar as the intensity is correlated with the existence of other restrictions
5See Edison and Warnock (2001), Edwards (2001), and Edison et al. (2004) for an extension of this way
of thinking, and for discussions and comparisons of various measures on capital account controls.
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on international transactions (Chinn and Ito, 2005). By the nature of its construction, the
Chinn-Ito index captures the depth of capital controls, because it does not directly refer
to the severity of restrictions on cross-border transactions, but to the existence of di¤erent
types of limitations; accordingly, this ability to measure the extensiveness of capital controls
is a good proxy for the intensity of capital controls (Chinn and Ito, 2005)6. Another merit
of this index is its wide coverage of more than 150 countries for the period 1970 through
2005 (see Chinn and Ito 2005 for a description of their index).
2.3.4 Additional Variables
FDI may be a substitute or a complement to trade in goods; that is FDI can act as a
substitute for trade ows because of trade costs, regardless of whether they are due to
transport costs or tari¤s.7 However, a stylized fact is that FDI and trade are positively
correlated in the industrial world.8 Therefore, if cross-border M&As acts as a substitute
for trade, then everything else equal, we would expect a positive coe¢ cient for the distance
between two countries. Moreover, the cost of investment may also increase with distance
(e.g. due to information asymmetries), so one might also nd a negative coe¢ cient for the
distance variable, implying complementarity betweenM&As and trade. The intuition behind
the distance variable implies that the greater the distance between two economies makes
managing foreign "subsidiaries" or acquisitions more di¢ cult (i.e. costly), and therefore,
detracts from the desirability of buying or merging with that nations rms. We will also
include the square of the distance, in order to measure the speed at which these "transport"
costs are increasing or decreasing.
Information costs can also play a role for the investment decision of rms. In this light,
Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) provide a model to explain the Feldstein and Horioka (1980)
puzzle; their model relies on the existence of asymmetric information between investors
in di¤erent countries, albeit by concentrating on greeneld investment rather than M&As.
6The Quinn (1997) index as a measure of the intensity of capital controls. The Quinn index is a composite
measure of nancial regulation that ranges from 0 to 14, with 14 representing the least regulated and most
open regime. According to Chin and Ito (2005), the correlation between the Quinn index and their index is
83.7%, suggesting that their index proxies the intensity of capital controls.
7See Mundell (1957) for early work adressing the relationship between trade and foreign investment in
the presence of trade barriers. Also see Markusen (1995) for a survey on multinational enterprises, where
economies of scale, rm-specic capital and other considerations are essential to a rms investment decision.
8See Baldwin and Ottaviano (2001) who show that rms engage in both intra-industry FDI and intra-
industry trade at the same time. Markusen (1997) provides "knowledge-capital" models, which allow for
horizontal and vertical integration of rms accross countries in the presence of trade costs among other
factors.
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More recent theoretical work by Martin and Rey (2004) shows the importance of information
costs in hindering cross-border asset ows, while Portes and Rey (2005) provide empirical
evidence for this theory by examining gross bilateral equity ows using a gravity model.
De Ménil (1999) also recognizes the importance of information costs in analyzing bilateral
FDI ows in a gravity framework, where he uses distance as a proxy for information costs.
We also consider a common language and common border as potential factors for reducing
the costs of doing business. The potential importance of language as a contributor to
trade links has several foundations, each of which is linked to some aspect of the reasoning
behind the importance of national border e¤ects. Perhaps the simplest argument is based
on transaction costs, with communication across language barriers being more expensive,
thus increasing the economic distance between potential trading partners not sharing a
language. Moreover, we also include a colony variable to proxy for cultural distance as well
as similarities in jurisprudence, implying intimate knowledge of the target economy, thereby
reducing business costs. Last but not least, we use GDP and GDP per capita data from
Angus Maddison, where GDP simply captures the size of the potential market (e.g. more
rms are available as potential M&A targets), and GDP per capita captures how rich that
particular market is, in addition to being a proxy for the quality of institutions and good
policies. The data for language, common border and colony are taken from CEPII.9
2.3.5 Empirical Procedure
We focus attention on the determinants of the number of bilateral cross-border M&As. As
this is a count variable, the rst empirical candidates for our estimation procedure are the
Poisson Regression Model (PRM) and the Negative Binomial Regression Model (NBRM).
The PRM extends the Poisson distribution by allowing for observed heterogeneity, that is
observation i is drawn from a Poisson distribution with mean , which is estimated from ob-
served characteristics xi as:10 i = E(mi j xi) = exp(xi) . The Poisson distribution imposes
the restriction that the mean be equal to the variance, that is E(mi j xi) = var(mi j xi).
In practice, the PRM rarely ts in most empirical studies due to overdispersion, indicating
that the variance exceeds the expected value. The NBRM addresses this issue by adding a
parameter reecting unobserved heterogeneity among observations: ei = exp(xi)i, where
the uncorrelated disturbance term i has mean 1 and is drawn from a gamma distribution.
We thus have: E(ei) = exp(xi), such that the PRM and the NBRM have the same mean
9See appendix B for descriptive statistics of all the variables used in this paper.
10Taking the exponential of xi forces i to be positive.
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structure.
Since E(mi j xi) = exp(xi) for both the PRM and the NBRM, they are examples of
the constant-elasticitymodels as discussed in Silva and Tenreyro (2006) with respect to
the gravity model. The essence of the model is as follows: if Tij is the ow from country i
to country j, Dij is a measure of the bilateral distance between the two countries, and Yi
and Yj are their respective income levels, a basic specication explaining the name gravity
equation is: Tij = 0Y
1
i Y
2
j =D

ij. If we add a disturbance term and control variables and
all observations are positive, this equation can be estimated by log-linearizing it and using
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). However, this approach is problematic because it is not
dened for observations with zeroows (which are abundant in trade ows and occur, as
we have seen, very frequently in M&A ows), which leads to biased and ine¢ cient estimates
when ignored as the zeros are not randomly distributed.
To overcome the zero-ow problem, Silva and Tenreyro (2006) suggest to incorporate
them directly in the estimation procedure simply by using the PRM instead of log-linearizing.
However, given that the PRM assumes overdispersion, then the next step is to use the NBRM
to take account of the usual overdispersion problem. Although we follow this procedure in
principle, theoretical considerations suggest to make additional modications. For trade
ows, Helpman et al. (2008) develop a theoretical model with heterogeneous rms that
predicts positive as well as zero trade ows in a generalized gravity equation. They propose
a two-stage estimation procedure that uses a selection equation into trade partners in the
rst stage and a trade ow equation in the second.11 The distinction of two di¤erent types
of groups is similar in spirit to the analysis of sample selection and specication error(see
Heckman, 1974).
Returning to FDI ows in general and M&As in particular, the empirical tradition to
explain FDI ows using gravity models is more recent, less extensive, and less abundant.
Nonetheless, Navaretti and Venables (2004) conclude: the cross-country pattern of FDI is
quite well approximated by the gravityrelationship,while Blonigen et al. (2007) argue
that: a gravity specication .. is arguably the most widely used empirical specica-
tion of FDI.Unlike its trade counterpart, we are only aware of one theoretical foundation
for the use of gravity models in FDI, provided recently by Bersgtrand and Egger (2007)
in a three-factor model, who conclude (p. 281): bilateral trade, FAS, and FDI owseco-
nomic determinants should be well-approximatedby gravity equations  yet not precisely
11To implement their estimator, one needs to nd an appropriate exclusion restriction for identication
of the second stage equation, which can be quite di¢ cult.
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the same gravity relationships.12 In their Markusen (2002) based model in which scale
economies (level e¤ects) play a key role, the trade and FDI ows depend on the endogenously
determined distribution of national rms, horizontal multinationals, and vertical multina-
tionals. Depending on the circumstances, there may be no bilateral FDI ows. Similarly, in
the Neary (2007) M&A context explaining the relationships between comparative advantage
and merger waves, there are no M&A ows between countries unless specic circumstances
hold, as discussed in Brakman et al. (2008b), in a heterogeneous rm context.13
The above discussion indicates that we should distinguish between two groups of obser-
vations to adequately deal with the zero-ow problem (in our M&A setting about 98 percent
of the total number of observations). This can be done in an empirically exible way by
using a zero-inated approach (see Lambert, 1992)14. The zero-inated model assumes that
there are two latent groups of observations on cross-border bilateral M&As. An observation
in the (always 0) Passive Group has an outcome of 0 with a probability of 1. A country in
the (potentially) Active Group might have a zero outcome, but there is a positive proba-
bility that there is a non-zero outcome. This process is developed in two stages: (i) model
membership into the latent groups (Active or Passive) and (ii) model counts for those in
the Active Group.
 Ad (i). Latent group membership. Let yi be a binary indicator of membership in the
Passive Group (yi = p) or the Active Group (yi = a) for observation i. As group
membership is not directly observable but depends on observable characteristics zi, it
can be empirically estimated using a binary regression model, such as logit or probit.
By denition, the count for an observation from the Passive Group is zero.
 Ad (ii) Counts for the active group. Given that an observation is from the Active
Group, we can model the number of M&As using a count model based on the observed
characteristics xi.15
The above discussion identies four main count models, namely PRM, NBRM, Zero-
Inated Poisson (ZIP), and Zero-Inated Negative Binomial (ZINB), which raises the ques-
12FAS = Foreign A¢ liate Sales
13Both countries must be active in a sector and it must be protable to take over another rm; roughly
translated this means di¤erences in comparative advantage must not be too large nor too small.
14This avoids the di¢ culty of trying to nd an appropriate exclusion restriction (Helpman et al, 2007).
15The characteristics xi need not be the same as the characteristics zi. Using the PRM in combination
with stage (i) results in the Zero-Inated Poisson model. Using the NBRM in combination with stage (i)
results in the Zero-Inated Negative Binomial model. Note that the outcome can be zero even though it is
an observation from the Active Group.
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Figure 2.7: Model Framework
tion of empirical model selection.16 The Vuong (1989) test can be used for selection of
non-nested models, and in our case it provides overwhelming support in favour of the zero
inated negative binomial model. As summarized in Figure 2.7, the discussion below there-
fore only reports the Zero Inated Negative Binomial (ZINB) estimates, using a logit binary
regression model in the rst stage.
2.4 Results
Part of our economic interpretation of the estimated coe¢ cients below is based on the
odds ratio and the incidence rate ratio. For the rst stage of the estimation procedure, let
Pr(yi = p j zi)=Pr(yi = a j zi) be the odds of a passive outcome versus an active one in the
logit model. Suppose b is the estimated coe¢ cient for some variable, and  the standard
deviation for non-dummy variables (respectively, a unit change for dummy variables). Then
eb is the odds ratio, that is the expected factor change in the odds of a passive outcome for
a -size change in the variable in question, holding all other variables constant. Note that
the odds ratio is multiplicative, so the magnitude of positive and negative e¤ects should be
compared using the inverse (that is, a 50 percent decline is comparable in magnitude to a
100 percent increase). For the second (negative binomial) stage of the procedure, we report
16Six if we include the distinction between using probit and logit at the rst stage of the zero inated
models; as the logit specication performed better we restrict attention to this possibility, which has the
added benet of using the odds ratio for economic interpretation.
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100(eb 1) which, similarly denotes the percentage change in the expected count for a -size
change in the variable in question, holding all other variables constant. In addition, at the
second stage the estimated coe¢ cients of the variables measured in natural logarithms can
be interpreted as elasticities.
Table 2.5 reports the estimation results for two basic specications and our baseline case.
The Basic I specication ignores waves and the impact of nancial openness but includes
time xed e¤ects. It thus has the main gravity equation ingredients at both stages of the
estimation procedure, namely economic size of acquirer and target (as measured by GDP),
economic development of acquirer and target (as measured by per capita income), distance
between acquirer and target, and the main dummy control variables (common language,
colony, and common border). The Basic II specication replaces the (serially correlated)
time xed e¤ects by wave variables. This has little impact on any of the estimated coe¢ cients
and the benet of providing an economic interpretation for the serial correlation. Moreover,
if we include time xed e¤ects and the wave variables, none of the time xed e¤ects are
statistically signicant. Since M&As are the main ingredients of FDI ows, and since there
has been a long discussion on the impact of nancial openness for the ability of countries to
successfully attract FDI ows, the third, baseline specication analyses in detail the impact
of nancial openness for acquirer and target on the global M&A ows. As can be concluded
from Table 2.5, the inclusion of the nancial openness variables has relatively mild, but
non-negligible e¤ects on the impact of the other (standard) variables of the gravity equation
listed in the Basic I and Basic II specications. The discussion below therefore restricts
attention to the economic e¤ects of the baseline specication.
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Table 2.5: Basic and Baseline Regression Results (Zero-Inated Negative Binomial)
basic I irrI basic II irrII base case irrbc StdDev
Active, negative binomial
LnGDPacq 0.522  172 0.517  169 0.480  160 1.99
LnGDPtar 0.631  236 0.612  222 0.631  252 1.99
LnGDPpcacq 0.474  71 0.382  54 0.489  77 1.17
LnGDPpctar 0.741  131 0.714  125 0.678  120 1.17
LnDistij -0.501  -35 -0.500  -35 -0.526  -36 0.85
Financial Openness
Acquirer 0.072  12 1.61
Target 0.062  10 1.61
wave1 0.3  18 0.2  13 0.63
wave2 0.06  8 0.06  8 1.24
Common Languagez 0.511  67 0.507  66 0.564  76 0.38
Colonyz 0.761  114 0.693  100 0.790  120 0.11
Common Borderz -0.117  -11 -0.010  -9 -0.115  -11 0.13
Passive, logit
LnGDPacq -0.463  -59 -0.460  -59 -0.498  -63 1.99
LnGDPtar -0.385  -52 -0.403  -54 -0.375  -53 1.99
LnGDPpcacq -1.383  -79 -1.382  -79 -1.267  -77 1.17
LnGDPpctar -0.071 -0.096 -0.062 1.17
LnDistij 0.885  113 0.873  111 0.889  113 0.85
Financial Openness
Acquirer -0.148  -21 1.61
Target -0.062  -10 1.61
Common Languagez -1.053  -65 -1.014  -64 -1.129  -68 0.38
Colonyz -1.046  -65 -1.125  -68 -0.963  -62 0.11
Common Borderz -1.891  -85 -1.723  -82 -1.536  -79 0.13
# of obs 380,492 345,646 255,468
Nonzero obs 5868 5710 5290
McFadden adj. R2 0.461 0.456 0.453
Notes: 1) Dependent variable is # of deals; 2) *, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% sig. levels
3) irr = 100 [exp(*StdDev)-1] = % change in expected count for StdDev increase in X
4) z the irr is calculated as 100[exp()-1] for a discrete change of 0 to 1
5) StdDev = standard deviation of X
6) Basic 1 regression includes time xed-e¤ects (no waves)
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2.4.1 Passive Group (rst stage, logit)
The bottom part of Table 2.5 discriminates as to whether an observation belongs to the
Passive Group (always 0) or the Active Group (potentially positive). The estimates can be
interpreted as in a standard logit model, determining the probability that the observation
should be classied in the Passive Group. With the exception of the targets per capita
GDP (which is not signicant), all included variables are important for the Passive Group
Active Group classication. We list the impact of the signicant variables in decreasing
order of economic magnitude, rst for the continuous variables and then for the dummy
control variables.17
In order of magnitude, an observation is more likely to belong to the Passive Group:
1. The lower the acquirers development level as measured by GDP per capita.
2. The smaller the acquirers market size as measured by total GDP.
3. The greater the distance to a potential target country.
4. The smaller the targets market size as measured by total GDP.
5. The higher the acquirers nancial openness.
6. The higher the targets nancial openness.
Similarly, for the dummy control variables, in order of magnitude an observation is less
likely to belong to the Passive Group if:
1. The two countries share a common border.
2. The two countries share a common language.
3. The two countries share a colonial history.
Evidently, to become active in the global M&A game it is crucial to have a su¢ ciently
high level of development as measured by per capita GDP or to share a common border.
Other important economic factors for becoming active are the total size of both the acquirers
and targets market (positively), the distance to potential targets (negatively), and common
language or colonial history (the last two indicate mutual knowledge of each others markets
and therefore lower costs of interaction). The negative impact of distance and the positive
17Recall that the magnitude of positive and negative e¤ects should be compared using the inverse.
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inuence of sharing a common border on the probability of becoming active appear to be
in contrast to the jumping argument. Part of this argument, however, is restored when we
discuss the size of M&A ows for the Active Group (see below). The impact of imposing
restrictions on capital ows (exchange controls, quantitative restrictions, multiple exchange
rates, or taxes) is detrimental to the probability of engaging in M&As, either as an acquirer
or a target; therefore, the probability that an observation belongs to the Passive Group
decreases if the nancial openness variable for acquirer or target increases. The economic
importance of nancial openness for acquirer and target is fairly modest (a percent change
in the odds ratio of  21 and  10 percent, respectively, see Table 2.5).
2.4.2 Active Group (Second Stage)
The top part of Table 2.5 indicates the size of cross-border M&As (as measured by their
number) given that the observation belongs to the Active Group. The estimates can be
interpreted as in a standard negative binomial model, determining the expected number of
M&As given the observed characteristics. All estimated coe¢ cients are signicant at the 5
percent level or stronger.
In order of economic magnitude, given that an observation belongs to the Active Group,
the expected number of M&As increases:
1. The higher the targets market size as measured by total GDP.
2. The higher the acquirers market size as measured by total GDP.
3. The higher the targets development level as measured by GDP per capita.
4. The higher the acquirers development level as measured by GDP per capita.
5. The lower the distance to a potential target country.
6. The higher the one-year lagged wave variable.
7. The higher the acquirers nancial openness.
8. The higher the targets nancial openness.
9. The higher the two-year lagged wave variable.
Similarly, for the dummy control variables given that an observation belongs to the
Active Group and in order of magnitude, the expected number of M&As increases if:
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1. The two countries share a colonial history.
2. The two countries share a common language.
3. The two countries do not share a common border.
To determine the size of cross-border M&As, market access as measured by the targets
total GDP is by far the most important variable (a standard deviation increase raises the ex-
pected number of counts by 252 percent), followed by market size of the acquirer (indicative
of the potential number of acquiring rms). Development levels of both acquirer and target
as measured by GDP per capita are also important (positively), followed by the distance
between acquirer and target (negatively). The economic impact of the nancial openness
and wave variables is more modest (fairly low percentage changes in expected counts). For
the dummy control variables, mutual knowledge of each others markets (lower costs of inter-
action) as measured by a common colonial history and common language is very important,
as it raises the expected number of M&As by 120 and 76 percent, respectively. For the
Active Group, in contrast to the Passive Group, sharing a common border is less important.
Note that this e¤ect provides some support for the jumping argument as sharing a common
border decreases the expected number of counts by 11 percent. Given that a country is
active in cross-border M&A activity, this suggests that there is an incentive to create some
distance between acquiring and target country.
2.4.3 Elasticities for Active Group and Trade discussion
To compare the main economic forces determining cross-border M&As relative to interna-
tional trade ows, Table 2.6 lists the elasticity and dummy control estimates for the number
of M&As (see Table 2.5) and the bilateral trade estimates taken from Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006, Table 3, column PPML). Since the latter focus on the value of trade ows,
we also include comparable estimates for the value of M&As (see Brakman et al., 2008a),
which are based on the same ZINB procedure used in this paper.
There are some remarkable di¤erences in the elasticities for trade and M&A ows.
 First, the impact of the size of the market as measured by GDP on M&A ows is less
pronounced when compared to trade ows. For an active acquirer, the elasticity for
M&As is 0:48 in number of deals and 0:35 in value terms, substantially lower than the
0:72 elasticity for trade ows. Similarly, for an active target the elasticity for M&As is
0:63 in number of deals and 0:37 in value terms, also both lower than the 0:73 elasticity
for trade ows.
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Table 2.6: Comparison Between Estimates
Cross-border M&A Estimates Bilateral trade
(Active Group) estimates
Number of Deals Value of Deals
LnGDPacq 0.480  0.347  0.721 
LnGDPtar 0.631  0.372  0.732 
LnGDPpcacq 0.489  0.139 0.154 
LnGDPpctar 0.678  0.342  0.133 
LnDistij -0.526  -0.285  -0.776 
Common Language 0.564  0.400  0.752 
Colony 0.790  0.454  0.019
Common Border -0.115  -0.136  0.202
 Second, the impact of the targets market structure as measured by per capita GDP
is more pronounced for M&A ows than for trade ows. The M&A elasticity of per
capita GDP for an active target is 0:68 in number of deals and 0:34 in value terms,
substantially larger than the elasticity of 0:13 for trade ows.18
 Third, the elasticity of GDP and per capita GDP for acquirer and target is asymmetric.
This holds for the elasticity of GDP regarding the number of M&As (0:48 < 0:63);
compare to the elasticity for value of M&As (0:35  0:37) or trade ows (0:72 
0:73). Similarly it holds for the elasticity of per capita GDP for number of M&As
(0:49 < 0:68) and value of M&As (0:14 < 0:34); compare to the elasticity for trade
ows (0:15  0:13). This asymmetry has important modeling implications that can
be dealt with by the Bersgtrand and Egger (2007) approach.
 Fourth, as was to be expected based on the a priori ambivalent nature of the re-
lationship between M&As and distance, we nd that the impact of distance is less
pronounced for M&As than for trade ows. Other things equal, a 10 percent increase
in distance reduces the value of trade ows by 7:8 percent,19 substantially higher than
18In value terms, an active acquirers GDP per capita is not signicant, although it is important for rst
stage active passive distinction (see Brakman et al. 2008).
19This estimate is slightly below the mean e¤ect reported in the Disdier and Head (2008) meta analysis
of a 9 percent decline in trade ows following a 10 percent increase in distance.
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the reduction in the number of M&As for active countries of 5:3 percent or the reduc-
tion in value of M&As of 2:9 percent. The di¤erent impact of distance on the number
and value of M&As suggests that the more distant M&As are more valuable, thereby
corroborating the story presented in panel C of Table 2.2.
 Fifth, the dummy control variables are important for determining the size of M&A
ows, but not for the Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) trade estimates. This is
in contrast to most other (positive and signicant) trade estimates reported in the
literature, which Santos Silva and Tenreyro attribute to their estimation procedure.
Possibly, a zero-inated procedure to deal with the excess zero problem for the trade
data as used here for the M&A estimates modies their ndings in this respect.
2.4.4 Countries of a feather ock together...
To summarize the above results: (i) market size (GDP) of both acquirer and target is more
important for trade ows than for cross-border M&As, (ii) market development (per capita
GDP) is more important for cross-border M&As than for trade ows, indicating that M&As
are predominantly a rich-persons game, (iii) for M&As, the targets market, both in size
and development, is more important than the acquirers market, and (iv) the impact of
distance is larger on trade ows than for M&As.
From a theoretical perspective, FDI ows, such as M&As, may be both a substitute
for trade ows (if the presence of a local production plant eliminates the need for (nal)
goods trade) or a complement to trade ows (if the local production plant is part of a
fragmentation process with intricately linked trade ows). Our estimates show that, from
an empirical perspective, M&As and trade ows are complementary, that is if the distance
between two locations increases, the expected number of M&As decreases. As was to be
expected based on the a priori ambivalent nature of the relationship between M&As and
distance, we nd that the impact of distance is less pronounced for M&A ows than for
trade ows (see Table 4). For active acquirers and targets, the M&A elasticity of distance is
about -0.53, substantially lower in absolute value than the trade elasticity of -0.78. As such,
other things equal, cross-border M&As decline less rapidly with distance than international
trade ows. However, other things are not equal, and as stressed above, not only the size
of the market is important but also the structure of this market in terms of per capita
income, particularly from a targets perspective. For example, starting from a country in an
active high-income region, say Switzerland in Western Europe, M&As decline less rapidly
with distance than trade ows as long as we remain within this high-income region, say the
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distance to Germany, France, and the U.K. As distance increases further, bringing African
and West Asian nations within reach, the potential targets per capita income level also
falls drastically, making M&As unattractive and leading only to limited M&A ows. A
further increase in distance, bringing North America, Japan or South America within reach,
would further decrease M&A ows, except when this is su¢ ciently compensated by an
increase in the targets attractiveness from a market access (size and structure) perspective.
Consequently, there are substantial M&Aows betweenWestern Europe and North America,
as well as, but in view of the above understandably to a lesser extent, between these two
regions and Asian high income countries.
For example, starting from a country in an active high-income region, say Switzerland
in Western Europe, M&As decline less rapidly with distance than trade ows as long as we
remain within this high-income region, say the distance to Germany, France, and the U.K.
As distance increases further, bringing African and West Asian nations within reach, the po-
tential targets per capita income level also falls drastically, making M&As unattractive and
leading only to limited M&A ows. A further increase in distance, bringing North America,
Japan or South America within reach, would further decrease M&A ows, except when this
is su¢ ciently compensated by an increase in the targets attractiveness from a market access
(size and structure) perspective. Consequently, there are substantial M&A ows between
Western Europe and North America and (in view of the above) to a lesser extent between
these two regions and the Asian high income countries. This market similarity (countries
of a feather) that is important for M&As allows us to understand the global M&A ows
relative to global trade ows, as depicted in Figure 2.2 and Table 2.2.
2.5 "Pull" & "Push" Factors
In this section, we augment our baseline model with several "pull" and "push" factors,
considered as important determinants of cross-border M&As. That is, while push factors
may help explain the timing and magnitude of new capital inows, pull factors may be
necessary to explain the regional distribution of new capital ows (Montiel and Reinhart,
1999). An important "push" factor is the level of interest rates in the "home" country,
which we will proxy by the 10-year US bond yield.20 In the literature there is a general
consensus that high real interest rates hamper FDI, other things being equal. Albuquerque
et al. (2003) nd a signicant and negative relation between the US T-Bill yield and FDI
20We also constructed a weighted average of G7 bond yields; where the coorelation between G7yield and
USyield is 0.94.
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ows. Calvo et al. (2001) show that FDI ows to emerging markets are lower during US
monetary tightening. Although no empirical literature exists for the specic case of the
number of M&A deals, the same result should (in principle) be expected, since low interest
rates at "home", leading to narrow interest rate margins and lower cost of capital at home,
are one of the main reasons o¤ered by multinationals to explain their operations abroad.
As can be seen in Table 2.7 (column IV ), the USyield has a negative e¤ect21 for the Active
group (as theory predicts), corroborating the "push" factor story behind the fact that tighter
monetary policy lowers M&A activity. More specically, our results imply that a 100 basis
point increase in the US interest rate will decrease M&A activity by 10% for the active
group.22
2.5.1 Capital Market Structure and Capital Flows
Capital inows in the 1990s were associated with a stern rise in bond and equity portfolio
ows; however, by the early 2000s many of these ows have gravitated towards larger equity
emerging markets, bypassing many countries (Montiel and Reinhart, 1999). An often given
explanation has been that in order to attract capital ows, "domestic" capital markets must
possess a threshold set of requirements (e.g. market size, accounting standards, disclosure
requirements, transparency, etc.).
Accordingly, in order to examine whether there is a systematic link between capital
ows and the structure of the "domestic" capital market, we augment our gravity model
by including two proxies for the size and the institutional setting of the "domestic" capital
market; that is, we include the lagged stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP
taken from the International Finance Corporation (which we label LagSMC). While this
variable pertains mainly to the equity market, it is also likely to proxy indirectly for the
size of the banking sector, as typically countries with underdeveloped capital markets also
tend to have a smaller nancial sector (see Montiel and Reinhart, 1999); furthermore, and
perhaps more importantly, the lag will take care of any endogeneity issues.
21We also ran the regression using the weighted average of G7 bond yield (G7yield), and the results are
quite similar (these results are available upon request).
22A 50 basis point increase in the US interest rate will decrease M&As by almost 5%, and a 25 basis point
increase will decrease M&As by almost 3%.
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Table 2.7: Augmented ZINB Estimates (US yield, stock market value, transparency)
Active IV irrIV V irrV V I irrV I StdDev
LnGDPacq 0.481  162 0.512  168 0.489  169 1.99
LnGDPtar 0.620  245 0.569  199 0.629  256 1.99
LnGDPpcacq 0.779  118 0.331  45 0.643  111 1.17
LnGDPpctar 0.641  110 0.761  134 0.530  85 1.17
LnDistij -0.510  -35 -0.440  -31 -0.516  -36 0.85
Financial Openness
Acquirer 0.090  16 0.051  9 1.61
Target 0.070  12 0.115  20 1.61
USyield -9.208  -10
LagSMCacq 0.006  27
LagSMCtar -0.00002
Transparencyacq 0.006
Transparencytar 0.049
wave1 0.2  12 0.63
wave2 0.07  8 1.24
Common Languagez 0.545  72 0.352  42 0.558  75 0.38
Colonyz 0.793  121 0.629  88 0.788  120 0.11
Common Borderz -0.134  -13 -0.095 -0.117 0.13
Passive
LnGDPacq -0.467  -61 -0.402  -54 -0.499  -64 1.99
LnGDPtar -0.398  -55 -0.478  -60 -0.386  -54 1.99
LnGDPpcacq -1.157  -74 -1.201  -74 -0.882  -64 1.17
LnGDPpctar -0.013 0.237  -23 0.117 1.17
LnDistij 0.892  114 0.847  106 0.879  112 0.85
Financial Openness
Acquirer -0.163  -23 -0.248  -33 1.61
Target -0.101  -15 -0.100  -15 1.61
USyield 6.583
LagSMCacp -0.005  -16
LagSMCtar 0.001
Transparencyacq -0.095 2.99
Transparencytar -0.006 2.99
Common Languagez -1.083  -66 -1.004  -63 -1.033  -65 0.38
Colonyz -0.940  -61 -1.087  -66 -0.948  -61 0.11
Common Borderz -1.829  -84 -2.066  -87 -1.689  -82 0.13
# of obs 282,378 291,692 197,785
Nonzero obs 5432 3985 4002
McFadden adj. R2 0.453 0.465 0.457
Notes: 1) Dependent variable is # of deals; 2) *, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% sig. levels
3) irr = 100[exp(*StdDev)-1] = % change in expected count for StdDev increase in X
4) z the irr is calculated as 100[exp()-1] for a discrete change of 0 to 1
5) StdDev = standard deviation of X
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We also add theTransparency International corruption index (which we label TRANSPAR)23
to proxy for the business environment in the "local" economy. As far as our market struc-
ture variables, the results can be seen in Table 2.7 (columns V and V I respectively). Our
results are as expected; that is, the lagged stock market capitalization coe¢ cient is highly
signicant and has the anticipated sign, where a one standard deviation increase in the
lagged capitalization of the stock market increases the number of M&As by just under 30%
for those acquirers in the active group, and will decrease the probability of remaining in the
passive group by 16%. This last result also corroborates the results found by di Giovanni
(2005), where economies with more developed domestic nancial markets are more likely to
engage in M&A operations.
2.5.2 Market and Business Uncertainty
As a last sensitivity analysis, we add the black market premium (labelled BMP)24 and the
exchange rate. The black market premium can be interpreted both as a measure of expecta-
tions of depreciation of the localcurrency, and as a rudimentary index of distortions. As
Fischer (1998) explains, expectations of depreciation may a¤ect investment through several
channels: (1) it is more attractive to hold foreign assets when a depreciation is expected25;
(2) economic uncertainty is higher under such conditions; (3) for those who can obtain for-
eign exchange at the o¢ cial rate, foreign capital goods are cheap to import. While the rst
two points suggest a negative relationship between the black market premium and foreign
investment (i.e. M&As), the third point implies the opposite. Furthermore, to the extent
that the black market premium serves as a general index of distortions, and therefore of an
unsustainablesituation, it is likely to be negatively correlated with M&As.
The results for the black market premium can be seen in Table 2.8 (column VII), where
the black market premium is strongly negatively correlated with M&A activity as expected.
That is, a one standard deviation increase in LnBMPacq translates into an almost 20% reduc-
tion in M&A activity for those acquirers in the active group, and just over a 40% reduction
for the targets in this same group. This result indicates that the black market premium
serves as a general index of distortions, and therefore of an unsustainablesituation in the
"local economy". As far as the link between FDI and exchange rate uncertainty, the litera-
23The Transparency International corruption index ranges from 0 = highly corrupt, to 10 = highly clean.
24This variable ranges from 1986-1999. Data is taken from the Global Development Network Growth
database at New York University.
25This assumes domestic interest rates have not adjusted, which is implied by the presence of a black
market premium.
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ture is rather mixed, as exchange rate volatility can both discourage FDI (Cushman, 1988),
and produce an incentive to hedge against exchange rate shocks through foreign location
(Aizenman, 1991).
However, empirical studies tend to point to a negative e¤ect of exchange rate volatility
on FDI. As far as the choice of exchange rate regime, a negative relationship between uncer-
tainty and M&As (FDI) would represent another justication for why developing countries
choose to x their nominal exchange rate, and a support for the argument made by Calvo
and Reinhart (2000) that oating could make developing countries loose their access to in-
ternational credit. In order to test this e¤ect, we add the exchange rate volatility (labelled
EXV ); which is measured by the bilateral coe¢ cient of variation yearly average. The re-
sults for the exchange rate volatility in Table 2.7 indicate that if the coe¢ cient of variation
increases by one standard deviation, then the number of M&As will decrease by 7% for
those active in M&As. In this respect, there are two aspects worth mentioning; exibility
and uncertainty. Although a exible exchange rate is one of the most important factors for
encouraging international nancial ows, high exchange rate volatility will discourage M&A
activity because it would be considered as increased uncertainty (or at least increased risk),
rather than exibility of the exchange rate for potential investors.
As far as the exchange rate, Blonigen (1997a) shows that real dollar depreciations increase
foreign acquisitions involving rm-specic assets by foreign rms. To illustrate this claim
Blonigen uses data on Japanese acquisitions in the US from 1975 to 1992. The argument that
real dollar depreciations increase foreign acquisitions that is put forth by Blonigen di¤ers,
for example, from Froot and Stein (1991)26, although both studies have the same outcome.
That is, Froot and Stein (1991) show that exchange rate movements are important because
markets are imperfect, while Blonigen (1997a) shows that exchange rate movements matter
because while domestic and foreign rms may have the same opportunities to purchase
rm-specic assets in the domestic market, foreign and domestic rms do not have the same
opportunities to generate returns on these assets in foreign markets. Due to an unequal
level of market access, exchange rate movements may a¤ect the relative level of foreign rm
acquisitions.
26Froot and Stein (1991) argue that when capital markets are subject to information imperfections,
exchange rate movements do in fact inuence foreign investment. Information asymmetry causes a divergence
between internal and external nancing, making the latter more expensive than the former, since lenders
incur monitoring costs and thus lend less than the full value of the asset.
46 CHAPTER 2 COUNTRIES OF A FEATHER FLOCK TOGETHER...
Table 2.8: Black Market Premium and Exchange Rates
Active V II irrV II V III irrIII StdDev
LnGDPacq 0.522  165 0.464  152 1.99
LnGDPtar 0.587  200 0.607  236 1.99
LnGDPpcacq 0.603  102 0.431  66 1.17
LnGDPpctar 0.652  114 0.654  115 1.17
LnDistij -0.481  -35 -0.540  -37 0.85
Financial Openness
Acquirer 0.048  8 1.61
Target 0.088  15 1.61
LnBMPacq -0.115  -19
LnBMPtar -0.307  -43
Exchange rate var -0.104  7
wave1 0.3  18 0.2  11 0.63
wave2 0.08  7 0.1  14 1.24
Common Languagez 0.409  51 0.591  81 0.38
Colonyz 0.941  156 0.758  113 0.11
Common Borderz -0.231  -21 -0.197  -18 0.13
Passive
LnGDPacq -0.518  -62 -0.443  -59 1.99
LnGDPtar -0.493  -60 -0.402  -55 1.99
LnGDPpcacq -1.431  -81 -1.180  -75 1.17
LnGDPpctar 0.018 -0.023 1.17
LnDistij 0.899  123 0.950  125 0.85
Financial Openness
Acquirer -0.192  -27 1.61
Target -0.058 1.61
LnBMPacp 0.279  67
LnBMPtar -0.360  -49
EXV 0.008
Common Languagez -1.392  -75 -1.098  -67 0.38
Colonyz -0.711  -51 -1.140  -68 0.11
Common Borderz -1.854  -84 -1.544  -78 0.13
# of obs 94,182 211,256
Nonzero obs 2595 3921
McFadden adj. R2 0.443 0.462
Notes: 1) Dependent variable is # of deals; 2) *, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% sig levels
3) irr = 100[exp(*StdDev) -1] = % change in expected count for StdDev increase
in X; 4) z the irr is calculated as 100[exp()-1] for a discrete change of 0 to 1;
5) StdDev = standard deviation of X
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2.6 Robustness
As a last exercise, we address three important issues. First, regarding the impact of outside
market potential of the target country on FDI ows, based on the recent work of Blonigen
et al. (2007). Second, regarding the impact of the Rest Of World (ROW) GDP, that is
total world income excluding acquiring and target nation, on FDI ows, based on the recent
work of Bersgtrand and Egger (2007). Third, regarding the impact of selection bias on the
estimated coe¢ cients and elasticities.
2.6.1 Surrounding Market Potential
Blonigen et al. (2007) analyze inter alia the impact of surrounding-market potential on
FDI. It is measured for country j as the inverse-distance-weighted GDPs of all other coun-
tries in the world, and therefore similar to Harris (1954) market potential approach while
excluding the target country GDP. The surrounding-market potential should only a¤ect
export-platform M&A decisions. Target country GDP is taken up separately in the estima-
tion procedure.27 Indeed, the authorss main ndings are (i) a clear rejection of a common
coe¢ cient of target country GDP and surrounding-market potential and (ii) a signicant
negative coe¢ cient of surrounding-market potential. The latter e¤ect is contrary to expec-
tations and current theoretical explanations. The authors discuss how this may be explained
by border e¤ects between neighboring countries, making the largest country in the area (with
the smallest surrounding-market potential) the most attractive location for export-platform
FDI.
Table 2.10 (see Appendix C) provides the estimation results for the surrounding-market
potential specication using our M&A data and procedure, both for the number of M&As
and their value (in constant 2005 US $). The results are similar for both cases. At the rst
(logit) stage, the targets market size (GDP) and the targets surrounding market potential
work in opposite directions. The higher the targets surrounding-market potential, the higher
the probability that the observation belongs to the Passive Group. Similarly, at the second
(negative binomial) stage (given that the observation belongs to the Active Group) the
targets market size and the targets surrounding market potential work again in opposite
directions. The estimated elasticity for the targets surrounding-market potential is  0:71
for the number of deals and  0:28 for the value of M&As. Our ndings thus support the
27We follow Blonigen et al. (2007) in normalizing the distance between Amsterdam and Brussels (173 km)
to unity. This also holds for lower distances. All other distances receive a weight that declines according to
173=dij , where dij is the distance between countries i and j.
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conclusions of Blonigen et al. (2007).
2.6.2 Rest of World GDP
Bergstrand and Egger (2007; B&E) develop a three-factor general equilibrium model to
explain gravity-type relationships for both international trade and FDI ows. One of
the testable hypotheses derived from their model is the relationship between FDI and
GDPROW. The latter measures global income excluding target and acquiring nation income
levels (not weighted by distance). Their model predicts a negative relationship between FDI
and GDPROW if the sum of target and acquiring nation GDP is smaller than GDPROW
(which is the case for any combination of countries). Using data for 17 OECD countries,
they nd empirical support for their hypothesis.
Table 2.11 (see Appendix C) provides the estimation results for the GDPROW speci-
cation using our M&A data and procedure, both for the number of M&As and their value.
Lets rst focus attention on columns 2 and 4, which incorporates the wave variables in the
estimation. Contrary to the ndings of B&E, the impact of GDPROW is not signicant for
determining the number of cross-border M&As, neither at the rst stage nor at the second
stage. When we (like B&E) analyze the value of M&As, however, things change and the
impact of GDPROW becomes stronger than analyzed by B&E. At the rst (logit) stage
GDPROW has a negative impact on the likelihood of a passive observation. Thus, other
things equal, the bigger the economy of the rest of the world, the larger the probability an
observation belongs to the Active Group. At the second (negative binomial) stage, given
that the observation belongs to the Active Group, the impact of GDPROW on the size of
cross-border M&As is negative (elasticity of  0:88), which is similar to the impact found
by B&E. These results provide some support for the B&E ndings in value terms (enriched
by an opposite e¤ect of the size of the global economy on the probability of being active).
Most countries are relatively small compared to the global economy, as are most country
pairs. For most observations, therefore, GDPROW is a close measure of global GDP. Con-
sequently, this variable is highly correlated with the global business cycle, which generates
M&A waves (i.e. GDPROW is highly correlated with the wave variables). Taking a closer
look at columns 3 and 5 of Table 2.11 (which show the estimates of the same procedure with-
out the wave variables), indicates opposing results in the rst stage of the estimation, and
signicantly positive results for GDPROW at the second stage of the estimation, both for
number of M&As and for their value. This shows that the rst stage results for GDPROW
are not very robust, arguably because this variable is simply a proxy for the business cycle
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(which was included in the estimates of columns 2 and 4 and proxied by the time xed
e¤ects in the B&E estimation).
2.6.3 Sample Selection
Data restrictions have prompted most previous FDI studies using the gravity analysis to
focus on a small set of countries. Most studies have an American perspective relative to
one or a limited number of (high income) other countries or at best analyze cross-border
bilateral FDI for the OECD countries over a given decade28. Our results are generally hard
to compare directly with these previous studies, not only because we analyze cross-border
M&As, but also because we focus on M&A ows rather than FDI stocks. In this sub-section,
we want to analyze the selection bias that is created when restricting attention to "more
easily available" data. Table 2.12 (in Appendix C) lists the estimation results of our baseline
case for all countries (Table 4.3) and when restricting attention only to the OECD countries,
both for number of deals and value of M&As (Brakman et al., 2008a).
The OECD countries fulll most of the requirements for becoming active in cross-border
M&As (generally high GDP, high per capita GDP, nancially open, etc.). The rst thing to
note when restricting attention to this group of countries, is the large decline in the number
of zero observations (from 98 percent to 51 percent). Not surprisingly, therefore, many of
the aspects that are relevant for passing the rst stage hurdle before becoming active in
M&As (at the global level) are no longer important at the OECD level, particularly for
the number of deals (insignicant for GDP of acquirer, nancial openness target, common
language, common colony, and common border). At the second stage, this holds for per
capita GDP of the acquirer for the number of deals and some of the (size-wise) less impor-
tant variables (nancial openness and waves). The direction and signicance of all main
gravity type variables (GDP acquirer and target, per capita GDP target, distance, common
language, colony, and common border) is robust at the second stage, although the size of the
estimated e¤ects and their relative impact di¤ers substantially. This holds in particular for
the estimated elasticities, where at the OECD level the relative importance of market size
for acquirer and target is reversed and the impact of the targets per capita GDP becomes
much more important. In contrast, the estimated elasticity for distance is fairly robust. In
short, caution is warranted when extrapolating results obtained in FDI studies for a limited
set of high income countries to the global level.
28Examples include Bergstrand and Egger (2007); Blonigen et al. (2007); Blonigen et al. (2005); Blonigen
and Davis (2004); Brainard (1997); and Eaton and Tamura (1994).
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2.7 Conclusions
We analyze the economic forces underlying cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As),
the most important type of FDI ows, using a large bilateral panel data set (encompassing
over 200 countries and 20 years). The large share of "zero" observations provides essential
information on the structure of these ows, which we model empirically using a zero-inated
negative binomial model. At Stage I, an observation is either classied in the Passive Group
(always zero) or in the (potentially) Active Group using a logit model. At Stage II, the
M&A ows in the Active Group are modeled using a gravity-type negative binomial model.
We nd that at Stage I, an observation is less likely to be in the Passive Group if the GDP
of either country is high, if the acquirers per capita GDP is high, if nancial openness of
either country is high, and if the two countries share a common language, a common border,
or former colonial ties. At Stage II, that is given that the observation belongs to the Active
Group, the variables that make it less likely to belong to the Passive Group usually increase
the size of M&A ows. An exception is provided by the common border variable, which
we interpret as evidence of a jumping motive for M&A ows. Compared to bilateral trade
ows, we nd that for M&As: (i) market size (GDP) is less important, (ii) market structure
(GDP per capita) is more important (M&As are a rich-mans game), (iii) the targets market
size and structure is more important than that of the acquirer (asymmetry), and (iv) the
bilateral distance is less important. We emphasize that our ndings, for example on the
asymmetry between acquirer and target and on the border e¤ect, have crucial implications
for theoretical model building; furthermore, they point at the importance of market access
and jumping motives.
The aim of this paper has been to present macroeconomic determinants, as well as the
gravitational forces behind M&A activity. Using an extensive data set, we show that cross-
border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have a number of features:
 Most FDI is in the form of cross-border M&As
 M&As tend to ow (mainly) between developed economies
 Waves play an important role in the mergers and acquisitions game
 Financial Openness (e.g. capital account liberalization) stimulates M&A activity
 A less uncertain business environment attracts more M&As
 The opportunity cost for direct investment (M&A) is driven by the US interest rate
and the return on long-run global assets
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It is well known that the evidence linking nancial openness (e.g. capital account open-
ness) to economic growth has been weak at best, but this stems from the fact that most
economists try to test for a direct relationship between these two variables. What our re-
sults show, is that more nancial openness leads to more FDI (as measured by cross-border
M&As), and we believe that it is this type of capital ow that has the potential to lead to
economic growth through its lower volatility and through its positive spillover e¤ects (e.g.
knowledge, technology, improvements to the labor force). Therefore, while the literature
suggests that transitional risks are associated with nancial openness, resisting liberaliza-
tion over an extended period may prove counterproductive; that is, as the pace, rhythm, and
scope of globalization advances, it becomes harder and perhaps even riskier for countries to
be nancially repressive due to the often argued positive e¤ects stemming from FDI (see
Chapter 4 for analysis of these issues).
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2.8 Appendix 2
Table 2.9: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Number of deals 0.031 0.831 0 144 882000
LnGDP 10.34 1.92 5.05 15.95 548940
LnGDPpc 8.09 1.13 5.33 10.28 564900
Ln(GDPROW ) 17.16 0.18 16.68 17.47 379456
Ln(Outside Market Potential) 13.83 0.48 12.60 15.36 427716
LnDistij 8.69 0.86 -0.005 9.89 760500
Financial Openness 0.15 1.56 -1.75 2.62 625800
Stock Market Capitalization 12.47 35.27 0 541.72 617400
USyield 0.067 0.013 0.047 0.089 882000
Exchange Rate Variability 0.36 0.71 0 10.27 574829
Ln(Black Market Premium) 2.09 1.87 -0.82 12.93 285180
Transparancy 1.17 2.53 0 10 573300
Wave1 1401 668.49 359 2663 793800
Wave2 2498.41 1184.48 603 4655 749700
Common language 0.19 0.39 0 1 882000
Colony 0.008 0.091 0 1 882000
Common border 0.011 0.11 0 1 882000
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Appendix B - Robustness Checks
Table 2.10: Surrounding Market Potential, ZINB estimates
Active Observations Active Observations
(negative binomial) (logit)
Number Value Number Value
LnGDPacq 0.314  0.269  -0.417  -0.650 
LnGDPtar 0.345  0.160  -0.563  -0.668 
LnGDPpcacq 0.447  0.252  -1.299  -1.497 
LnGDPpctar 0.589  0.410  -0.317  -0.690 
LnDistij -0.460  -0.260  0.951  0.915 
Ln(Surr. markettar) -0.713  -0.284  0.487  0.784 
Fin. Openacq -0.015 0.050  -0.168  -0.122 
Fin. Opentar 0.031 0.009 -0.081  -0.058 
wave1 (coef*100) 0.024  0.008
wave2 (coef*100) 0.021  0.024 
Common Language 0.241  0.411  -0.838  -0.831 
Colony 0.673  0.618  -1.107  -1.135 
Common Border 0.034 -0.094 -0.609  -0.289 
Observations 184,702 160,503
Non-zero Obs. 3,012 2,639
Dependent variable is # of deals or value of deals
*, **, ***, indicate 10%, 5%, 1% signicance levels
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Table 2.11: Rest of World GDP, ZINB estimates
Number of Deals Value of Deals
Active, negative binomial
LnGDPacq 0.220  0.260  0.254  0.301 
LnGDPtar 0.676  0.690  0.170  0.194 
LnGDPpcacq 0.058 0.011 0.272  0.226 
LnGDPpctar 0.718  0.696  0.365  0.379 
LnDistij -0.439  -0.426  -0.241  -0.244 
Ln(GDPROW ) 0.032 2.486  -0.878  1.253 
Fin. OpenAcq -0.008 0.049  0.058  0.086 
Fin. OpenTar 0.062  0.067  0.006 0.005
wave1 (coef*100) 0.020  0.006
wave2 (coef*100) 0.017  0.027 
Common Language 0.100 0.090 0.450  0.458 
Colony 1.329  1.284  0.691  0.700 
Common Border 0.110 0.094 -0.162 -0.186 
Passive, logit
LnGDPacq -0.752  -0.728  -0.666  -0.668 
LnGDPtar -0.163  -0.197  -0.706  -0.712 
LnGDPpcacq -1.748  -1.726  -1.360  -1.323 
LnGDPpctar 0.358  0.344  -0.476  -0.461 
LnDistij 0.924  0.940  0.781  0.762 
Ln(GDPROW ) 0.335 0.476 -1.220  -1.947 
Fin. OpenAcq -0.252  -0.223  -0.150  -0.163 
Fin. OpenTar -0.028 -0.044 -0.043  -0.052 
Common Languagez -1.456  -1.384  -0.930  -0.862 
Colonyz 0.076 -0.044 -1.083  -1.081 
Common Borderz -0.257 -0.319 -0.459  -0.396 
# of obs 160,503 179,319 160,503 179,319
Nonzero obs 2639 2678 2639 2678
Notes: Dependent variable is # of deals or value of deals
*, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% signicance levels
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Table 2.12: ZINB estimates, All and OECD
Number of Deals Value of Deals
All OECD All OECD
Active, negative binomial
LnGDPacq 0.480  0.606  0.347  0.480 
LnGDPtar 0.631  0.372  0.372  0.281 
LnGDPpcacq 0.489  0.159 0.139 0.074
LnGDPpctar 0.678  2.078  0.342  2.105 
LnDistij -0.526  -0.485  -0.285  -0.333 
Fin. OpenAcq 0.072  0.032 0.055  -0.109
Fin. OpenTar 0.062  0.093  0.028 0.073
wave1 (coef*100) 0.20  -0.001 0.010  -0.005
wave2 (coef*100) 0.06  0.015  0.022  0.048 
Common Language 0.564  0.391  0.400  0.454 
Colony 0.790  0.975  0.454  0.708 
Common Border -0.115  -0.367  -0.136  -0.354 
Passive, logit
LnGDPacq -0.498  0.171 -0.680  -0.624 
LnGDPtar -0.375  -1.161  -0.708  -0.552 
LnGDPpcacq -1.267  -7.665  -1.354  -2.254 
LnGDPpctar -0.062 2.915  -0.601  -0.139
LnDistij 0.889  1.195  0.787  0.664 
Fin. OpenAcq -0.148  -0.716  -0.161  -0.138 
Fin. OpenTar -0.062  0.337 -0.072  -0.069
Common Language -1.129  -16.62 -1.143  -0.469 
Colony -0.963  -1.223 -1.022  -1.704 
Common Border -1.536  -15.07 -0.441  0.159
# of obs 255,468 2918 255,468 2981
Nonzero obs 5290 1461 5290 1461
Notes: Dependent variable is # of deals or value of deals; source for # of deals
"all" estimates is Table 3 (baseline column); source for value of deals "all" estimates
is Brakman et al. (2008a) Table 2.
*, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% signicance levels
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Appendix C - Gravity Equation Derivation
Theoretical derivation of the gravity equation (see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003)
Assumptions:
 All goods are di¤erentiated by place of origin (the Armington assumption)
 Each economy is specialized in the production of only one good
 The supply of each good is xed
 Preferences are homothetic, and are approximated by a CES function
Consumers in economy j maximize:
maxU =
P
i
ic
 1

ij
 
 1
(D1)
s:t
P
i
pijcij = yj (D2)
where
cij = consumption by economy j consumers of goods from economy i
 = elasticity of substitution between all goods
i = positive distribution parameter
yj = Nominal income of region j residents
pij = price of economy i goods for region j consumers
assuming
pij = pi ij
where
pi = exporter i supply price (net of transport costs)
 ij = transport costs
and
xij = picij + ( ij   1)picij = pijcij
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with
xij = nominal value of exports from i to j; and yi =
P
j
xij
substituting (D2) into (D1) and maximizing yields the nominal demand for economy i
goods by economy j consumers:
xij =

ipi ij
pj
1 
yj (D3)
with the consumer price index of economy j being
pj =
P
i
(ipi ij)
1 
 1
1 
(D4)
the sum of is exports to all countries must equal is GDP as follows:
yi =
P
j
xij =
P
j

ipi ij
pj
1 
yj = (ipi)
1 P
j

 ij
pj
1 
yj (D5)
substituting (D5) into (D3) yields
xij =
yiyj
yw

 ij
pj
1 
P
j

 ij
pj
1 
j
(D6)
where yw =
P
j
yj world nominal income, and
yj
yw
= j. Now lets dene
i =
"P
j

 ij
pj
1 
j
# 1
1 
(D7)
substituting (D7) into (D6) yields
xij =
yiyj
yw

 ij
ipj
1 
(D8)
and substituting (D5) into (D4) yields
pj =
"P
i

 ij
i
1 
i
# 1
1 
(D9)
assuming symmetric trade barriers ( ij =  ji), (D7) and (D9) can be solved yielding
58 CHAPTER 2 COUNTRIES OF A FEATHER FLOCK TOGETHER...
pi = i (D10)
with
p1 j =
P
i
p 1i i
1 
ij 8j
substituting (D1) in (D8) yields the gravity equation
xij =
yiyj
yw

 ij
pipj
1 
(D11)
Chapter 3
Unlocking the Value of M&As
3.1 Introduction
Two1 waves stand out in the history of globalization. The rst wave took place in-between
1850-1913, and the second wave started after WWII and continues until this day (see Bordo
et al., 2003); moreover, Baldwin (2006) characterizes globalization in terms of two great
unbundlings. In his view, during the rst wave and much of the second wave, the fall in
transportation costs and the removal of trade barriers enabled international specialization,
by spatially unbundling production from consumption2. With the second unbundling, the
start of which Baldwin (2006) dates at around 1980-1990, production itself is increasingly
geographically separated; that is, it is no longer the case that production takes place under
a single roof. In this light, new technologies enable rms to relocate certain stages of the
production process to other countries.
As Figure 3.1 shows, throughout the past 15 years the growth rate of FDI has surpassed
the growth rates of both world GDP and world trade. This increased importance of FDI has
led to an enthralling and relatively new research agenda that tries to explain the existence of
multinational enterprises or MNEs (see for example Navaretti and Venables, 2004; Helpman,
2006; Brakman and Garretsen, 2008). A key feature of these models is the role of trade
barriers or, in general, economic distance in determining FDI, since distance related variables
are crucial for understanding FDI patterns. For example, if FDI is mainly market seeking,
then larger trade costs will stimulate FDI. If, on the other hand, FDI is factor-cost seeking,
then higher trade barriers will reduce FDI, since it would be more expensive to re-import
1This chapter is co-authored with Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen, and Charles van Marrewijk.
2This is the standard or textbook view of globalization.
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intermediate products. Given that most FDI continues to take place between developed
economies, the dominant motive for FDI seems to be the market-seeking motive.3 This last
observation presents us with a puzzle, since the fall in trade barriers during the last two
decades (e.g. EU integration) should have led to a reduction of market-seeking FDI (see
Neary, 2007, 2008). As we have argued and as Figure 3.1 illustrates, the opposite seems
true (i.e. FDI has become more important).
Figure 3.1: Growth of World GDP, FDI and Trade (constant 2000$; index, 1970 = 100; log
scale)
Neary (2008) identies and analyzes possible explanations for this puzzle. His rst
argument is that FDI might not only be market seeking (in a bilateral sense), but can be
of the export-platformtype; that is, rms are looking for a central location from which
to serve a set of closely related and integrated countries. The inclusion of these so-called
third countrye¤ects may explain why increased EU integration stimulates FDI in the EU,
especially from the USA (thereby bypassing EU-US trade costs that would be incurred if
the goods were to be exported from the USA to the EU). There is evidence that these third
countrye¤ects or spatial linkages are important (Garretsen and Peeters, 2008), but also
evidence that they are not (Blonigen et al., 2007). The second explanation, and one that
constitutes the starting point for the present paper, follows from an application of Nearys
GOLE (General Oligopolistic Equilibrium) model (see Neary, 2007, 2008). This model deals
3The share of FDI to developing countries is increasing (see Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004).
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with the aforementioned puzzle, given that it addresses the stylized fact that most FDI ows
are in the form of cross-border Mergers & Acquisitions (hereafter, M&As). Therefore, in
this paper and using a newgravity model approach, we will test the relevance of distance
and other determinants for the value of cross-border M&As.4 Based on the Thomson data
set for M&As, we use an extensive data set with rm-specic M&A data for 211 countries
during the period 1986-2005.
The goal of the research herein is twofold; rst, we want to establish whether our gravity
approach can help unlock the value of cross-border M&As. To date, and despite its quan-
titative importance (see section 2), gravity studies have mainly focused on trade or on FDI
in general, and have largely ignored cross-border M&As (for exceptions, see Evenett, 2004;
di Giovanni, 2005). Second, and related to the abovementioned observations, by focusing
on the distance variable and on nancial openness, we seek to nd out if our gravity model
can help us improve our understanding of the relationship between economic and nancial
integration on the one hand and the value of cross-border M&As on the other hand. Our
main results are that the market-seeking motive is important and that market size variables
related to the target increase the value of M&As. Furthermore, the results are consistent
with Nearys (2008) prediction, insofar as the distance variable reects integration. Con-
cerning nancial openness, the results are more ambiguous for countries that are already
active in M&A activity; however, for the passivegroup (i.e. countries that do not engage in
M&A activity), nancial openness seems to be a prerequisite to attract cross-border M&As.
The paper evolves as follows. In section 2 we present several stylized facts on FDI, and
in particular on cross-border M&As; furthermore, we outline5 how the recent rise of FDI,
dominated by cross border M&As, can be reconciled with the ostensible increase of economic
and nancial integration. Section 3 discusses our estimation strategy and introduces our
gravity model by focusing on the zero-gravityproblem. Section 4 presents our estimation
results, and section 5 concludes.
3.2 Cross-Border M&As and Nearys model
Looking at FDI as a broad category obscures the fact that most FDI is in the form of cross-
border M&As. Figure 5.2 shows a decomposition of FDI and it is clear that M&As constitute
the bulk of FDI, whereas Greeneld FDI is considerably less important than M&As. The
main di¤erence between these two forms of investments, is that in an M&A control of
4A companion paper Garita and van Marrewijk (2008) analyzes the number of deals.
5Using Neary (2007, 2008) as our main point of reference.
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assets and operations is transferred from a local to a foreign company, the former becoming
an a¢ liate of the latter (UNCTAD, 2000). However, it has not been until recently that
models in international economics have started to emerge, which enable us to understand
M&As. Nearys (2007) model takes the standard partial equilibrium explanations for M&As
one step further. In the literature, two motives are mentioned to explain M&As: a strategic
motive (reduce competition) and an e¢ ciency motive (cost reductions).
An explanation of cross-border M&As, however, also has to explain the cross-border
part of the deals. In this vein, trade theory suggests that comparative advantage could be
included in a full or general equilibrium explanation of M&As. A di¤erent but equally novel
line of research in international economics (see Navaretti and Venables, 2004; Helpman, 2006
for surveys), seeks to understand the conditions under which rms decide to locate (part of)
their production abroad (the so-called o¤-shoring decision).
Figure 3.2: Distribution of di¤erent types of FDI
When they decide to o¤shore, some rms do so under the ag of FDI, while other rms
go for outsourcing. However, in this stream of literature, and in contrast to its empirical
relevance illustrated in Figure 5.2, the analysis of cross-border M&As is still in its infancy.
Our overview of the structure of cross-border M&As is based on Thomsons Global Mergers
and Acquisitions Database, which provides the best and most extensive data source for
M&As to date. Its main sources of information are nancial newspapers and specialized
agencies like Bloomberg and Reuters. Our Thomson data set begins in 1979 and ends
in August 2006. Initially, the focus in the Thomson data set was on American M&As;
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nevertheless, systematic M&A data for almost all countries is available from the mid 1980s
onwards. Therefore, in presenting the data we will focus on the period 1986 2005.
We collected information on all completed /unconditional cross-border M&As with a
deal value of at least $10 million, which means that for the period 1986 2005 we have
27,541 cross-border M&As. As Table 3.1 shows, most M&As result in e¤ective ownership;
furthermore, about 50% of M&As take place within the same sector (i.e. horizontal M&As).
We can only speculate as to why this might be the case; however, as previously mentioned,6
a likely explanation is that most cross-border M&A are market seeking. That is, taking one
of your competitors out of the market reduces competition and raises prots. Furthermore,
buying a rm outside ones own sector might be motivated by an e¢ ciency motive, since it
can be protable to control a larger part of the value chain. Nonetheless, and regardless of
the strategy, both motives increase prots after the take-over.
Table 3.1: Overview of Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions
# of deals per cent
Cross-Border M&As, 1986-2005 27,541
E¤ective M&As 27,461 99.7
Avg. % of shares acquired 75.5
Avg. % of shares owned after deal 80.1
# of tender o¤ers 2,476 9.0
# of horizontal M&As (2-digit level) 13,605 49.4
Figure 3.3 illustrates that the share of horizontal M&As is very stable over time when
measured by the number of deals; uctuating around the average of 49 per cent (ranging
from a low of 45.1 per cent in 1986 to a high of 51.5 per cent in 1996). Horizontal M&As are
substantially more volatile when measured using the value of the deals; uctuating around
the average of 56 per cent, ranging from a low of 46.7 per cent in 1988 to a high of 73.0
per cent in 1999. Those who would argue that the value of horizontal M&As has declined
since 1999, are obviously obscuring the fact that the 1999 peak is not representative over a
longer time horizon. Moreover, the 2005 value of horizontal M&As of 55.2 per cent is very
close to the long run average of 56 per cent. Using either measure we nd little support
6Of course, strategic motives may (also) be at work here.
64 CHAPTER 3 UNLOCKING THE VALUE OF M&AS
Figure 3.3: Horizontal (2-digit) Cross-border M&As; share of total
for the argument that the share of horizontal M&As is declining. From an international
economics perspective, the question arises whether existing theories of FDI can explain the
dominance of horizontal FDI. On the face of it, this is not the case; assuming that during
our sample period (1985-2005) trade costs (broadly dened) have decreased, the standard
FDI model predicts that horizontal FDI should have become less important. In terms of
the proximity-concentration trade-o¤, a drop in trade costs shifts the trade-o¤ in favor
of exporting. That is, with falling trade costs foreign markets might be better served by
exporting instead of (horizontal) FDI. However, (Neary, 2008) shows that falling trade costs
might nonetheless explain the rise of horizontal FDI, and thus the bulk of cross-border
M&As7 (see Appendix A for a summary of Nearys (2007, 2008) reasoning). The puzzle
put forward in this paper depends on whether or not trade integration has indeed taken
place. Although the exact measurements of trade costs is di¢ cult (see Anderson and van
Wincoop, 2003), the consensus is that transportation costs in the period under consideration
have declined in general (Hummels, 2007).
A historical perspective reveals another remarkable characteristic of (cross-border) M&As.
Figure 3.4 depicts the evolution of all cross-border M&As over time for our sample period,
both measured as the number of deals and the value of deals (in constant 2005 $ bn., using
the US GDP deator). Clearly, even when looking at this relatively short period, there is
7Once we allow for an FDI model that explicitly incorporates the possibility of cross-border M&As,
instead of merely looking at FDI as a black box (Neary, 2007).
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substantial variation over time, with periods of rapid increase followed by periods of rapid
decline. This corroborates the more general nding that M&As come in waves. To date, ve
merger waves have been identied throughout the 20th century, three of which took place
after WWII (Andrade et al., 2001). The third wave took place in the late 1960-early 1970s.
The fourth wave ran from (about) the mid 1980s until 1990. The fth wave started around
1995 and ended in 2000 with the collapse of the new economy. Figure 3.4 also shows that
a subsequent sixth (still ongoing) merger wave started in the 21st century around 2003.8
Figure 3.4: Cross-Border M&As (1985-2005); # of Deals and Value
In rounding-up our stylized facts discussion regarding cross-border M&As, we focus on
inter-regional M&As in our sample. This gives us an indication of the extent to which
di¤erent global regions interact with one another by delivering more valuable cross-border
M&As. Figure 3.5 depicts the inter-regional cross-border connections for the period 2001-
2005, rounded to the nearest integer. Since there are 9 global regions there are 72 di¤erent
inter-regional connections.9 First, we note that by far the largest and most valuable inter-
regional M&A ows are from North America to Western Europe (28 per cent of the total),
and vice versa (22 per cent of the total). Together these two ows account for 50 per cent of
8Note the the data used in tis paper covers the fourth and fth waves.
9Only 19 of these ows appear in Figure 3.5, since the remaining 53 ows are rounded to 0 percent. This
already indicates that "zero" observations are important in the sample, and are important for the estimates
(see section 3.4).
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the value of all inter-regional M&As and clearly dwarf all other inter-regional connections.
Second, Western Europe is buying substantial amounts of rms in Eastern Europe (6 per
cent). Third, the other high-income region connections (between EUR and AAS and between
NAM and AAS) are considerable (about 5 per cent each). Fourth, M&A ows toward East
Asia and the Pacic are still rather small, certainly compared to the attention this receives
in the popular media. Fifth, and nally, Western Europe is the M&A center of gravity
vis-à-vis creating more value; in other words, it is the only global region with connections
to all other regions.10
Figure 3.5: Inter-regional Cross-border M&As; % of total (value), 2001-2005
3.3 Methodology and Estimation Strategy
By now, a standard tool to deal with distance-related cross-border economic interactions like
bilateral trade or FDI ows is the gravity model rst developed by Tinbergen (1962). After a
period in which the gravity model fell out of fashion for its lack of theoretical underpinnings
(despite its empirical success), the gravity model has seen a revival as it has become clear
that it can be derived from (a wide range of) theoretical models with solid micro-foundations
(see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003, for a trade survey, and Bersgtrand and Egger, 2007
10This is reminiscent of the role of Western Europe in inter-regional trade ows (van Marrewijk, 2007).
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for an FDI foundation). Notwithstanding this revival, the number of models that produce
a gravity-type specication is relatively large, thereby making the gravity model inapt as a
tool to discriminate between di¤erent theoretical trade models (see Helpman et al., 2008).
Our aim, however, is not to discriminate between theoretical trade models but merely to
test the relevance of distance and other determinants for the value of bilateral M&A ows,
specically in relation to the hypotheses derived by Neary (2007 and 2008).
Econometrically, the estimations of the gravity model, be it for trade ows or FDI ows,
are not without problems, given the zero gravity problem(see Anderson and vanWincoop,
2003; Feenstra, 2004; Bosker, 2008; Bosker and Garretsen, 2008). For our purposes this is
an important issue, since the percentage of observations with zero M&As, depending
on the precise (sub) sample, is quite high (see next section). The existence of zero M&A
ows constitutes a problem because the often-preferred log-linearized gravity specication
is undened for observations with zero ows. A proper handling of these zero observations
is therefore important (see Silva and Tenreyro, 2006; Helpman et al., 2008; Garita and van
Marrewijk, 2008). Furthermore, OLS estimates of the log-linearized model may be both
biased and ine¢ cient in the presence of heteroskedasticity.
A common method of handling the zero-gravityproblem thus far has been to simply
discard the zeros by truncating the sample and using OLS, or simply to add a constant factor
to each observation on the dependent variable and then estimate the gravity model through
a Tobit estimation. These approaches are correct as long as the zero values are randomly
distributed; however, if they are not random, as is often the case, then it introduces selection
bias (see Bosker, 2008). Until recently, this problem has been ignored in gravity studies,
but it can be handled by means of sample selection correction. In this light, Helpman et al.
(2008) propose a theoretical model rationalizing the zero trade ows and propose estimating
the gravity equation with a correction for the probability of countries to trade. In order to
estimate their model, they apply a two-step estimation technique (similar to sample selection
models commonly used in labor economics). To implement the new estimator, one needs
to nd an appropriate exclusion restriction for identication of the second stage equation,
which can be quite di¢ cult.11
11One could argue that the 2-step estimation procedure used by Helpman et al. (2008) is not introduced
for econometric purposes (i.e. to deal with the zero gravity problem), but follows directly from their
preferred trade-theoretical model (in the tradition of Melitz, 2003). In the latter model, it is crucial to
distinguish between the probability of trade and the volume of trade (or in their terminology, between the
extensive and intensive margins of trade), which is exactly what their 2-step-estimation procedure does. As
to the use of the exclusion restriction (a variable that in the 1st (probit) step is included to inuence the
probability of trade but is not part of the 2nd step as it is meant not to inuence the volume of trade),
Helpman et al. (2008) use religion (see also Bosker and Garretsen, 2008).
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The above suggestion to distinguish between two groups of observations to adequately
deal with the zero-ow problem can be done in an empirically exible way by using a zero-
inated approach (see Lambert, 1992), which is similar to the Heckman Selection model
but does not rely on the associated normality assumptions, and is therefore less restrictive
(Heckman, 1974 and Razin and Sadka, 2007 for an application on FDI).12 The zero-inated
model assumes that there are two latent groups of observations; an observation in the
(always 0) Passive Group has an outcome of 0 with a probability of 1; an observation in the
(potentially) Active Group might have a zero outcome, but there is a positive probability
that there is a non-zero outcome. This process is developed in two stages:
1. model membership into the latent groups (Active or Passive) using a logit model
and observed characteristics (so-called inationvariables because they inatethe
number of zeros).
2. model the value of cross-border M&As for observations in the Active Group via a
Poisson or negative binomial regression.
The Poisson model imposes the restriction that the conditional mean of the dependent
variable is equal to its variance. The negative binomial regression model generalizes the
Poisson model by introducing an individual unobserved e¤ect into the conditional mean
which allows for over-dispersion in the data (see Blonigen, 1997b; Coughlin and Segev, 2000;
Wooldridge, 2002; Barry et al., 2003). The approach can also use it for our non-integer data
(the value of M&As; see Santos-Silva and Tenreyro, 2006, for trade ows). The Vuong
(1989) test can be used for selection of non-nested models; repeated application provides
overwhelming support in favour of the zero-inated negative binomial (ZINB) model, such
that we restrict attention below to reporting the ZINB results.
3.4 Estimation Results
3.4.1 Baseline estimations
To test the model outlined above from the acquirers perspective, we analyze the value
of cross-border M&As undertaken by rms in a specic country for the period 1986-2005.
For both the acquiring and target country, and in line with the gravity approach, we in-
clude GDP and GDPpercapita as explanatory variables. As with bilateral trade, we expect
12This avoids the di¢ culty of trying to nd an appropriate exclusion restriction (Helpman et al., 2008).
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GDP (percapita) to have a positive e¤ect on cross border M&A for both the acquiring (ex-
porting) and target (importing) country. The bilateral (geodesic) distance (Distij) between
countries i and j is also included. As previously mentioned, cross-border M&As come in
waves. Therefore, in order to deal with this feature we construct two variables Wave1 and
Wave2, where the former (latter) denotes the number of cross border M&As in the year
(two years) prior to time t.
The variables common language, colony, and common border capture the transaction-
or information costs associated with cross border M&As; they are taken from the CEPII
database. We also include (de jure) nancial openness in our baseline specication, since
cross border M&As are an example of international capital ows. This variable (measured
by the Chinn-Ito index) is thought to have a positive e¤ect on M&As, in particular where
it concerns the nancial openness of the target country.13 As we explained in section 2, set
against the recent FDI models, the rise of FDI (in casu, cross border M&As) is not easy
to reconcile with ongoing economic integration (falling trade or transport costs). Apart
from economic integration, and di¤erent from gravity models of international trade, we
expect that cross border M&As are also (or even mainly) driven by the degree of nancial
integration and/or other nancial variables. When changing our baseline specication we
will include various nancial variables. In addition, we incorporate regional xed e¤ects (for
the regions introduced in Figure 3.5). Note, that these region xed e¤ects are di¤erent from
the country-based distance e¤ects.
Table 3.2 presents the estimation results for our baseline gravitymodel. The columns
related to the active group give estimates for the group for which the observations are
not necessarily zero, the columns with respect to the passive group give estimates for the
always-zero group of observations. With the exception of the wave variables, we use the
same characteristics for both groups. The signs for these variables are often opposite, which
makes intuitive sense. Note that we have indeed a very large number of zero observations.
The estimation results for the Active Group in Table 3.2 show that typical gravity variables
help to explain the value of cross-border M&As between countries. A larger market size
as measured by GDP leads to a higher value of M&As both from an acquirer and target
perspective. GDP per capita only has a positive e¤ect on the value of M&As from the target
perspective, indicating that market size is not the only income e¤ect determining the value
of M&As, but also that the distribution of income is important.
13See Chinn and Ito (2002, 2005) for more details on this index.
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Table 3.2: Baseline Estimates (Zero-Inated Negative Binomial)
Active Group Passive Group
(Neg Bin Model) (Logit Model)
Coef. irrA Coef. irrP
LnGDPacq 0.347  100 -0.680  -74
LnGDPtar 0.372  110 -0.708  -76
LnGDPpcacq 0.139 -1.354  -79
LnGDPpctar 0.342  49 -0.601  -50
LnDistij -0.285  -22 0.787  -95
Financial Openness
Acquirer 0.055  9 -0.161  -23
Target 0.028  5 -0.072  -11
wave1 0.01  7
wave2 0.02  31
Common Languagez 0.400  49 -1.143  35
Colonyz 0.454  58 -1.022  10
Common Borderz -0.136  -13 -0.441  -6
# of obs 255,468 Nonzero obs 5290
McFadden adj. R2 0.241 Reg. dummies yes
Notes: Dependent variable is value of deals; *, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1%
signicant levels. For at least the 10% signicance level, the coe¢ cients
can be interpreted as elasticities; irr = 100[exp(  StdDev)  1] =
% change in expected count for StdDev increase in X ; z the irr is
calculated as 100[exp()  1] for a discrete change of 0 to 1; StdDev =
standard deviation of X ; the wave coe¢ cients are multiplied by 100.
Regarding nancial openness, we nd that it is a prerequisite for M&As to take place
(the variables are strongly signicant in the column for the Passive Group), but that it is
relatively unimportant in determining the value of M&As. Capital mobility seems to act as
a cut-o¤ or hurdle variable; without capital mobility M&As are unlikely to occur at all.
What is the relation between economic integration (here approximated by the distance
variable Dij) and M&As? If distance proxies increased economic integration, then we nd
evidence in favor of Nearys GOLE model. That is, increased economic integration increases
competition in the home market, which lowers prots of the target (and acquirer) and makes
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a takeover more likely. In addition, increased integration makes prots of the acquirer in
foreign markets larger, which also increases the probability of a takeover, but prots of
the target also increase, which makes the probability smaller. The balance of all e¤ects is
positive (Neary, 2008). The negative sign of the distance variable is consistent with this line
of reasoning; that is, the lower the distance, the higher the value of M&As. In addition, the
wave variables further validate Nearys model, since initial M&As stimulate further M&As
because prots in the market increase with less competitors.
These e¤ects of economic integration are enlarged by the results for common language
and colony; if integration takes place in already culturally integrated areas (e.g. areas
that share the same jurisprudence), then this further stimulates M&As. In contrast to the
standard e¤ect for trade ows, the e¤ect of a common border on M&A activity is negative.
This is in line with expectations; that is, given that an M&A takes place, the negative border
e¤ect indicates that rms want to create some distance. For nearby economies, alternative
modes of entry are available. For example, at close range, exporting might be more protable
than setting up shop in foreign markets.
3.4.2 Baseline estimation sensitivity analysis
We also investigated the robustness of our results, by augmenting our baseline model with
several "pull" and "push" factors that are considered important determinants of cross-border
M&As (see Appendix B for estimation results). That is, while push factors may help
explain the timing and magnitude of new capital inows, pull factors may be necessary
to explain the regional distribution of new capital ows (Montiel and Reinhart, 1999).
US interest rates
An important "push" factor is the level of interest rates in the home country, which we
will proxy by the 10-year US bond yield. In the literature, there is a consensus that high
real interest rates hamper FDI, other things being equal. Albuquerque et al. (2005) nd a
signicant and negative relation between the US T-Bill yield and FDI inows; moreover,
Calvo et al. (2001) show that FDI inows to emerging markets are lower during US monetary
tightening. Our results are in line with the literature as far as the Active Group is concerned,
since the US yield coe¢ cient is negative and a one standard deviation increase in US interest
rate decreases the value of M&A activity by over 10%.
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Market structure
Unlike the surge in capital inows to developing countries in the 1970s and early 1980s,
which were almost exclusively driven by commercial bank lending, capital inows in the
1990s were associated with a stern rise in bond and equity portfolio inows; much of these
inows have gravitated towards larger equity emerging markets, bypassing many countries
(Montiel and Reinhart, 1999). An often given explanation is that markets must overcome a
threshold set of requirements (market size, accounting standards, disclosure requirements,
transparency, etc.) in order to attract capital ows. Accordingly, we augment our model
by including the lagged stock market capitalization as proxy for the size of the domestic
capital market (an indirect proxy for the size of the banking sector, see Montiel and Reinhart,
1999); we lag this variable to take care of any endogeneity issues. The results are mixed. For
the Active Group only the acquirer seems to benet from a more developed stock market.
For the passive group, the odds of remaining in this group decrease for the acquirer if the
capitalization of the stock market increases; however, the odds of remaining inactive in
M&As increase for the target as the stock market capitalization increases. We also add
the Transparency International corruption index14 (labeled Transparency) to proxy for the
business environment in the local economy. The results are in line with expectations, where
a less uncertain business environment will increase the value of M&As for the target country
in the Active Group by 28%.15 For the Passive Group, making the business environment
more transparent reduces the odds of remaining in this group for both acquirer and target
by about 10%.
Macroeconomic Distortions
We use the black market premium as a measure of expected depreciation of the local cur-
rency and an index of distortions. Expected depreciation a¤ects investment through several
channels: (1) it is more attractive to hold foreign assets; (2) economic uncertainty is higher;
(3) foreign capital goods are cheaper to import at the o¢ cial rate. The rst two points
suggest a negative relationship between the black market premium and foreign investment
while the third point implies the opposite. As an indicator of distortions, the black market
premium should be negatively correlated with the value of M&As. This is in line with our
ndings as a one standard deviation increase in the black market premium reduces the value
of cross-border M&As for the Active Group by 30% and increases the odds of remaining in
14The Transparency International corruption index ranges from 0 = highly corrupt, to 10 = highly clean.
15The coe¢ cient of the acquirer is not signicant.
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the Passive Group by 44%. Regarding the link between FDI and exchange rate uncertainty16
the literature is mixed, as volatility can both discourage FDI (Cushman, 1988) and produce
an incentive to hedge against exchange rate shocks through foreign location (Aizenman,
1991). In our comprehensive study we nd that these two forces balance as exchange rate
volatility does not inuence the value of cross-border M&As (in contrast to Blonigen, 1997b;
Froot and Stein, 1991).
Table 3.3: Outside Market Potential ZINB estimates
Active Group Passive Group
(Neg Bin Model) (Logit Model)
Coef. irrA Coef. irrP
LnGDPacq 0.269  67 -0.650  -71
LnGDPtar 0.160  35 -0.668  -72
LnGDPpcacq 0.252  33 -1.497  -82
LnGDPpctar 0.410  60 -0.690  -54
Ln(out. mrkt pottar) -0.284  13 0.784  119
LnDistij -0.260  -20 0.915  121
Financial Openness
Acquirer 0.050  8 -0.122  -18
Target 0.009 -0.058  -9
wave1 0.008
wave2 0.024  34
Common Languagez 0.411  51 -0.831  -57
Colonyz 0.618  5 -1.135  -68
Common Borderz -0.094  -1 -0.289  -25
# of obs 184,702 Nonzero obs 3012
McFadden adj. R2 0.232 Reg. dummies yes
Notes: Dependent variable is value of deals; *, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1%
signicant levels. For at least the 10% signicance level, the coe¢ cients
can be interpreted as elasticities; irr = 100[exp(  StdDev)  1]
= % change in expected count for StdDev increase in X; z the irr is
calculated as 100[exp()  1] for a discrete change of 0 to 1; StdDev
= standard deviation of X ; the wave coe¢ cients are multiplied by 100.
16As measured by the coe¢ cient of variation of the bilateral exchange rate.
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3.4.3 Market Potential
Following Blonigen et al. (2007), we introduce the market potential of the target country in
our model among the set of regressors to analyze the economic platform motive for M&As.
This variable is the distance weighted GDP of countries surrounding the target country,
where distance is measured in proportion to the distance between Brussels and Amsterdam
(173 km, in accordance with Blonigen et al, 2007).17 We nd a negative e¤ect for the
market potential variable; this implies that a di¤erent market is more attractive as a target
destination than as an attractive export platform. We conclude that the export platform
FDI motive is not sustained by our data (see Table 3.3), in line with Blonigen et al. (2007).
The other variables are consistent with our earlier ndings; thereby indicating that GDP of
the target is the dominant variable.
3.4.4 The baseline model over time
We are not only interested in the impact of distance (or economic integration) and nancial
openness on the value of cross border M&As as such, but also on changes in this relation
over time. We thus estimated our baseline model in four 5-year periods (1986-1990, 1991-
1995, 1996-2000, and 2001-2005). As previously mentioned, our working assumption is that
both economic and nancial integration have increased in our sample period; therefore, we
expect the e¤ect of distance to change over time. Firstly, Table 3.4 shows that the results
do not di¤er markedly from those for the total sample period regarding the impact of GDP
(per capita), waves, common border, and common colony. The distance coe¢ cients for both
the Active and Passive Groups have increased in absolute value terms (these results are
similar to Disdier and Head, 2008), implying that distance has become more important over
time. This holds in particular for the Passive Group coe¢ cients. Two observations are
important. First, why has the measured impact e¤ect of distance increased over time? To
understand this, one must realize that the estimated coe¢ cients are reduced form estimates
of equilibriumM&A decisions under changing circumstances. Economic integration is a local
phenomenon (EU integration focuses on neighboring European countries, and similarly for
NAFTA, ASEAN, etc.) which increases the attractiveness of nearby M&As, to which rms
respond by engaging more in local M&A activity.
17Distances below 173 Km are set equal to the normalization. Note that GDP of the target country itself
is not included in this outside measure, as it is already included separately.
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Table 3.4: Baseline ZINB estimates, separate periods
1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005
Active
LnGDPacq 0.354  0.287  0.365  0.368 
LnGDPtar 0.423  0.333  0.417  0.302 
LnGDPpcacq 0.039 0.078 0.257  -0.066
LnGDPpctar -0.354  0.300  0.400  0.338 
LnDistij -0.256  -0.269  -0.361  -0.279 
Financial Openness
Acquirer 0.084 0.064 0.225  -0.023
Target 0.112  0.128  0.024 0.000
wave1 0.03 0.03  0.01 0.02
wave2 0.05 0.05  0.03  0.05 
Common Languagez 0.170 0.223  0.587  0.457 
Colonyz 0.748  0.341  0.574  0.390 
Common Borderz -0.213 -0.252  -0.165 0.112
Passive
LnGDPacq -0.595  -0.649  -0.691  -0.727 
LnGDPtar -0.671  -0.662  -0.718  -0.765 
LnGDPpcacq -1.378  -1.032  -1.365  -1.534 
LnGDPpctar -1.167  -0.703  -0.497 -0.566 
LnDistij 0.564  0.772  0.793  0.910 
Financial Openness
Acquirer -0.327  -0.263  -0.116  -0.074 
Target -0.196  -0.124  -0.024 0.006
Common Languagez -0.716  -1.246  -1.094  -1.244 
Colonyz -1.145  -1.041  -1.018  -1.038 
Common Borderz -0.269 -0.500  -0.399  -0.438 
# of obs 68,209 67,514 88,972 57,683
Nonzero obs 667 1235 2242 1288
McFadden adj. R2 0.272 0.254 0.232 0.235
Region Dummies yes yes yes yes
Notes: Dependent variable is value of deals; *, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% signicant levels
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This, in turn, is reected in the increased impact of distance on M&As, particularly for
the Passive Group. Second, what do the changed coe¢ cients imply? Briey, the higher
impact of distance on M&As indicates that economic integration (reduction of distance,
broadly measured) is becoming more important over time. The e¤ects of common language
follow a similar pattern as the distance coe¢ cients; that is the coe¢ cients increase over time
(in absolute value) for both the Active and Passive Groups. This implies that as countries
have moved to reduce transaction (business) costs between them, the value of cross-border
M&As has increased accordingly. The e¤ect of colony on the value of M&As decreases over
time for the Active Group, whereas it remains relatively stable over time for the Passive
Group. Regarding the common border e¤ect, we nd that it is relatively stable over time,
but only a¤ects the Passive Group. In other words, as economic integration increases, and
countries start to sharea common border, the odds of remaining in the Passive Group
decrease considerably (approximately by 40%).
3.5 Conclusion
Most FDI is between similar (developed) countries, predominantly in the form of M&As.
This suggests that the market-seeking motive of FDI dominates the data. At present, this
seems to be the consensus in the literature. The empirical puzzle identied by Neary (2008)
is that we have witnessed both an increase of cross-border M&As and increased economic
integration. If the market-seeking motive indeed dominates the data, then these facts provide
us with a puzzle because increased integration should result in less M&As as markets can
more easily be served through exports instead of FDI. Neary (2008) suggests two solutions
to the puzzle: the export platform motive for FDI, and the prot-seeking motive that follows
from his own GOLE model. In the former case, FDI in a specic country gives access to
surrounding markets, whereas in the latter case M&As take place through a subtle balancing
act between higher prots and higher takeover costs. Using a zero-inated negative binomial
model, we nd evidence against the export platform motive; target GDP is more important
than distance weighted GDP of surrounding countries (with a negative impact). We also nd
in favor of Nearys (2008) GOLE model for M&As in a world characterized by increased
economic integration. Furthermore, we nd evidence in support of nancial openness as
a necessary condition for M&As to take place; once a threshold level is reached, nancial
openness has little impact on the value of M&As. Last, but not least, we conrm the impact
of ongoing economic integration on M&As, which like trade ows are becoming more local
(impact of distance increases over time).
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3.6 Appendix Chapter 3
This appendix presents a simple way to look at a cross-border M&A. However, the reader
must keep in mind that this box is more of a way of organizing thoughts, rather than a
complete model but it illustrates the key issues involved (for a complete model, the reader
is referred to Neary, 2007). Let 1and 0 indicate the post- and pre-merger situation,
respectively. Then the gain of taking over a Home rm, by a foreign rm is given by:
GH = [

1(n  1; n j :)  0(n; n j :)]  0(n; n j :) > 0 (3.1)
The rst term (in square brackets) relates to the gain in protability from reduced
competition by taking over the domestic rm; that is, the number of domestic rms is
reduced by 1, from n to (n   1). The number of foreign rms, n, does not change. The
second term indicates the cost of acquiring the domestic rm. This is a function of prots
of the target the more protable a target is the higher the take-over costs and the cost
of nancing the take-over. If the acquirer has a windfall gain, for example, higher share
prices due to the takeover, the nance costs are smaller The j : indicates that other variables
are taken as given (for example cost factors that reect di¤erences in relative costs). The
balance between the change in prots and the costs involved in the M&A determines whether
a takeover will take place. The inuence of the takeover cost is such that cost di¤erences
cannot be too large; otherwise, taking over a rm that is much more e¢ cient than the
acquirer is becomes too expensive.
How can economic integration (a fall in trade costs) go along with an increase in M&As?
First, as Neary (2008) points out, the export platform argument o¤ers an explanation that is
in line with the proximity-concentration models that seek to explain horizontal FDI. Firms
gain access to an integrated region by investing in one of its members in order to gain access
to the overall region. However, in the context of equation (1), economic integration also
leads to more horizontal FDIs, especially M&As, but for a di¤erent reason. For example,
a reduction in trade barriers increases the protability of an exporting rm in the foreign
market, and this makes a takeover more likely. Moreover, a reduction in trade barriers also
increases competition in both markets, since this increases the likelihood of a cross-border
M&A (as takeover costs become smaller), but on the other hand, it also reduces prots of
the acquirer, and this makes a takeover less likely. The balance is such that more economic
integration leads to more M&As (Neary, 2007 and 2008)
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Appendix B - Sensitivity Analysis
Table 3.5: Exchange Rate Variability ZINB estimates
Active Group Passive Group
(Neg Bin Model) (Logit Model)
Coef. irrA Coef. irrP
LnGDPacq 0.309  85 -0.672  -74
LnGDPtar 0.351  101 -0.711  -76
LnGDPpcacq 0.213  28 -1.383  -80
LnGDPpctar 0.339  49 -0.600  -51
LnDistij -0.271  21 0.837  104
Financial Openness
Acquirer 0.024 -0.173  -24
Target 0.045  7 -0.097  -14
Exchange rate var. 0.036 0.055
wave1 0.015  10
wave2 0.019  27
Common Languagez 0.610  84 -1.050  -65
Colonyz 0.387  47 -1.092  -67
Common Borderz -0.225  -20 -0.311  -27
# of obs 211,256 Nonzero obs 3921
McFadden adj. R2 0.249 Reg. dummies yes
Notes: Dependent variable is value of deals; *, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1%
signicant levels. For at least the 10% signicance level, the coe¢ cients
can be interpreted as elasticities; irr = 100[exp(  StdDev)  1]
= % change in expected count for StdDev increase in X ; z the irr is
calculated as 100[exp()  1] for a discrete change of 0 to 1; StdDev
= standard deviation of X ; the wave coe¢ cients are multiplied by 100.
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Table 3.6: US yield ZINB estimates
Active Group Passive Group
(Neg Bin Model) (Logit Model)
Coef. irrA Coef. irrP
LnGDPacq 0.343  99 -0.671  -74
LnGDPtar 0.383  115 -0.710  -76
LnGDPpcacq 0.399  59 -1.333  -79
LnGDPpctar 0.341  49 -0.587  -50
LnDistij -0.290  -22 0.765  92
Financial Openness
Acquirer 0.078  13 -0.178  -25
Target 0.039  6 -0.089  -13
US yield -11.975  -13 11.858  15
Common Languagez 0.421  52 -1.131  -68
Colonyz 0.493  64 -1.011  -64
Common Borderz -0.114 -0.366  -31
# of obs 282,378 Nonzero obs 5432
McFadden adj. R2 0.241 Reg. dummies yes
Notes: Dependent variable is value of deals; *, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1%
signicant levels. For at least the 10% signicance level, the coe¢ cients
can be interpreted as elasticities; irr = 100[exp(  StdDev)  1]
= % change in expected count for StdDev increase in X ; z the irr is
calculated as 100[exp()  1] for a discrete change of 0 to 1; StdDev
= standard deviation of X ; the wave coe¢ cients are multiplied by 100.
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Table 3.7: Black Market Premium ZINB estimates
Active Group Passive Group
(Neg Bin Model) (Logit Model)
Coef. irrA Coef. irrP
LnGDPacq 0.330  85 -0.638  -70
LnGDPtar 0.379  103 -0.643  -70
LnGDPpcacq 0.424  64 -1.386  -80
LnGDPpctar 0.256  35 -0.579  -49
LnDistij -0.289  -23 0.611  73
LnBMP
Acquirer -0.160  -26 -0.194  43
Target 0.003 -0.202  45
wave1 0.054  42
wave2 -0.037  -26
Common Languagez 0.332  39 -0.898  -59
Colonyz 0.556  74 -1.046  -65
Common Borderz -0.248  -22 -0.185  -17
# of obs 94,182 Nonzero obs 2595
McFadden adj. R2 0.226 Reg. dummies yes
Notes: Dependent variable is value of deals; *, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1%
signicant levels. For at least the 10% signicance level, the coe¢ cients
can be interpreted as elasticities; irr = 100[exp(  StdDev)  1]
= % change in expected count for StdDev increase in X ; z the irr is
calculated as 100[exp()  1] for a discrete change of 0 to 1; StdDev
= standard deviation of X ; the wave coe¢ cients are multiplied by 100.
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Table 3.8: Transparency ZINB estimates
Active Group Passive Group
(Neg Bin Model) (Logit Model)
Coef. irrA Coef. irrP
LnGDPacq 0.338  98 -0.677  -75
LnGDPtar 0.410  129 -0.694  -75
LnGDPpcacq 0.204  27 -0.963  -67
LnGDPpctar 0.103  13 -0.426  -39
LnDistij -0.295  -22 0.763  92
Financial Openness
Acquirer 0.107  19 -0.248  -32
Target 0.042  7 -0.104  -15
Transparency
Acquirer -0.008 -0.070  -19
Target 0.083  28 -0.062  -17
wave1 0.002
wave2 0.023  31
Common Languagez 0.408  50 -1.095  -67
Colonyz 0.452  57 -0.981  -63
Common Borderz -0.199  -18 -0.492  -6
# of obs 197,785 Nonzero obs 4002
McFadden adj. R2 0.246 Reg. dummies yes
Notes: Dependent variable is value of deals; *, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1%
signicant levels. For at least the 10% signicance level, the coe¢ cients
can be interpreted as elasticities; irr = 100[exp(  StdDev)  1]
= % change in expected count for StdDev increase in X ; z the irr is
calculated as 100[exp()  1] for a discrete change of 0 to 1; StdDev
= standard deviation of X ; the wave coe¢ cients are multiplied by 100.
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Table 3.9: Lagged Stock Market Capitalization ZINB estimates
Active Group Passive Group
(Neg Bin Model) (Logit Model)
Coef. irrA Coef. irrP
LnGDPacq 0.356  106 -0.654  -74
LnGDPtar 0.242  101 -0.739  -78
LnGDPpcacq -0.144 -0.931  -69
LnGDPpctar 0.343  49 -0.632  -52
LnDistij -0.286  -22 0.769  93
Financial Openness
Acquirer 0.064  11 -0.203  -28
Target 0.030 -0.116  -17
SMCt 1
Acquirer 0.005  22 -0.008  -28
Target 0.001 0.003  10
Common Languagez 0.252  29 -0.972  -62
Colonyz 0.571  77 -0.972  -62
Common Borderz -0.279  -24 -0.442  -36
# of obs 203,960 Nonzero obs 3608
McFadden adj. R2 0.252 Reg. dummies yes
Notes: Dependent variable is value of deals; *, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1%
signicant levels. For at least the 10% signicance level, the coe¢ cients
can be interpreted as elasticities; irr = 100[exp(  StdDev)  1]
= % change in expected count for StdDev increase in X ; z the irr is
calculated as 100[exp()  1] for a discrete change of 0 to 1; StdDev
= standard deviation of X ; the wave coe¢ cients are multiplied by 100.
Chapter 4
Financial Openness and Economic
Growth
4.1 Introduction
The1 nexus between international nancial openness and economic growth continues to be
one of the most hotly debated issues among international macroeconomists.2 That is, do
nancially open economies grow faster than nancially closed economies precisely because of
their openness to international nancial markets? Economic theory suggests that nancial
openness should foster economic growth; however, empirical work thus far has not found
robust evidence for the existence of such a link (Kose et al., 2006). Nevertheless, the extent
of nancial market liberalization around the world has increased signicantly, especially
since the 1980s, where a key driver has been the increased movement of capital ows
seeking the opportunity to diversify risk, while earning a higher return. At the same time,
many economies have stimulated capital inows by deregulating domestic nancial markets,
and by introducing market-oriented reforms. In particular, many developing and transition
economies have eliminated obstacles on international nancial transactions, while at the
same time have relaxed regulations on domestic nancial markets. In other words, policies
have been aimed at increasing nancial markets openness to foreign investors Furthermore,
the increase in the degree of integration of world capital markets has been accompanied by
1This chapter is co-authored with Leon Bettendorf.
2The fairly recent exchange between J. Stiglitz and K. Rogo¤, through a series of papers and open letters,
is perhaps the most clear example of the hotness of this debate.
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a signicant increase in private capital ows to developing countries.3
4.1.1 Theoretical Developments
The neoclassical textbook world shows that there are positive impacts on growth of inte-
grating into international capital markets (especially for developing countries). For example,
more nancial openness and closer nancial integration can strengthen the domestic nancial
system leading to more investment, to a more e¢ cient allocation of capital, and therefore
to higher economic growth (Levine, 2001). Furthermore, theoretical arguments supporting
nancial openness revolve around (a) the benets of international risk sharing for consump-
tion smoothing; and (b) the benecial impact of capital ows on investment and growth.
These potential benets can be particularly large for some types of capital inows, most
notably foreign direct investment (FDI). Therefore, it has been suggested by some promi-
nent economists that it is important to di¤erentiate between short-term (e.g. portfolio and
debt) and long-term capital ows (i.e. FDI); where the latter type of investment brings
with it not only resources, but also technology, access to markets, and knowledge. As em-
phasized by Berthélemy and Démurger (2000), Borensztein et al. (1998), and Grossman
and Helpman (1991), FDI may smooth the transfer of "know-how" (i.e. managerial and/or
technological); furthermore, it can improve the skills composition of the labor force as a
result of learning by doinge¤ects, investment in formal education, and on-the-job train-
ing. In addition, as discussed by Markusen and Venables (1999), although FDI may reduce
the prots of local rms due to increased competition in the product and factor markets,
spillover e¤ects through linkages to supplier industries may reduce costs, raise prots, and
stimulate investment. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, FDI is also not as volatile,
and therefore not as troublesome as short-term ows that can quickly come in and out of
a country.4 However, arguments against the economic wisdom of openness to global capital
ows have also been put forward. This side of the debate argues that nancial openness
is not necessarily welfare enhancing in the presence of distortions such as trade barriers,
weak institutions, and/or macroeconomic imbalances; or if information asymmetries a¤ect
the proper working of the international nancial markets (Bhagwati, 1998; Rodrik, 1998;
Rodrik and Subramanian, 2008; Stiglitz, 2000).
Financial openness might not only have an ambiguous e¤ect on the level but also on
the volatility of growth rates. On the one hand, access to world capital markets expands
3Even though now-a-days the "Lucas Paradox" (i.e. capital owing up-hill from developing countries to
developed countries) seems to be the prominent e¤ect (see Prasad et al., 2007).
4see Stiglitz (2000) for a further development of this argument.
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investorsopportunities for diversication and provides higher risk-adjusted rates of return.
From the point of view of the target country, there are many large benets as well. For
example, it has been argued that access to international nancial markets gives countries
the opportunity to borrow in order to smooth consumption vis-à-vis adverse shocks, and that
international risk sharing can improve growth and welfare gains (Obstfeld, 1994a). On the
other hand, the literature recognizes that volatility risk, quick reversals, and sudden stops in
capital ows in the context of highly integrated nancial systems may represent a signicant
cost, where concerns associated with such reversals were heightened by the nancial crises
of the 1990s (Agenor, 2001). In fact, both domestic and international nancial liberalization
appear to have been associated with costly nancial crises as documented by, for example,
Williamson and Mahar (1998). Although skewed fundamentals played a major role in all
of the abovementioned crises, they have also highlighted the instability of nancial markets
and the risks that the unhindered movement of capital ows across borders can create for
economies with "fragile" nancial systems, and for economies that lack the proper rules of
the game.
4.1.2 Empirical Developments
Despite a rich body of contributions, the empirical literature is still lacks convincing power
with regard to the nancial openness-growth nexus. As is stated by Prasad et al. (2003)
Theoretical models have identied a number of channels through which international -
nancial integration can promote economic growth in developing countries... However, there
is as yet no clear and robust empirical proof that the e¤ect is quantitatively signicant.
Empirical work by Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995), Kraay (1998), Edison et al. (2002), and
Fratzscher and Bussiere (2004) have not conrmed a robust long-term impact of nancial
openness on growth. Their results support Rodrik (1998) who concluded that capital con-
trols are essentially uncorrelated with long-term economic performance. On the other hand,
there are studies that do nd a signicant positive relationship between nancial openness
(i.e. openness to the international capital markets) and economic growth such as Quinn
(1997) and Edwards (2001). More recent research has aimed to shed more light on the
question whether the positive growth impact of nancial openness depends on thresholds
(or third factors) such as a sound institutional framework and macroeconomic stability, but
the results remained mixed at best (Arteta et al., 2001; Edison et al., 2002; Klein, 2005).5
5Detailed reviews of the literature on nancial openness and growth have been given by Eichengreen
(2002), Edison et al. (2002), Kose et al. (2006), and Henry (2007).
86 CHAPTER 4 FINANCIAL OPENNESS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
The theoretical literature that focuses on FDI identies a number of channels through
which FDI inows will be benecial to the target economy; yet, the empirical literature
has had di¢ culties identifying these advantages. Most prominently, a large number of
applied papers have looked at the FDI-growth nexus, but their results have been far from
conclusive (see Durham, 2004; Li and Liu, 2005). The consensus that is slowly emerging
is that FDI is benecial when compared to other types of capital inows such as portfolio
investment, though there are economists who maintain that even this benecial e¤ect is
limited. Additional research e¤orts have been devoted to identifying other features unique
to FDI, such as the positive externalities it generates, or its relative permanence (see Aitken
and Harrison (1999) for a micro-level study, and Fernadez-Arias and Montiel (1996); Sarno
and Taylor (1999) for macro-level studies). Notwithstanding these fragile conclusions, most
countries continue to vigorously pursue policies aimed at attracting FDI inows.
One reason why empirical research on the nancial openness-growth linkage has remained
inconclusive thus far is that di¤erent approaches and econometric techniques make it di¢ cult
to synthesize the results. That is, although the majority of economists begin the analysis
by using cross-country growth models, plenty of noticeable di¤erences linger with regard to
the countries in the sample, the period under investigation and the econometric procedure
employed (see Henry, 2007 for more evidence). Current research of the e¤ects of nancial
openness on economic growth have typically employed a neoclassical growth model; where
economists regress the growth rate of real per capita GDP on a measure for the degree of
international nancial openness or integration, in addition to a vector of control variables
which proxy fundamental growth drivers.6 However, the econometric models employed in
previous studies di¤er in two important respects: on the one hand with regard to the
measures for the degree of nancial openness (eithe de jure or de facto), and on the other
hand with regard to the econometric model (specication).
As previously mentioned, nancial integration has also (at times) been proxied by the
extent to which legal (or de jure) restrictions hinder the free movement of capital (Quinn,
1997; Rodrik, 1998; Chinn and Ito, 2005). However, it has also been argued that nancial
openness should be measured quantitatively (i.e. de facto)7 (see Kose et al., 2006). The
second main issue that needs to be considered, relates to the specication of the empirical
model. Some authors like (Edison et al., 2002) have made the case that short-term policy
6Such as the investment to GDP ratio, human capital, plus a convergence e¤ect.
7Kraay (1998) is one of the rst to have used gross capital ows and stocks divided by GDP as a
quantitative proxy for the extent of international nancial integration. As mentioned by Henry (2007),
Eichengreen (2001) and Edison et al. (2002) discuss the advantages of both approaches, where the choice of
the econometric model is a question of both convenience and data availability.
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variables like the budget decit and ination need to be included (Henry, 2007). Others
researchers have controlled for a more restrictive set of long-run determinants of economic
growth ala Levine and Renelt (1992) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). In particular, the
inclusion of the investment ratio has proved problematic. Edison et al. (2002), Eichengreen
and Leblang (2003), Klein and Olivei (1999), and Bekaert et al. (2006), did not include it (on
grounds of potential endogeneity), although the motivation has not always been discussed
in detail8. Other authors such as Rodrik (1998), Edwards (2001), Klein (2003) and Arteta
et al. (2001) explicitly control for di¤erent investment ratios at the beginning of the period
under investigation (Henry, 2007). In this respect, a key issue for any development strategy
is to identify the fundamentals that may allow economies (especially developing economies)
to exploit the upside, while minimizing the downside risks often linked with the openness of
their nancial markets (i.e. open capital accounts).
4.1.3 The Road Ahead
The point of departure for the research herein, is the link between nancial openness and
growth, where the empirical literature (thus far) suggests that the link between nancial
openness and growth is weak. In this light, we employ a bias corrected LSDV (least squares
dummy variable) dynamic panel data model. The results indicate that for developing coun-
tries, nancial openness and FDI have a positive direct e¤ect on economic growth, in addition
to an indirect e¤ect through capital accumulation. Furthermore, M&As stimulate economic
growth through capital accumulation. The results for developed economies are markedly
di¤erent; for example, nancial openness does not have a signicant e¤ect on growth, ei-
ther directly or indirectly. However, FDI and portfolio inows, both contribute directly to
economic growth. Moreover, portfolio inows also have an e¤ect on growth through capital
accumulation. The one similarity between developed and developing economies is that FDI
positively a¤ects TFP in both cases.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data and the econometric
methodology. Section 3 explores the link between nancial openness and economic growth.
Section 4 explores the link between FDI and investment through crowding-in or crowding-
out e¤ects. Section 5 decomposes capital ows as has been argued by Stiglitz (2000) and
others; while section 6 breaks-down FDI into its largest component (M&As). Section 7
discusses absorptive capacity and "relative backwardness" issues, while section 8 closes the
research circle by looking at the e¤ects of nancial openness, FDI, and portfolio ows on
8For a detailed exposition of this issue, see Bosworth and Collins (2003).
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TFP. Last but not least, section 9 summarizes and concludes.
4.2 Data & Econometric Methodology
In order to test the hypothesis that nancial openness and di¤erent types of capital ows
have a positive e¤ect on economic growth, we use a dynamic panel-data methodology to
estimate a cross-country growth regression. This methodology makes it possible to control
for country-specic e¤ects, and to account for the potential endogeneity of the explanatory
variables, in addition to autocorrelation and persistence. This section rst describes the
variables used in the regressions. Five-year periods are employed, which is typical in the
literature, since ve years is thought to be long enough to eliminate business-cycle e¤ects, but
short enough to capture important changes that occur over time for a particular country (see
Henry, 2007). Moreover, we decompose the sample into developing and developed countries
(see the list of countries in Appendix A).
In order to estimate the relationship between nancial openness, di¤erent types of capital
ows and economic growth, it is important to control for other determinants of the growth
rate. The control variables were selected based on the literature as important determinants of
growth rates across countries.9 Two of the variables employed in the estimation are measured
at the beginning of each period, and thus proxy for initial conditions in a neoclassical model.
The rst variable is log of per capita income, where the neoclassical model suggests that
the coe¢ cient on per capita income represents the convergence e¤ect and thus should be
negative. The second variable is a measure of the stock of human capital, where growth
theory predicts that the coe¢ cient on the stock of human capital should be positive. For
the human capital variable we use the secondary school completion rate of people over 25
years of age, taken from the Barro and Lee data set.10
4.2.1 LSDVC Dynamic Panel Estimation
Situations in which past decisions impact on current behavior are ubiquitous in economics;
that is, a crucial issue in empirical economics, strictly related to the modeling of dynamic
relationships, is the presence of unobserved country heterogeneity and characteristics. Panel
data sets, where the behavior of N cross-sectional units is observed over T periods, provide
9Appendix D describes the variables used in the analysis, while Appendix E gives the summary statistics.
10The other control variables are measured as averages over each ve-year period, spanning 1970-2005,
and are drawn from a number of sources detailed in Appendix D.
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a solution to accommodating the joint occurrence of dynamics and unobserved "individ-
ual" heterogeneity in the issue of interest. Since Nickell (1981), where it is shown that the
Least Square Dummy Variable estimator (LSDV) is not consistent for nite T in autoregres-
sive panel data models, a number of consistent instrumental variable (IV) and Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) estimators have been proposed in the econometric literature
as an alternative to LSDV. Anderson and Hsiao (1982) suggest two simple IV estimators
that, upon transforming the model in rst di¤erences in order to eliminate the unobserved
individual heterogeneity, use the second lags of the dependent variable (either di¤erenced or
in levels), as an instrument for the di¤erenced one-time lagged dependent variable. Arellano
and Bond (1991) propose a GMM estimator for the rst di¤erenced model, which, relying
on a greater number of internal instruments is more e¢ cient than the Anderson and Hsiao
estimator. Moreover, Blundell and Bond (1998) observe that with highly persistent data
rst-di¤erenced IV or GMM estimators may su¤er of a severe small sample bias due to weak
instruments. As a solution, they suggest a "system GMM estimator" with rst-di¤erenced
instruments for the levels-equation and instrument in levels for the rst-di¤erenced equation.
A weakness of IV and GMM estimators is that their properties hold for large N, so they
can be severely biased and imprecise in panel data consisting of a small number of cross-
sectional units (as is often the case in most macro panels). On the other hand, Monte Carlo
studies (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Kiviet, 1995; Judson and Owen, 1999) demonstrate that
LSDV, although inconsistent, has a relatively small variance compared to IV and GMM esti-
mators. Moving from the foregoing considerations, an alternative approach based upon the
bias-correction of LSDV has recently become popular in the econometric literature. Nickell
(1981) shows the inconsistency of the LSDV estimator for N  ! +1, which is bounded of
order T 1. Kiviet (1995) uses more robust techniques to approximate the small sample bias
found in the LSDV estimator; he includes expressions in the order of N 1T 1. As Bruno
(2005) explains, the approximation terms evaluated at the unobserved true parameter val-
ues, are of no direct use for estimation; therefore, to make them operational he suggests
replacing the true parameters by the estimates from some consistent estimators. Monte
Carlo evidence therein shows that the bias-corrected LSDV estimator (LSDVC) performs
better than the IV-GMM estimators in terms of bias and root mean squared error. In ad-
dition, Judson and Owen (1999) strongly support the bias-corrected LSDV estimator for
macroeconomic panels (i.e. when N is small).
As Bruno (2005) exaplains, in Kiviet (1999), the bias expression is more accurate to
include terms of at most order N 1T 2. Furthermore, Bun and Kiviet (2003), upon sim-
plifying the approximations in Kiviet (1999), carry out Monte Carlo experiments showing
90 CHAPTER 4 FINANCIAL OPENNESS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
that the rst order term of the approximation evaluated at the true parameter values is
already capable of accounting for more than 90% of the actual bias. However, none of the
above-mentioned procedures to correct the LSDV estimator is feasible for unbalanced pan-
els. This gap is lled in Bruno (2005), where the bias approximations in Bun and Kiviet
(2003) "are extended to accommodate unbalanced panels with a strictly exogenous selection
rule" (Bruno, 2005) . Therefore, we will employ the bias corrected LSDV estimator for
unbalanced panels as developed by Bruno (2005), where the correction we employ is based
on the "system GMM" estimator as developed by Blundell and Bond (1998).
4.3 Financial Openness and Growth Results
The literature has long recognized that it is remarkably di¢ cult to gauge the degree of
the openness of the capital account (see Eichengreen, 2001; Edison et al., 2004). As Chinn
and Ito (2005) argue, although there has been considerable e¤ort aimed at capturing the
extent and intensity of capital account controls, the consensus in the literature is that any
such measures fail to capture (in its entirety) the complexity of capital controls for a num-
ber of reasons. First, usual measures of measuring capital controls (or nancial openness)
fail to account for the intensity of capital controls, where the most prominent example of
such measures include dummy variables based upon the IMFs Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Second, the IMF dummy variables
are too aggregated to illustrate the complexity of actual capital controls (see Edison et al.
2004); that is, capital controls can di¤er depending on the direction of capital ows as well
as the type of nancial transactions targeted. Thirdly, it is di¢ cult to discriminate between
de jure and de facto capital controls, since these policies are often implemented regardless
of whether they actually control the volume and/or type of capital owing into an economy.
On the other hand, the private sector has the incentive to circumvent any capital account
controls (and in many occasions they succeed); thereby cancelling out the expected e¤ect of
this type of regulation (Edwards, 1999; Chinn and Ito, 2005). Therefore, researchers often
talk about nancial integration among economies and interpret it as de facto restrictions on
capital transactions (Chinn and Ito, 2005).
In here, we rely on the nancial openness index developed by Chinn and Ito (2002), which
is the rst principle component of the four IMF binary variables found in the AREAER. One
of the qualities of their index is that it measures the intensity of capital controls insofar as the
intensity is correlated with the existence of other restrictions on international transactions
(Chinn and Ito, 2005).
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By the nature of its construction, one may argue that the Chinn-Ito index measures
the extensiveness of capital controls, because it may not directly refer to the strictness of
restrictions on cross-border transactions, but to the existence of di¤erent types of restric-
tions; however, measuring the extensiveness of capital controls may be a good proxy for the
intensity of capital controls11. Another merit of this index, is its wide coverage of more than
150 countries and for the period 1970 through 2005 (see Chinn-Ito, 2002, 2005, and 2007
for a description of their index).
Table 4.1 reports the results of de jure nancial openness on growth for developing
economies. The rst specication (1.1) shows that the three standard control variables have
the expected sign, where growth benets from a catching-up e¤ect, a higher investment rate
and a better educated labor force. The trade openness measure in (1.2) does not contribute
signicantly to growth; however, the nancial openness index in (1.3) has a signicant
positive e¤ect. In the last two columns we include interaction e¤ects with the (ln) GDP
per capita level.12 The results that include trade openness do not improve after including
a threshold e¤ect (1.4). In contrast, the rejection of specication (1.3) against (1.5) means
that the e¤ect of nancial liberalization is not uniform over the countries. Interestingly, the
negative interaction coe¢ cient points at an opposite threshold e¤ect vis-à-vis the literature,
since the marginal e¤ect of nancial openness is the largest for the "less wealthy" developing
countries.13 This argument is better illustrated through Figure 4.1, which depicts the total
e¤ect including the 95% condence intervals.14 Figure 4.1 also shows that an improvement
in nancial openness by, for example, easing capital account restrictions, stimulates growth
signicantly for those countries that have had (or have) an income level lower than 5000
PPP-2000$s (i.e. lnGDPpc = 8:5).
11The Quinn (1997) index as a measure of the intensity of capital controls. The Quinn index is a composite
measure of nancial regulation that ranges from 0 to 14, with 14 representing the least regulated and most
open regime. According to Chin and Ito (2005), the correlation between the Quinn index and their index is
83.7%, suggesting that their index proxies the intensity of capital controls.
12Interaction e¤ects with human capital and the black market premium yield similar results and are
therefore not reported.
13See section 4.7, for more on this seemingly contradictory results vis-à-vis the literature.
14The total e¤ect is calculated as 1+ 2 lnGDPpc, where 1 denotes the coe¢ cient of FinOpen and 2
the interaction coe¢ cient. For the moment d[I=Y ]=dF inOpen = 0.
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Table 4.1: Financial Openness and Growth for Developing Economies
Dependent variable: lnGDPpc
1:1 1:2 1:3 1:4 1:5
lnGDPpct 1 -0.047 -0.053 -0.055 -0.053 -0.077
(0.048) (0.048) (0.057) (0.049) (0.054)
Initial lnGDPpc -3.174  -3.082  -3.029  -3.181  -2.863 
(0.742) (0.732) (0.715) (0.825) (0.702)
Investment rate 0.268  0.282  0.245  0.282  0.239 
(0.059) (0.066) (0.060) (0.065) (0.059)
Human Capital 0.105  0.114  0.082 0.111  0.078
(0.045) (0.047) (0.057) (0.048) (0.057)
Trade Openness -0.008 -0.023
(0.010) (0.063)
Financial Openness 0.446  4.460 
(0.235) (1.934)
Trade Open*lnGDPpc 0.002
(0.007)
Fin Open*lnGDPpc -0.487 
(0.228)
observations 433 433 424 433 424
Notes: bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis
;; are 10%, 5%, 1% signicance levels respectively
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Figure 4.1: Marginal E¤ect of Financial Openness on Growth for Developing Economies
(with 95% condence interval)
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The results are markedly di¤erent between developing and developed countries, see Table
4.2. As far as developed economies, the rst specication (2.1) shows that for the three
standard control variables growth only benets signicantly from a higher investment rate.
However, de jure nancial openness does not a¤ect growth signicantly, which is logical
in view of the already "e¢ cient" capital markets in developed countries. Furthermore, an
increase in nancial openness does not improve growth signicantly even after taking into
account threshold e¤ects (see 2.3 and 2.5). However, for developed economies more trade
openness stimulates growth (2.2 and 2.4).
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Table 4.2: Financial Openness and Growth for Developed Economies
Dependent variable: lnGDPpc
2:1 2:2 2:3 2:4 2:5
lnGDPpct 1 0.088 -0.091 0.091 -0.061 0.113 
(0.112) (0.113) (0.079) (0.119) (0.086)
Initial lnGDPpc -1.551 -2.550  -2.331  -2.408  -2.314 
(1.096) (1.045) (1.085) (1.059) (1.076)
Investment rate 0.175  0.223  0.219  0.213  0.205 
(0.065) (0.064) (0.078) (0.064) (0.075)
Human Capital 0.033 0.047  0.049  0.045  0.047 
(0.023) (0.022) (0.028) (0.022) (0.028)
Trade Openness 0.055  0.480 
(0.013) (0.212)
Financial Openness 0.145 3.781
(0.182) (4.904)
Trade Open*lnGDPpc -0.040 
(0.019)
Fin. Open*lnGDPpc -0.378
(0.507)
observations 132 132 127 126 127
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis
;; are 10%, 5%, 1% signicant levels respectively.
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In the above regressions, we estimated the e¤ect of nancial openness while controlling
for changes in the investment rate; now lets turn to the impact of nancial openness on the
investment rate. The results shown in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 indicate that (de jure) nancial
openness has a positive e¤ect on capital accumulation for both developing and developed
economies. The estimate is robust to including government expenditures and a political
rights index (see columns 3:2(4:2) and 3:3(4:3)). Furthermore, this e¤ect does not signi-
cantly interact with human capital (see column 3:4(4:4)). These ndings partially contradict
Bonglioli (2007), who found no e¤ect whatsoever of nancial openness on capital accumu-
lation for developing countries. However, she uses a dummy variable to proxy for nancial
openness and therefore, only allows for the possibility that countries are either completely
open or completely closed.
Table 4.3: E¤ect of Financial Openness on (I/Y) for Developing Economies
Dependent variable: I=Y
3:1 3:2 3:3 3:4
(I=Y )t 1 0.584
 0.584  0.567  0.566 
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.055)
Human Capital -0.139  -0.139  -0.141  -0.131 
(0.044) (0.044) (0.051) (0.051)
Fin. Openness 0.662  0.666  0.752  1.078 
(0.176) (0.176) (0.284) (0.414)
G/Y -0.015 -0.001 -0.002
(0.042) (0.049) (0.049)
Political Rights -0.152 -0.157
(0.152) (0.152)
Fin. Openness*HC -0.019
(0.017)
observations 471 471 425 425
Notes: bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis
, ,  are 10%, 5%, 1% signicant levels respectively
96 CHAPTER 4 FINANCIAL OPENNESS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Table 4.4: E¤ect of Financial Openness on (I/Y) for Developed Economies
Dependent variable: I=Y
4:1 4:2 4:3 4:4
(I=Y )t 1 0.603
 0.602  0.593  0.582 
(0.088) (0.074) (0.088) (0.091)
Human Capital -0.074  -0.068  -0.068  -0.031 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.030)
Fin. Openness 0.586  0.560  0.560  1.256 
(0.252) (0.249) (0.310) (0.486)
G/Y -0.091 -0.101 -0.185
(0.154) (0.146) (0.156)
Political Rights -0.367 -0.261
(0.274) (0.278)
Fin. Openness*HC -0.022
(0.014)
observations 127 127 118 118
Notes: bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis
, ,  are 10%, 5%, 1% signicant levels respectively
4.4 Capital Inows and Investment
The following sections measure nancial openness by de facto capital ows, in particular we
distinguish between FDI inows and portfolio inows, where theory predicts that the former
type of capital ows can simulate economic growth by augmenting capital accumulation
and/or by improving total factor productivity (this section focuses on the rst channel; see
section 8 for the TFP channel). The growth impact of FDI ows has attracted renewed
interest in the wake of the "recent" FDI boom; however, while the theoretical literature
has pointed out that FDI may boost growth, the empirical literature shows considerable
disagreement vis-à-vis the relevance of these impacts. On the one hand, rm-level data often
nd no signicant productivity e¤ects of FDI (see for example Fernadez-Arias and Montiel,
1996). On the other hand, macro-level studies tend to conclude that FDI boosts growth via
higher productivity and/or physical investment (see World Bank, 2001), while other papers
argue that this requires the target economy to satisfy certain thresholds (see Borensztein
et al., 1998); moreover, other more recent studies are even less successful in establishing the
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connection between FDI and economic growth (see Blonigen and Wang, 2004; Carkovic and
Levine, 2005). Despite these ambiguities, private capital ows are generally found to have
a signicant impact on domestic investment, with the relationship being strongest for FDI
and international bank lending, and weaker for portfolio ows (Bosworth and Collins, 1999).
Table 4.5: E¤ect of Di¤erent Capital Flows on (I/Y) for Developing Economies
Dependent variable: I=Y
5:1 5:2 5:3 5:4 5:5
(I=Y )t 1 0.525
 0.503  0.502  0.504  0.474 
(0.061) (0.057) (0.075) (0.061) (0.053)
Initial lnGDPpc 0.353 0.620 0.567 0.524 0.692
(1.418) (1.404) (1.553) (1.646) (1.520)
Human Capital -0.062 -0.037 -0.031 -0.035 -0.023
(0.072) (0.083) (0.079) (0.088) (0.086)
lnBMP -0.523  -0.558  -0.567  -0.579 
(0.193) (0.678) (0.262) (0.346)
FDI Inows 0.559  0.633  0.623  0.616 0.628 
(0.195) (0.221) (0.267) (0.423) (0.250)
Portfolio Inows 0.145 0.155 0.168 0.199
(0.315) (0.345) (0.323) (0.327)
G/Y -0.035 -0.037 -0.013
(0.085) (0.101) (0.101)
Political Rights -0.089
(2.317)
FDI Inows*HC 0.0006
(0.020)
FDI Inows*lnBMP -0.030
(0.114)
observations 278 222 221 222 222
Notes: bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis
, ,  are 10%, 5%, 1% signicant levels respectively
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Table 4.5 shows the results for the investment equation for developing economies, where
both the initial GDP-level and the human capital variables do not enter any of the speci-
cations signicantly. I also incorporate the (ln)black market premium as an indicator of
economic instability, since the black market premium can be interpreted as both a measure
of expectations of depreciation of the localcurrency, and as a rudimentary index of dis-
tortions. Expectations of depreciation may a¤ect investment through several channels: (1)
it is more attractive to hold foreign assets when a depreciation is expected; (2) economic
uncertainty is higher under such conditions; (3) for those who can obtain foreign exchange
at the o¢ cial rate, foreign capital goods are cheap to import. While the rst two points
suggest a negative relationship between the black market premium and economic growth
(and investment), the third point implies the opposite. Furthermore, to the extent that the
black market premium serves as a general index of distortions, and therefore of an unsus-
tainable situation, it is likely to be negatively correlated with investment and GDP per
capita growth.
As expected, investment falls with this premium. In the specications without a thresh-
old (5:1   5:3), an increase in FDI inows of 1% leads to a 0:6% increase in I=Y , indicat-
ing that FDI might be crowding out domestic investment in developing economies, which
contrasts with Borensztein et al. (1998) who found a (non-robust) crowding in e¤ect for
developing countries.15 Moreover, portfolio inows do not have a signicant e¤ect on the
investment rate (5:2). Adding the share of government expenditures (G/Y) and an index
of political rights does not change the estimates in (5:3). The last two columns introduce
interaction e¤ects with FDI inows; however, these interaction terms are not signicant,
and the total e¤ect of FDI inows on the investment ratio remains stable at around 0:6.
As far as developed economies, once again we nd that in comparison to developing
economies, the results are markedly di¤erent (see Table 4.6). However, one major di¤erence
in the specication, is that instead of using the black market premium (which is almost
non-existent for developed economies), we use the size of the public sector as a basic control
variable. In all specications, the G=Y -ratio has a signicant negative e¤ect, which simply
means that scal discipline is benecial for economic growth on average. Interestingly, while
FDI inows do not have a signicant e¤ect on investment, portfolio inows are positively
and signicantly correlated with the investment ratio.16
15The hypothesis that the coe¢ cient is larger than one is rejected for the rst two specications.
16Investment in the rich, homogenous countries does seem to depend only on capital inows that do not
aim at controlling a rm. Furthermore, this results conrms the "nancial development" argument, since
nancial markets in developed economies are highly developed.
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Table 4.6: E¤ect of Di¤erent Capital Flows on (I/Y) for Developed Economies
Dependent variable: I=Y
6:1 6:2 6:3 6:4
(I=Y )t 1 0.576
 0.568  0.560  0.666 
(0.101) (0.103) (0.107) (0.069)
Initial GDPpc 2.699 2.066 1.950 0.659
(1.710) (1.752) (1.767) (1.439)
Human Capital -0.067  -0.060 -0.035 -0.061
(0.037) (0.041) (0.047) (0.556)
G/Y -0.321  -0.360  -0.407  -0.478 
(0.167) (0.178) (0.175) (0.156)
FDI Inows 0.025 0.041 0.587 0.136
(0.166) (0.161) (0.642) (0.154)
Portfolio Inows 0.140  0.148  0.138  1.024 
(0.061) (0.071) (0.075) (0.236)
Political Rights -0.496 -0.442 -0.382
(0.326) (0.337) (0.325)
FDI*HC -0.011
(0.013)
Portfolio*HC -0.022 
(0.007)
observations 120 111 111 111
Notes: bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis
, ,  are 10%, 5%, 1% signicant levels respectively
Moreover, FDI-inows remain insignicant when an interaction e¤ect with human capital
is included (6.3); however, the e¤ect of portfolio inows does vary with the education level
of the labor force (6.4). Figure 4.2 illustrates this point, where the total e¤ect of portfolio
inows on the investment ratio is signicantly positive as long as the secondary school rate
is less than 36%.17 Moreover, crowding-in e¤ects can not be rejected for countries with lower
17These results might seem odd at rst sight, since they do not appear to be in line with the absorption
capacity approach that claims that countries must have a minimum level of human capital for attracting
foreign capital. However, "relative backwardness" (Findlay, 1978) has been shown to play a major role
vis-à-vis spillovers having a major impact on the (further) development of economies. See section 4.7 for a
further discussion.
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levels of human capital.18
Figure 4.2: Marginal E¤ect of Portfolio Inows on the Investment rate for Developed
Economies (with 95% condence interval)
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4.5 Decomposing Capital Flows
An alternative avenue of analysis into the outcome of nancial openness, which we pursue in
this section, is based on the view that capital ows are not all the same. For example, Stiglitz
(2000) has argued that countries should pursue long-term capital ows, while controlling the
short-term ows.19 Capital ows that are characterized by "equity-like" features are not only
believed to be more stable and less prone to reversals (see Wei, 2006), but are also believed
to carry with them many indirect benets of nancial globalization, such as transfers of
managerial and technological expertise.20
While we realize that it is di¢ cult to state unequivocally that private capital ows drive
growth (since it could be that domestic growth drives capital ows), the evidence does seem
18The upper bound of the condence interval exceeds one for Greece (1970-1980), Portugal (1970-2000)
and Spain (1970-1985).
19Stiglitzs argument is based on the serious repercussions to an economy from attracting short-term ows.
20In the literature, it is argued that FDI can help decrease a rmsnancing constraints. For example,
Blalock and Gertler (2005) nd that FDI can alleviate the unfavorable e¤ects of nancial crisis by helping
rms maintain uninterrupted access to credit through their parent companies.
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to point to the idea that private capital ows can, at the very least, reinforce the growth
process. Although economic theory and empirical investigations have much to say about
where international capital ows may gravitate,21 both theory and evidence are less precise
about the impact of such ows on the "local" economy. For example, once in a country,
private capital ows may increase domestic consumption, investment, and/or TFP, or they
may principally increase a countrys foreign exchange reserves. However, if ows are driven
merely by incentives to evade taxes or jump other legal barriers, money may ow out of a
country as quickly as it ows in.
Table 4.7: Growth and the Decomposition of Capital Flows for Developing Economies
Dependent variable: lnGDPpc
7:1 7:2 7:3 7:4
lnGDPpct 1 0.156  0.135  0.113  0.032
(0.075) (0.064) (0.064) (0.065)
Initial GDPpc -3.043  -3.025  -2.702  -2.447 
(0.832) (0.921) (0.893) (1.159)
Human Capital 0.125  0.101  0.148  0.124 
(0.050) (0.058) (0.067) (0.067)
(G/Y) -0.044 -0.086  -0.085  -0.025
(0.059) (0.050) (0.049) (0.077)
FDI Inows 0.290  0.266  0.555  0.335 
(0.104) (0.121) (0.252) (0.114)
Portfolio Inows -0.064 0.014 0.174
(0.136) (0.147) (0.248)
FDI Inows*HC -0.013
(0.010)
FDI Inows*lnBMP -0.011
(0.087)
observations 294 289 289 222
Notes: bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis
*, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% signicance levels respectively
21For the macroeconomic drivers of long-term (M&A) capital ows, see Garita and van Marrewijk (2008)
and/or Chapter 2 of this book.
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Table 4.7 shows that FDI inows are indeed benecial to an emerging marketsgrowth
prospects. However, while most of the burgeoning literature analyzing portfolio ows into
emerging markets suggests that portfolio equity ows should have a positive and signicant
impact on economic growth, the results in Table 4.7 do not conrm this positive association.
FDI inows stimulate economic growth, independent of interactions with human capital or
the (ln)black market premium (columns 7:3 and 7:4).
Table 4.8: Growth and the Decomposition of Capital Flows for Developed Economies
Dependent variable: lnGDPpc
8:1 8:2 8:3 8:4 8:5
lnGDPpct 1 -0.064 -0.048 -0.074 -0.064 -0.077
(0.086) (0.099) (0.087) (0.091) (0.090)
Initial GDPpc -1.775 -1.747  -1.894  -2.269  -2.354 
(1.133) (1.124) (1.125) (1.142) (1.137)
Human Capital 0.023 0.022 0.024 0.066  0.036 
(0.019) (0.022) (0.019) (0.025) (0.018)
(G/Y) -0.294  -0.314  -0.293  -0.367  -0.376 
(0.098) (0.089) (0.102) (0.098) (0.098)
FDI Inows 0.212  0.189  1.075  0.237 
(0.072) (0.099) (0.383) (0.098)
Portfolio Inows 0.036  0.009 -0.004 0.423 
(0.021) (0.024) (0.025) (0.166)
FDI Inows*HC -0.018 
(0.008)
Portfolio_Inows*HC -0.009 
(0.004)
observations 126 127 126 126 126
Notes:bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis
*, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% signicance levels respectively
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Figure 4.3: Marginal E¤ects of Portfolio Inows on Economic Growth for Developed
Economies (with 95% condence interval)
Figure 4.4: Marginal E¤ects of FDI inows on Economic Growth for Developed Economies
(with 95% condence interval)
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As far as developed economies, Table 4.8 shows that both FDI and portfolio investment
have a positive and signicant e¤ect on economic growth, and it can be certainly argued
that this is because of the highly developed nancial and institutional systems in these
economies. These results are in line with Reisen and Soto (2001) and Durham (2004) who
nd that both capital ows can have growth-promoting e¤ects. As far as the total e¤ects of
portfolio ows, we see (in Figure 4.3, based on specication 8:5) that countries with "lower"
(initial) human capital benet the most from portfolio ows vis-à-vis economic growth.22
For example, even though the United States has a human capital level (in the period 2001-
2005) of almost 46%, we cannot reject that there is no e¤ect (or even a negative e¤ect) of
portfolio ows on growth. A similar Figure (see Figure 4.4, based on specication 8:4) is
obtained for the marginal e¤ect of FDI. This e¤ect is not signicantly positive for countries
with a human capital level exceeding 50% (i.e. Austria, Germany, New Zealand, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland and the US).
4.6 Decomposing FDI and the E¤ects on Growth
As has been previously mentioned, the theoretical literature argues that FDI can boost
growth; however, the empirical literature shows considerable disagreement about the rele-
vance of these impacts. For example, macroeconomic studies tend to conclude that FDI
boosts growth23, although some papers argue that this requires the destination economy
to satisfy certain conditions (see for example Borensztein et al., 1998); however, rm-level
analysis often nd no signicant e¤ects of FDI.24
However, there are two major di¢ culties with the interpretation of many of these results.
First, both macro and micro studies face problems of bidirectional causality; that is, high-
productivity and high growth rms and countries are more likely to attract FDI than the
rest. The other di¢ culty, and the one that we analyze in this section, is the use of "total"
FDI in the estimation process.25
However, as shown in Figure 4.5, MNCs can undertake FDI either through greeneld
investments or through M&As; where the main di¤erence between these two forms of in-
22Examples for which the marginal e¤ect is signicantly positive include Greece (1970-1990), Portugal
(1970-2005) and Spain (1970-1990).
23See World Bank (2001) and/or Kose et al (2006), and the references therein.
24See the discussion in Section 4.8.
25Another possible reason as argued by Blonigen and Wang (2005) is the pooling of countries (i.e. com-
bining developed and developing countries) in regression frameworks.
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of Di¤erent types of FDI (in 2000-2001)
vestments is that in an M&A control of assets and operations is transferred from a local
to a foreign company, the former becoming an a¢ liate of the latter(UNCTAD, 2000).26
In Section 4.4, we found that the investment rate depends on FDI inows for developing
economies and on portfolio inows for developed economies; interestingly, the same conclu-
sion holds when FDI inows are replaced by M&A inows. Tables 4.9 and 4.10 show that
M&A inows only have a signicant positive impact on capital accumulation in developing
economies. As far as developed economies, portfolio inows remain signicant when inter-
acted with human capital or GDP per capita (columns 3 and 5). Whereas the previous
section found that FDI inows were signicant in explaining growth for both country types,
signicance is lost when the M&A variable is used (See Tables 4.15 and 4.16 in Appendix
D). However, this "non-signicance" can be attributed to the limited number of available
observations.
26TheM&A variable spans the period 1986-2005 based on all completed/uncoditional cross-border M&As
with a deal value of at least $10 million (the source of the M&A variable is Thomsons Global Merger and
Acquisitions database). For a detailed description of the M&A variable, see Garita and van Marrewijk
(2008) and/or Chapters 2 and 3 of this book.
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Table 4.9: E¤ect of Mergers and Acquisitions on Investment for Developing Economies
Dependent variable: (I=Y )
9:1 9:2 9:3 9:4 9:5
(I=Y )t 1 0.516  0.645  0.427  0.375  0.406 
(0.095) (0.094) (0.127) (0.126) (0.122)
Initial GDPpc -2.216  -1.959 -2.068 -2.199 -2.011
(1.337) (1.632) (1.724) (1.726) (2.348)
Human Capital -0.025 -0.811 0.092 0.098 0.096
(0.092) (9.459) (0.096) (0.097) (0.089)
MA Inows 0.474  0.567  1.010  1.424  1.210 
(0.209) (0.210) (0.324) (0.500) (0.696)
Portfolio Inows -0.136 -0.071 0.261 0.288 0.233
(0.190) (0.190) (0.271) (0.257) (0.354)
(G=Y ) -0.176  -0.043 -0.026 -0.036
(0.060) (0.108) (0.106) (0.107)
LnBMP -0.459 -0.338
(0.361) (0.423)
MA_inows*LnBMP -0.302 -0.161
(0.291) (0.324)
Political Rights -0.255
(0.318)
observations 199 196 135 135 135
Notes: bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis
*, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% signicant levels respectively
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Table 4.10: E¤ect of Mergers and Acquisitions on Investment for Developed Economies
Dependent variable: (I=Y )
10:1 10:2 10:3 10:4 10:5
(I=Y )t 1 0.645  0.624  0.511  0.622  0.647 
(0.115) (0.110) (0.112) (0.119) (0.116)
Initial GDPpc 0.728 1.555 0.789 0.184 1.359
(2.522) (2.739) (2.522) (2.539) (2.484)
Human Capital -0.054 -0.033 -0.044 -0.060 -0.067
(0.046) (0.059) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046)
(G=Y ) -0.722  -0.710  -0.840  -0.801  -0.717 
(0.229) (0.234) (0.231) (0.249) (0.226)
MA Inows -0.253 0.426 -0.168 9.102 -0.193
(0.257) (0.823) (0.256) (10.073) (0.257)
Portfolio Inows 0.044 0.040 0.946  0.052  3.555 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.306) (0.031) (1.629)
MA_inows*HC -0.013
(0.015)
Portfolio*HC -0.020 
(0.007)
MA_in*GDPpc -0.927
(1.001)
Portfolio*GDPpc -0.332 
(0.159)
observations 85 85 85 85 85
Notes: bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis
*, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% signicant levels respectively
4.7 Absorptive Capacity & "Relative Backwardness"
The literature, in particular Kose et al. (2006), stresses that nancial openness only leads to
better outcomes when certain initial conditions are met. In contrast, the estimation results
(as illustrated in Figures 4.1-4.3) point to negative interaction e¤ects, implying that countries
that operate before the threshold seem to benet the most from nancial globalization. This
section elaborates on an explanation of this nding.
International economists have long argued that along with international trade, the most
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important medium for international technology transfer is FDI. Furthermore, it is well known
that multinational companies carry out most of the worlds private research and develop-
ment endeavors; this implies that they produce and control the latest advancements of
technology. When MNCs set up a foreign a¢ liate, the a¢ liate receives some amount of the
proprietary technology that comprises the parents rm-specic advantage and allows it to
compete successfully with local rms that (might) have better-quality knowledge of local
markets, consumer preferences, and business practices. This leads to a di¤usion of technol-
ogy, but not necessarily to any formal transmission of know-howoutside the boundary
of the rm. According to Blomstrom and Kokko (2003), this stems from the fact that the
establishment of a foreign a¢ liate is a decision to internalize (the use of) technology. How-
ever, MNC technology can nonetheless spillover into the surrounding economy that increase
the level of human capital in the host country and create productivity increases in local
rms (Blomstrom and Kokko, 2003).
Since multinationals o¤er training and technical support to their local suppliers and
customers, the e¤ects work through forward and/or backward linkages. Moreover, the labor
market is another important channel for spillovers, since MNCs tend to train their workforce,
who may end up taking a job in a local rm or through creative destructionestablish their
own company (Blomstrom and Kokko, 2003). Therefore, long-term capital ows (i.e. FDI)
can be a precious starting place of spillovers, since these spillovers strengthen the human
capital base in an economy needed to adapt "new" ideas to the local market. However,
FDI does not automatically lead to productivity and technology spillovers. Instead, "FDI
and human capital interact in a complex manner, where FDI inows create a potential for
knowledge spillovers to the local workforce, and at the same time, as the host countrys level
of human capital determines how much FDI it can attract and whether local rms are able
to absorb the potential benets. Therefore, it is likely that the relationship is non-linear
and that multiple equilibria are possible" (Blomstrom and Kokko, 2003). For example,
host economies with relatively high levels of human capital may be able to attract large
amounts of "technology intensive" foreign MNCs that contribute signicantly to the further
development of labor skills. At the same time, economies with weaker initial conditions
may experience relatively smaller inows of FDI, and those foreign rms that enter are
likely to use "simpler" technologies that none-the-less contribute to local learning and skill
development.
As far as the results of the paper thus far, one clear trend that has emerged is that
countries with "lower" levels of human capital are the ones that benet the most from de jure
or de facto nancial openness. This "relative backwardness" between economies was rst
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emphasized by Findlay (1978), who highlighted the importance of "relative backwardness"
for the speed of adoption of new technologies and spillover benets from MNCs. Findlays
model suggests that the greater the technological distance between (the less advanced) host
country and the (advanced) home country, the greater the available opportunities to exploit
in the host country, and therefore, the more rapidly new technologies are adopted. Hence,
the potential for positive spillovers is higher the larger the absorptive capacity gap between
host and home countries. In the next section, we probe deeper into this e¤ect by looking at
how di¤erent types of de jure (de facto) nancial openness a¤ect TFP.
4.8 Closing the Circle - TFP results
There is a widely held belief that nancial openness is benecial to growth, because as a
group, developed and emerging markets have experienced far higher cumulative growth than
developing economies. First, lets begin by looking at the unconditional relationship between
TFP and nancial openness, Figure 4.627 shows that there is a weak positive correlation,
consistent with the general wisdom that economies that have integrated into global nancial
markets grow faster (albeit indirectly through an increase in TFP).
Figure 4.6: Unconditional Relationship between Financial Openness and TFP for Developing
Economies
27OLS equation is TFP = 1:157(0:137)+0:350(0:095)Financial_Openness. Robust standard errors
in parenthesis.
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However, once other growth determinants are controlled for28, the relationship disappears
(see Figure 4.7). Obviously, there is considerable endogeneity in this type of analysis, but
it does clarify the point in the literature (see for example Kose et al., 2006) that nancial
openness by itself, may not be the key to higher growth. The "collateral benets" of nancial
openness as identied by Kose et al. (2006) should boost e¢ ciency, and in addition, total
factor productivity. The approach that we follow in this last section ties in well with the
literature identied by Kose et al. (2006), who emphasize the importance of TFP growth as
the main driver of long-term growth. At the end of the day, if nancial openness (de jure or
de facto) is to have permanent e¤ects on growth, it must push up the production possibility
frontier. Surprisingly enough, research on whether nancial openness (integration) raises
TFP is scarce. Recent exceptions are Edwards (2001) who concludes that the evidence is
not robust; and Bonglioli (2007), who shows that nancial integration has a positive direct
e¤ect on productivity, albeit with the use of a dummy variable for nancial integration.
Figure 4.7: Conditional Relationship between Financial Openness and TFP for Developing
Economies
28These controls are the investment rate, initial GDP per capita, human capital, and time xed
e¤ects (specication 11.1 in Table 4.11).
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Table 4.11: E¤ects of Financial Openness, FDI, and Portfolio ows on TFP
Dependent variable: TFP growth
Developing Developed
11:1 11:2 11:3 11:4 11:5 11:6
TFP growtht 1 0.181  0.165  0.140  -0.045 -0.061 -0.053
(0.071) (0.079) (0.082) (0.079) (0.085) (0.088)
Investment rate 0.106  0.162 
(0.053) (0.072)
Initial GDPpc -3.379  -2.239  -1.973  -2.770  -2.237  -2.720 
(0.803) (0.957) (0.961) (1.015) (1.073) (1.107)
Human Capital 0.027 0.028 0.078 0.067  0.033  0.066 
(0.046) (0.058) (0.077) (0.026) (0.017) (0.024)
Fin. Openness 0.093 0.130
(0.198) (0.165)
(G/Y) -0.037 -0.076 -0.053 -0.328  -0.286  -0.376 
0.058 (0.068) (0.073) (0.110) (0.099) (0.095)
FDI Inows 0.239  0.572  0.195  0.698 
(0.120) (0.292) (0.100) (0.387)
Portfolio Inows -0.037 -0.004 0.006 0.231
(0.129) (0.009) (0.023) (0.171)
FDI*HC -0.016 -0.011
(0.013) (0.008)
Portfolio*HC -0.004 -0.005
(0.010) (0.004)
observations 285 210 210 127 126 126
Notes: bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis
*, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% signicant levels respectively
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In addition, the empirical literature on the spillover e¤ects of FDI also gives mixed
results. For example, some studies argue that foreign ownership has a positive e¤ect on pro-
ductivity for domestic rms and industries (see Barrell and Pain, 1997); while other studies
nd little or no evidence of spillover e¤ects stemming from FDI (see Aitken and Harrison,
1999).29 The literature has also argued that "total" foreign direct investment may bring new
technology and management techniques that increase the e¢ ciency of "acquired" rms and
generate economy-wide spillovers. For example, Mishkin (2006) has argued that develop-
ing countries can import greater e¢ ciency by allowing foreign investors to take controlling
stakes in domestic nancial rms, and thereby bring in state-of-the-art nancial interme-
diation practices. Recently, Henry (2007) has even stated that "these stories are plausible
but empirically unsubstantiated". The results of the TFP-regressions in Table 4.11 support
the story. First, TFP growth does not depend on de jure measures of nancial openness for
both developed and developing economies (columns 11:1 and 11:4). Second, FDI inows do
contribute to TFP growth but portfolio inows do not have a signicant e¤ect (11:2 and
11:5). Third, threshold e¤ects in terms of human capital do not improve the explanation of
TFP growth.
4.9 Conclusions
It is well known that the evidence linking nancial openness (e.g. capital account openness)
to economic growth has been weak at best; nonetheless, a large amount of literature has been
devoted to the analysis on the e¤ect of nancial liberalization on GDP growth. However, to
understand the total e¤ect of nancial liberalization, it is important to know the channels
and the directionality through which it a¤ects an economy. Furthermore, it is important
to take into account the possibility that di¤erent policies a¤ect countries di¤erently (this is
especially true for developed and developing economies). In this light, the research herein
has probed deeper into the aforementioned relationship by studying separately the impact
of nancial openness (de jure and de facto) on economic growth, capital accumulation,
and total factor productivity. By using a new econometric approach to study the direct
and indirect channels of nancial openness for 186 developing and 25 developed economies
from 1970-2005, we nd positive and encouraging results (see appendix G for a graphical
representation of the results).
29Tansani and Zejan (1996), and Haddad and Harrison (1993) nd no evidence of productivity spillovers;
Blomstrom and Sjoholn (1999) nd no evidence of technology spillovers, but do nd some evidence of
productivity improvements stemming from greater competitive pressure.
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As far as developing economies, we nd that de jure nancial openness has a positive
direct e¤ect on economic growth, and an indirect on growth through capital accumulation;
however, de jure nancial openness does not a¤ect TFP. When it comes to FDI, the results
show that it a¤ects economic growth directly, and that FDI also a¤ects capital accumulation
positively. As far as developed economies, the results show that de jure nancial openness
does not a¤ect economic growth; however, it does stimulate capital accumulation. Further-
more, for developed economies FDI and portfolio ows both play a signicant and positive
role in stimulating economic growth; moreover, portfolio inows positively inuence capital
accumulation.
Another clear trend that emerged throughout the paper, is that countries with "lower"
levels of human capital are the ones that benet the most from de jure or de facto nancial
openness. The importance of "relative backwardness" for the speed of adoption of new
technologies and spillover benets from MNCs suggests that the greater the technological
distance between (the less advanced) host country and the (advanced) home country, the
greater the available opportunities to exploit in the host country, and therefore, the more
rapidly "new technologies" are adopted. Hence, the potential for positive spillovers is higher
the larger the absorptive capacity gap between host and home countries. Accordingly, the
TFP regression results show that there is a signicant and positive correlation between
FDI and total factor productivity, which is the one similarity vis-à-vis the results between
developing and developed economies.
From a policy perspective, while the literature suggests that transitional risks are as-
sociated with nancial openness, the results herein show that resisting liberalization over
an extended period may prove counterproductive; especially since as the pace, rhythm, and
scope of globalization advances, it becomes harder and perhaps even riskier for countries
to be "nancially repressive". In practice, the proper response to large capital inows
depends on a myriad of country-specic circumstances, including the nature of the inows,
the stage of the business cycle, and the scal policy situation, for example. Accordingly,
one of the key areas of future research, especially given the ndings herein, is to look at the
consequences of de jure and/or de facto nancial openness vis-à-vis countries with sub-
stantialcurrent account decits, or countries with inexibleexchange rates (see Chapter
5 for a further elaboration of this last point).
Another area of future research that we are particularly interested in, relates to a re-
cent working paper by Rodrik and Subramanian (2008), who argue that countries ought
to be classied into saving-constrained and investment-constrained economies (instead of
the standard developing, emerging, and developed economies classication). That is, after
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liberalizing their capital accounts (by allowing the free movement of capital ows), only
saving-constrained economies will respond as predicted by theory. In contrast, the problem
for investment-constrained economies is not the lack of savings but the lack of protable
investment opportunities; once this latter type of economies get access to (cheaper) loans
from foreign investors, capital inows will simply substitute for domestic savings without
stimulating domestic investment and thereby economic growth.30 Therefore, they argue that
their new categorization explains the mixed evidence found vis-à-vis nancial openness and
economic growth. We have already begun to incorporate this new classication into our
future research agenda, in order to check whether the results are indeed sensitive to this
alternative decomposition.
30These arguments are supported by regression outcomes in (Prasad et al., 2003), who show that non-
industrial countries running current account surpluses tend to grow faster.
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Developed Economies
AUSTRALIA FINLAND IRELAND MONACO SPAIN
AUSTRIA FRANCE ITALY NETHERLANDS SWEDEN
BELGIUM GERMANY JAPAN NEW ZEALAND SW ITZERLAND
CANADA GREECE LIECHTENSTEIN NORWAY UK
DENMARK ICELAND LUXEMBOURG PORTUGAL USA
Developing (Emerging) Economies
AFGHANISTAN BELIZE CENTRAL A. REP. DOMINICAN REP. GUATEMALA
ALBANIA BENIN CHAD ECUADOR GUINEA
ALGERIA BERMUDA CHILE EGYPT GUINEA BISSAU
ANDORRA BHUTAN CHINA EL SALVADOR GUYANA
ANGOLA BOLIVIA COLOMBIA EQUATORIAL GUINEA GREENLAND
ANTIGUA AND BAR. BOSNIA -HERZ. COMOROS ERITREA HAITI
ARGENTINA BOTSWANA CONGO ESTONIA HONDURAS
ARMENIA BRAZIL COSTA RICA ETHIOPIA HONG KONG
AZERBAIJAN BRUNEI COTE DIVOIRE FIJI HUNGARY
AMERICAN SAMOA BULGARIA CROATIA FAEROE ISLANDS INDIA
ARUBA BURKINA FASO CUBA GABON INDONESIA
BAHAMAS BURUNDI CYPRUS GAMBIA IRAN
BAHRAIN CAMBODIA CZECH REP. GEORGIA IRAQ
BANGLADESH CAMEROON CHANNEL ISL . GHANA ISRAEL
BARBADOS CAPE VERDE CONGO D. R . (ZAIRE) GRENADA ISLE OF MAN
BELARUS CAYMAN ISLANDS DJIBOUTI GUAM JAMAICA
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Developing Countries (continued)
JORDAN MALTA OMAN SLOVAK REPUBLIC TUNISIA
KAZAKHSTAN MARSHALL ISL . PAKISTAN SLOVENIA TURKEY
KENYA MARTINIQUE PALAU SOLOMON ISLANDS TURKMENISTAN
KIRIBATI MAURITANIA PANAMA SOMALIA TUVALU
KOREA NORTH MAURITIUS PAPUA N. G . SOUTH AFRICA UGANDA
KOREA SOUTH MEXICO PARAGUAY SRI LANKA UKRAINE
KUWAIT M ICRONESIA PERU ST KITTS AND NEVIS UNITED ARAB E.
KYRGYZ REP. MOLDOVA PHILIPPINES ST LUCIA URUGUAY
LAOS MONGOLIA POLAND ST VINCENT AND THE G . UZBEKISTAN
LATVIA MOROCCO PUERTO RICO SUDAN VANUATU
LEBANON MOZAMBIQUE QATAR SURINAME VENEZUELA
LESOTHO MYANMAR ROMANIA SWAZILAND VIETNAM
LIBERIA MAYOTTE RUSSIA SYRIA VIRGIN ISLANDS(US)
LIBYA NAMIBIA RWANDA SERBIA AND MONT. WEST BANK
LITHUANIA NAURU SAMOA TAIWAN YEMEN
MACAO NEPAL SAN MARINO TAJIK ISTAN YUGOSLAVIA
MACEDONIA NETHERLANDS A. SAO TOME AND P. TANZANIA ZAMBIA
MADAGASCAR NICARAGUA SAUDI ARABIA THAILAND ZIMBABWE
MALAW I NIGER SENEGAL TIMOR EAST
MALAYSIA NIGERIA SEYCHELLES TOGO
MALDIVES NEW CALEDONIA SIERRA LEONE TONGA
MALI N . MARIANA ISL. SINGAPORE TRINIDAD AND T.
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Appendix B - Sources and Denitions of Variables
Table 4.12: Variable Description
GDPpc Logarithm of GDP per capita from the PWT 6.2
Financial Openness Chinn-Ito index (2007)
LnBMP Logarithm of the black market premium from the Global
Development Network Growth Database of NYU
GDPpc_growth GDP per capita growth rate from the PWT 6.2
TFP growth Total Factor Productivity, calculated (authors calculation) as
(GDPpc growth  0:3  Capital percapita growth)
M&A inows Value of Mergers and Acquisitions (in constant
2000 $ bn, using GDP deator) divided by GDP; Source of
M&As is Thompsons Global M&A Database
FDI inows FDI Inows divided by GDP from UNCTAD
Portfolio inows IMF International Financial Statistics
Human Capital Secondary school completion rate as percentage of
labor force over 25 years of age from Barro and Lee dataset
Political Rights 1=highest degree of freedom; 7=lowest; from the
Freedom House
Trade Openness Imports plus Exports divided by GDP from the PWT 6.2
I/Y Investment divided by GDP from the PWT 6.2
G/Y Government spending divided by GDP from the PWT 6.2
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Appendix C - Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.13: Descriptive Statistics for 186 Developing Economies
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
GDPpc growth 1.66 5.03 -30.60 49.38 998
LnGDPpc 8.14 1.05 5.50 11.21 1015
Financial Openness -0.23 1.38 -1.78 2.60 888
Trade Openness 81.31 50.74 2.21 410.33 1017
G/Y 23.59 11.05 2.48 89.22 1026
I/Y 13.68 8.13 1.13 58.82 1026
Human Capital 15.91 12.15 0.30 63.90 580
TFP 0.74 3.96 -29.49 15.31 604
Political Rights 4.21 2.11 1 7 1056
Portfolio Inows 0.21 4.15 -94.07 20.83 589
FDI Inows 4.47 61.29 -5.55 1660.54 735
MA Inows 0.61 1.46 0 18.59 630
LnBMP 2.55 1.91 -1.10 12.92 584
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Table 4.14: Descriptive Statistics for 25 Developed Economies
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
GDPpc growth 2.23 1.51 -1.73 8.70 161
LnGDPpc 9.85 0.31 8.99 10.80 161
Financial Openness 1.33 1.35 -1.77 2.60 148
Trade Openness 62.84 45.20 10.76 279.58 161
G/Y 17.03 4.16 6.83 26.50 161
I/Y 25.25 4.26 17.50 38.91 161
Human Capital 38.28 13.24 5.8 69.60 154
TFP 1.42 1.28 -1.53 6.84 161
Political Rights 1.88 1.55 1 6.60 158
Portfolio Inows 6.01 31.49 -0.53 370.05 145
FDI Inows 1.83 2.49 -0.01 15.30 147
MA Inows 2.26 2.80 0 19.05 92
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Appendix D - FDI Decomposition and (I=Y ) Results
Table 4.15: Growth and the Decomposition of FDI for Developing Economies
Dependent variable:  lnGDPpc
15:1 15:2 15:3
GDPpct 1 0.034 0.031 0.045
(0.116) (0.114) (0.117)
Initial GDPpc -7.672  -7.532  -8.055 
(2.576) (2.576) (2.618)
Human Capital 0.027 0.017 -0.036
(0.096) (0.095) (0.115)
(G/Y) -0.049 -0.095 -0.061
(0.112) (0.110) (0.116)
Political Rights 0.022 -0.028 0.103
(0.329) (0.326) (0.329)
LnBMP -0.028 -0.066 0.041
(0.387) (0.431) (0.388)
MA Inows 0.559 0.200 -0.040
(0.530) (0.692) (0.762)
Portfolio inows 0.270 0.278 0.239
(0.365) (0.363) (0.374)
MA_inows*LnBMP 0.280
(0.326)
MA_inows*HC 0.034
(0.041)
observations 134 134 134
Notes: bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis
*, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% signicant levels respectively
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Table 4.16: Growth and the Decomposition of FDI for Developed Economies
Dependent variable:  lnGDPpc
16:1 16:2 16:3 16:4 16:5
GDPpct 1 -0.071 -0.079 -0.069 -0.048 -0.093
(0.188) (0.154) (0.157) (0.156) (0.155)
Initial GDPpc -5.967  -5.778  -6.109  -6.359  -5.539 
(2.003) (2.124) (2.025) (2.021) (1.885)
Human Capital 0.069  0.075  0.074  0.065  0.060 
(0.035) (0.042) (0.035) (0.035) (0.033)
(G/Y) -0.809  -0.817  -0.861  -0.848  -0.809 
(0.179) (0.177) (0.185) (0.196) (0.168)
MA Inows -0.135 0.035 -0.112 5.279 -0.092
(0.191) (0.579) (0.193) (7.359) (0.180)
Portfolio inows 0.037  0.037  0.261 0.040  2.420 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.222) (0.023) (1.056)
MA_inows*HC -0.003
(0.011)
Portfolio*HC -0.005
(0.005)
MA_in*GDPpc -0.537
(0.731)
Port*GDPpc -0.234 
(0.103)
observations 85 85 85 85 85
Notes: bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis
*, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% signicant levels respectively
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Appendix E - Graphical Representation of Results
Figure 4.8: Graphical representation of results from di¤erent types of capital ows for
developing countries; + = positive and signicant e¤ect; solid lines represent a direct e¤ect
on growth; dashed lines represent indirect e¤ects on growth.
4.10 APPENDIX CHAPTER 4 123
Figure 4.9: Graphical representation of results from di¤erent types of capital ows for
developed economies; + = positive and signicant e¤ect; solid lines represent a direct e¤ect
on growth; dashed lines represent indirect e¤ects on growth.

Chapter 5
Joint Currency Crisis and Contagion
5.1 Introduction
In economics, it has long been argued that systemic risk is a particular feature of nancial
systems. That is, while contagion can occur in other areas of an economy, the likelihood
and harshness in nancial systems is often regarded as considerably higher since a full crisis
in the nancial system can have strong adverse consequences for general economic welfare.
However, while "systemic risk" is now widely accepted as the fundamental concept for the
study of nancial instability, most work thus far only tackles a few aspects of that risk, and
there is no clear understanding of the overall concept of contagion and the linkages between
its di¤erent features.
In rst-generation interpretations of currency crises1, the viability (or lack thereof),
of a xed exchange rate is determined by exogenous fundamentals unalike to the behav-
ior of economic agents. For instance, in these types of models, market participants base
their expectations on the conjecture that their actions will not a¤ect scal imbalances or
domestic credit policies. By contrast, the interaction between expectations and actual out-
comes is at the core of the second-generation models of crises, in which market expectations
unswervingly inuence macroeconomic policy decisions.2
The key point emphasized in second-generation models is that the interaction between
investors expectations and actual policy outcomes can lead to self-fullling crises. For
example, in a country whose monetary authorities are committed to maintaining a xed
exchange rate but are prepared to oat their currency under extraordinary circumstances
1The approach was forged by Krugman (1979), who adapted the Salant and Henderson (1978) model to
the analysis of currency crises, and was further rened by Flood and Garber (1984).
2The standard studies on self-fullling crises are Obstfeld (1986, 1994b).
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then foreign investors might face the possibility of a devaluation of that currency. This
in turn would reduce the value of their claims if the countrys loans from abroad were
denominated in the borrowing nations domestic currency. Moreover, if foreign investors see
the likelihood of devaluation as very likely, they would have little choice but to charge a
high risk-premium on any loan. This implies that the economiesborrowing costs would rise
signicantly, thereby reducing credit opportunities and restraining output growth. Given
this scenario, the countrys authorities would feel the costs of maintaining the x to
be too high and choose to devalue their currency in order to boost aggregate demand.
Interestingly, the devaluation would validate the initial investorsexpectations, which leads
to a self-fullling prophecy, in that the prospect of devaluation leads to events (an increase
in the risk premium) that elevates the opportunity cost of defending the xed exchange
rate. Therefore, the forecasts force a policy response (the abandonment of the peg) that
validates the original expectations. Note that the crisis scenario described above is not
the only possible outcome of second-generation models. That is, if investors do not foresee
any devaluation and do not charge any risk premium, then borrowing costs will be low
and the authoritieswill be able to maintain the exchange rate peg, which will validate the
expectations of no devaluation. As discussed by Pesenti and Tille (2000), the main advantage
of resorting to such an interpretation of currency crises is the ability to di¤erentiate between
two kinds of volatility: one related to nancial markets and one related to macroeconomic
fundamentals.
Market sentiment, in the form of sudden changes in market participantsexpectations
then plays an important role in the determination of a crisis. We know that exchange rates
(and other asset prices) are less predictable than they are in models with a unique outcome,
as a result, second generation models are deemed to "square better with the stylized facts of
global nancial markets" (Masson, 1999). However, when speculators expect the occurrence
of a crisis across countries, they have an incentive to engage in nancial market transactions
that create links between otherwise separatemarkets (what Kodres and Pritsker (2002)
call "cross-market rebalancing"3). That is, if speculators expect that a crisis in country i will
be immediately followed by a crisis in country j, they have an incentive to be active in both
currency markets in order to "benet" from this joint correlation. If a crisis then occurs in
country i, it will change the wealth levels of these speculators and, therefore, change their
actions in country j0s currency market in a way that increases the probability of a crisis in
the latter. The belief that contagion will occur is entirely self-fullling; that is, if investors
3In our case, "cross-market rebalancing" only occurs within the same region, since as shown in section
4.4, currency crisis contagion is not very likely to jump across regions.
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expect there to be no correlation between the outcomes of the two markets, they will have
no incentive to rebalance their portfolios, and contagion will not occur. Needless to say, this
view is a simple theory of contagion in which a devaluation of one currency acts as a signal
that coordinates expectations on the crisis equilibrium in another currency market.4 The
immediate source of equilibrium contagion (when it occurs) in this simple setting, is the fact
that the same investors can be active in both markets, which generates (at the very least) a
wealth channel through which crises are transmitted. In this way, the analysis herein relates
to a number of papers that study how nancial interdependence can lead to contagion (see
Kodres and Pritsker, 2002).
Moreover, because open economies cannot insulate themselves fully from their "surround-
ing environment", then economies may need (in the long-run) to take on more synchronized
measures in order to mitigate any contagion e¤ects. However, despite the burstof con-
tagion models, consensus does not exist vis-à-vis the relevant contagion channels and the
implications for policy.
Figure 5.1: Waves of Capital Flows to Emerging Markets and Current Account Balances
For example, if the trade channel is relevant then countries may need to diversify their
trade portfolio, and/or x their exchange rates in order to steer clear of speculative attacks
stemming from a fall in international competitiveness5. If, on the other hand, the "nan-
4If two countries are highly integrated, of course, (through trade, etc.) it is not entirely surprising that a
crisis in one would have strong e¤ects on the other. The importance of expectations is most often stressed
in cases where the two currencies are, at least in principle, not closely related.
5Where international cooperation of the a¤ected economies may lead to the establishment of a single
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Figure 5.2: Waves of Capital Flows to Emerging Markets and the Accumulation of Reserves
cial contagion" channel is relevant, then countries may need to impose capital controls on
(short-term) capital ows. Moreover, some economists view increasing nancial openness
and unregulated capital ows as a grave obstruction to global nancial stability (see Bhag-
wati, 1998; Rodrik, 1998; Stiglitz, 2000; Rodrik and Subramanian, 2008), leading to calls for
capital controls (such as Tobin taxes) on international asset trade. Other economists have
argued that increased openness to capital ows has, in general, proven vital for countries
aiming to leapfrog from lower- to middle-income status, while considerably enhancing sta-
bility among industrialized countries (e.g., Fischer, 1998; Summers, 2000). This is evidently
a matter of substantial policy signicance, especially with economies like China and India
taking steps to open up their capital accounts.
The wave of capital ows running through many emerging market economies since the
early 2000s and has brought renewed attention on how macroeconomic policies should re-
spond to these ows, especially in light of current account balance positions (see Figure 5.1)
and the degree of reserves accumulation (see Figure 5.2). Although these capital ows are
associated with ample global liquidity and favorable worldwide economic conditions accord-
ing to the IMF (2007), in many cases they are a manifestation of improved macroeconomic
frameworks and growth-enhancing structural reforms (IMF, 2007). However, the inows
also generate important challenges because of their potential to generate overheating, loss
of competitiveness, and increased vulnerability to crises; accordingly, signicant concerns
currency like in the USA or the EU.
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about the stability of national and international nancial systems (stemming from the crises
that occurred throughout the 1990s) have been voiced throughout the last few years. More-
over, the fear remains that in an environment of relatively free international capital markets
such crises are becoming more frequent and that such developments may easily spill over to
other economies.
Interestingly, there is little empirical evidence supporting the view that nancial open-
ness by itself increases vulnerability to crises. However, while crisis episodes receive most
of the attention, they are just (for the most part) spiky expressions of the more general
phenomenon of macroeconomic volatility. As the abovementioned argument highlights, the
strength and the recurring nature of the crises has forced both practitioners and academics
to focus on contagion as the guilty party. For example, during the 1990s developed and
developing countries experienced severe nancial di¢ culties, including balance-of-payments
crises and systemic banking failures. Accordingly, the scale and impact of these events
renewed interest in the existing crisis and contagion literature and stimulated a large
volume of new theoretical and empirical work to explain and/or predict crises in order to
provide countries with appropriate policy advice needed to avert any impending crises. In
response to these events, several di¤erent theoretical models were developed showing how
crises end up spreading across countries. For example, some of the major models of conta-
gion are based on trade linkages and macroeconomic similarities (Gerlach and Smets, 1995;
Eichengreen et al., 1996; Glick and Rose, 1999; van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001), while
other models are based on nancial linkages, neighborhood e¤ects, and exogenous shifts in
investorsbeliefs (Masson, 1999; Calvo and Mendoza, 2000; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000;
Kodres and Pritsker, 2002).
Accordingly, this paper addresses three interrelated questions: (i) is the probability that
a country faces a speculative attack a¤ected by a crisis elsewhere? (ii) How does the joint
probability of a crisis a¤ect the degree of contagion? (iii) Does nancial integrationinto
world capital markets increase the probability of a crisis? To address these questions, the pa-
per follows a three-step approach. First, we employ an alternative statistical method known
as extreme value theory (EVT) to identify largevalues of an EMP index. This statistical
technique is particularly well designed to address the occurrence of nancial market crises,
which are rare events located far out in the tails of empirical distributions. In an univariate
setting, this approach has been used to study the frequency of currency market (Koedijk
et al., 1990; Hols and de Vries, 1991), stock market (Jansen and de Vries, 1991; Longin,
1996) and bond market (Hartman et al., 2004) crashes in industrial countries. However, in
contrast to the literature, we only focus on emerging and developing markets (Asia, Africa,
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and the Western Hemisphere). Perhaps more importantly, we extend the analysis of extreme
exchange rate uctuations to a bivariate setting, measuring the joint occurrence of currency
market crashes.
The "crises elsewhere" variable that is often constructed in the contagion literature only
considers whether at least one of the other (neighboring) countries is su¤ering a crisis.
However, by construction, this procedure gives the same weight (i.e. the same importance)
to (all) other countries. Intuitively, however, countries may have di¤erent links during
crises (non-normal) periods. Therefore, to specify a "crisis elsewhere" or contagion measure
without considering the di¤erences in the linkages, can at the very least lead to misleading
results. Accordingly, our second step is to incorporate the di¤erent levels of connections
between countries by taking into account the conditional probability of joint failure (CPJF)
to weight our contagion variable.
Third, we estimate a panel probit model as in Eichengreen et al. (1996), to test for the
existence of contagion, while also empirically identifying the true likelihood of contagion.
Moreover, the research herein di¤ers from Eichengreen et al. (1996) in at least two ways.
First, we use extreme value theory the test for contagion. This corresponds to a more
accurate measure of contagion, which is a noteworthy divergence from prior research in this
area. The normal procedure in the literature has been to pick a threshold based on the mean
and standard deviations of an exchange market pressure index, where values of the index
above the threshold are coded to indicate a currency crisis. However, there is no consensus
on the specication of the threshold.6 Second, we construct a new estimator (as previously
mentioned) and an expanded data set representing many di¤erent regions of the world. On
a broader basis, we can test for contagion, while also allowing contagion to operate through
"cross-market rebalancing" and the so-called "neighborhood channel".
Overall, our conditional probability of joint failure analysis (CPJF) indicates that cur-
rency crises are only regionally contagious. For example, economies within Asia and some
economies within Africa display signicant tail-dependence. The western hemisphere economies
are tail-independent, indicating that currency crisis do not spread from one economy to an-
other within the western hemisphere. As far as "global" contagion, we do not nd much
evidence that contagion spreads from region to region. Empirically, our probit results point
out that currency crises can be attributed to lack of macroeconomic discipline (i.e. monetary
and scal). Moreover, the estimation results reveal that higher levels of nancial integration
into world nancial markets lowers the probability of a crises. Our results also indicate that
6For example, global mean plus 1.5 standard deviations as in Eichengreen et al. (1996); or country specic
mean plus 3 standard deviations as in Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000).
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the sudden stop of capital ows and their quick reversal exacerbates the probability of a
crisis
5.2 Methodology and Data
As has been previously stated, the main objective of this paper is to answer three questions:
(i) is the probability that a country faces a speculative attack a¤ected by a crisis elsewhere?
(ii) How does the joint probability of a crisis a¤ect the degree of contagion? (iii) Does
"nancial integration" into world capital markets increase the probability of a crisis? Before
answering these questions, this section explains our methodological approach.
5.2.1 Exchange Market Pressure Index
Following Girton and Roper (1977) and Eichengreen et al. (1996), we construct an index of
exchange market pressure (EMP) as a weighted average of changes of the nominal exchange
rate, changes in international reserves, and changes in nominal interest rates, in order to
capture speculative pressure on a country and its currency (see Eichengreen, Rose and
Wyplosz, 1995, and/or Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000). This EMP index is an adequate
proxy for currency crises, since it capture speculative attacks, whether successful or not.
The reasoning following this index is that a central bank can allow the domestic currency
to depreciate as a reaction to speculative attacks against its currency. On the other hand,
the central bank has the ability to shield its currency by using its foreign reserves or by
increasing interest rates. Accordingly, the calculation of the exchange market pressure for
country i at time t is as follows (see Appendix E, F, and G for a graphical representation):
EMPit =
1
e
eit
eit
  1
r

rmit
rmit
  rmus;t
rmus;t

+
1
it
( (iit   ius;t)) (5.1)
where eit are the units of country i0s currency per U.S. dollar in period t; e is the standard
deviation of the relative change in the exchange rate (eit
eit
); rmit is the ratio of gross foreign
reserves to money stock or monetary base for country i in period t; r is the standard
deviation of the di¤erence between the relative changes in the ratio of foreign reserves and
money (money base) in country i and the USA

rmit
rmit
  rmus;t
rmus;t

; iit is the nominal interest
rate for country i in period t; ius;t is the nominal interest rate for the USA in period t;
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it is the standard deviation of the nominal interest rate di¤erential ( (iit   ius;t)).7 By
denition, a currency crisis occurs when the realized exchange market pressure is unusually
large. The main problem with this terminology is in dening the threshold that determines
the largeness of the index, and therefore, the approach used varies from study to study.
A common feature of studies that try to comprehend the fundamental determinants of
currency crises is the construction of a single composite index; that is, an index of exchange
market pressure (EMP) that will systematically identify the presence and harshness of cur-
rency crises or speculative attacks on a currency. In this light, studies such as Eichengreen
et al. (1995, 1996), Sachs et al. (1996), and Kaminsky et al. (1998), have proposed di¤erent
approaches to the construction of the EMP index. Once a decision has been made on how
to construct the EMP index, then it is eventually employed directly to either construct a
binary dependent index variable in logit/probit models, in which case a speculative attack
episode is identied once the index is above a certain threshold, or instead as a continuous
dependent variable in a more "structural" empirical model of currency crises. The problem
with the literature when it comes to the classication of speculative attacks on a currency
is largely its arbitrary process. More specically, the customary manner of choice for the
statistical threshold previously mentioned has involved arbitrary multiples of the standard
deviation of the EMP above its mean (i.e. 1.5, 2, or 3 standard deviations are commonly
used). This procedure relies on the existence of nite variance in the EMP index. By consid-
ering the EMP as a normally distributed variable, the threshold (which is arbitrarily chosen),
in fact corresponds to a quantile with a certain probability level,8 and as shown below, the
assumption of normality vis-à-vis the EMP index is far from satisfactory. Furthermore, the
existence of innite variance cannot be ruled out for the EMP index. Therefore, the conven-
tional method of dening currency crises is statistically awed or inaccurate in capturing
the truedispersion of any given EMP series. In other words, the conventional method
of employing the mean and standard deviation underestimates the frequency of speculative
attacks.
In order to dene a crisis, we use a quantile of the EMP series as our threshold choice
without a priori specifying the distribution of the EMP. Moreover, given the existence of
7In theory, for a pure oat, the change in the exchange rate would correspond exactly to the index of
exchange market pressures. At the other extreme, for a peg, the exchange rate would be constant, and
uctuations in the EMP would be driven entirely by changes in reserves and/or interest rates through
intervention.
8In nance, the high quantile is the so-called Value-at-Risk (VaR). That is, for a risk factor X, its VaR at
a given level p is dened as V aR(p), which satises P (X > V aR(p)) = p. Therefore, by assuming a normally
distributed EMP, the mean plus 1.5 standard deviation threshold corresponds to a VaR at probability level
6:7%.
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nite variance, we consider "extreme value analysis" as the proper instrument. We use
monthly data ranging from 1978   2007 in order to calculate the probability of a crisis in
country i at time t. Similar to de Haan and de Ronde (1998), we choose the threshold
by using a Hill plot (see Hill, 1975). That is, we rst calculate the Hill estimators against
the number of high order statistics k. We then choose a level k around which the estimate
(in the Hill Plot) is stable. For all countries in our sample, we choose k = 45; this level
corresponds to a quantile with probability level 45=337 = 13:3%.9 Formally, this means that
for a certain country i, lets denote the EMP series as EMPit at time t. Now suppose that
the V aR at probability level 13.3% is V aRi.10 Then the crisis variable for country i at time
t is dened as
Crisisit = 1 if EMPit  V aRi (5.2)
= 0 otherwise:
5.2.2 Econometric Approach
This section species the model that is used to test whether the probability of a crisis in
an individual country is a¤ected by a crises elsewhere, while controlling for initial macro-
economic conditions in the country under question. According to a number of theoretical
models reviewed in section 5.2, currency crises may be contagious through trade, may also be
contagious for countries that have similar macroeconomic fundamentals, for countries that
are more nancially integrated into the world capital markets, and for countries that are
neighbors. Therefore, following Eichengreen et al. (1996) we estimate a panel probit model
using monthly data for 23 emerging and developing economies (see Appendix A, B, and C
for the list of sample countries, data descriptions, and descriptive statistics respectively) as
follows:
Crisisit = D(Crisisjt) + I(L)it + "it (5.3)
where
9Given our time period, we have 348 months at our disposal. However, due to missing data for some
months, at the end we can only work with 337 months.
10As previously mentioned, these are the 45th order statistics from the top.
134 CHAPTER 5 JOINT CURRENCY CRISIS AND CONTAGION
D(Crisis) = 1 if (Crisis) = 1 for any i 6= j and i & j 2 (same region)
= 0 otherwise
In this model, the vector I(L)it is an information set of macroeconomic control variables.
This information set includes (see appendix B for a full description) the growth rate of
money (M2) as a percentage of international reserves, CPI ination, domestic credit as
a percentage of GDP, the growth rate of real GDP, the percentage of government budget
(net) balance relative to GDP, and the percentage of the current account relative to GDP.11
These fundamental controls are included in line with the arguments of the rst generation
models of speculative attacks, which was rst brought to light by Krugman (1979) and
was later modied by Flood and Garber (1984). A number of papers have extended the
Krugman-Flood-Garber model in other directions (see for example Agénor et al., 1992).
As was discussed in section 5.2, in this type of models, expansionary scal and monetary
policies12 led to higher domestic demand for both traded and non-traded goods. The former
causes a deterioration of the trade balance while the latter causes a real appreciation of
the currency. Thus, external variables such as trade and current account balances, and
the evolution of the real exchange rate can also be used as leading indicators of currency
crises under the rst-generation approach. Therefore, these models predict co-movements
between speculative attacks and adverse developments in the fundamental determinants of
the exchange rates. In these models, diverging fundamentals are viewed as being inconsistent
with a given parity and are interpreted by market participants as a signal that realignment
will occur eventually. This expectation leads to an immediate speculative attack against
the currency resulting in crisis in country i independently of the contagious spread of crises
from other countries. We also include variables that capture the di¤erent channels by which
crisis may take place (or can be exacerbated). That is, we include several de facto measures,
such as "trade openness", "nancial openness",13 FDI inows, portfolio inows and debt
inows, in order to provide a better picture of the extent of a countrys integration into
global (nancial) markets.
11Each variable enters as deviation from the corresponding variable of the center country, which in our
case it is the United States.
12Proxied by the government budget decit as a percentage of GDP and the growth rate of domestic
credit, respectively.
13Trade openness is the sum of exports and imports over GDP; nancial openness is the sum of nancial
assets and liabilities divided by GDP.
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5.2.3 Weighting Contagion
The "crises elsewhere" variable constructed in Section 5.3.2 only considers whether at least
one of the other countries in the same region is su¤ering a crisis. However, by construction,
this procedure gives the same weight (i.e. the same importance) to (all) other countries.
Intuitively, however, countries may have di¤erent links during crises (non-normal) periods.
Therefore to specify a "crisis elsewhere" or contagion measure without considering the di¤er-
ences in the linkages, can at the very least lead to misleading results. Therefore, in order to
incorporate the di¤erent levels of connections between countries, we need as a rst measure,
the dependence of the EMPs between di¤erent countries during periods of extreme values
(or crises). Note that a regular dependence measure, such as the correlation coe¢ cient, does
not serve this purpose since the correlation coe¢ cient measures dependence given "moder-
ate levels" (i.e. during normal times). Therefore, we are looking for a measure for the tail
dependence (i.e. a measure during non-normal times).
Luckily for us, we have at our disposal a few indicators that capture tail-dependence (see
Hartman et al., 2004), stemming from multivariate extreme value analysis. Among them,
we choose the conditional probability of joint failure (CPJF)(see Embrechts et al., 2000).14
Therefore, given that at least one of two countries is in a crisis, the CPJF is dened as the
conditional probability that the other country is also in a crisis. Suppose EMPi and EMPj
are the EMPs of countries i and j, then the corresponding V aR at probability level p of
these two variables are V aRi(p) and V aRj(p). We then dene:
CPJF i;j= lim
p!0
P (EMP i> V aRi(p) and EMP j> V aRj(p)jEMP i> V aRi(p) or EMP j> V aRj(p))
(5.4)
Notice that under the multivariate extreme value analysis framework, this limit exists (see
de Haan and Ferreira, 2006, Ch. 7)15. Hence, even for a nite level of p, as soon as p is at a
low level, the conditional probability is already close to its asymptotic value.16 To estimate
CPJFi;j, we use the following estimator (see de Haan and Ferreira, 2006, Ch. 7)17:
14This measure is reminiscent of the correlation coe¢ cient, in the sense that the asymptotic independence
case corresponds to 0, while full dependence corresponds to 1.
15The CPJFij + 1 is the  mentioned in section 7.4 on pg 258.
16Therefore, the choice of p for dening a crisis is insensitive when it is at a low level.
17The \CPJF estimator is the H-measure found in section 7.4. Since this measure is asymptotic normal,
we can test its signicance from its asymptotic distribution (see section 5.4).
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\CPJF i;j =
P
tCrisisitCrisisjtP
tCrisisit +
P
tCrisisjt  
P
tCrisisitCrisisjt
(5.5)
It is clear that a higher CPJF between two countries indicates that a nancial crisis
in these two countries is more likely to occur at the same time. In other words, when
one of these two countries is in a crisis, it is more likely for the other country to be in a
crisis. Moreover, for a given country, the CPJFs between country (A) and other countries
(e.g. B, C, D) in the same region may vary, which highlights (as previously mentioned) the
di¤erent linkages during crisis periods. Therefore, when constructing the "crises elsewhere"
or contagion variable, it is necessary to consider the CPJFs between this country and the
others as weights. In this manner we downweight those countries who are less connected,
while giving a higher weight to those countries that are highly connected. Therefore, our
newly constructed "weighted crises elsewhere" variable is given as:
Wit(Crisis) =
X
j 6=i
CPJFijCrisisjt: (5.6)
Using this new measure, we will run a probit model (see section 5.6) as:
Crisisit = Wit(Crisis) + I(L)it + "it: (5.7)
5.3 Tail Dependence or Independence?
The traditional method employed to study interdependencies between di¤erent random
events is the (pearson) correlation between such events, since correlations fully characterize
all interdependencies (but only if the random variables are multivariate normally distrib-
uted). However, there are two drawbacks to this measure for the purposes of this chapter.
First, the distribution of asset returns (e.g. exchange rates) is not (multivariate) normally
distributed. That is, the tails of the return distributions are "fat". Second, the correlation
concept is a global measure, and it empirically under-weights the dependency in the tail
region. Therefore, the (pearson) correlation measure is inadequate for our purposes.
Accordingly, and as shown in section 5.3.3, we measure systemic risk in a bivariate setting
through the conditional probability of joint failure (CPJF). The CPJF always lies between
0 and 1; if it is zero, then the probability of a joint crash is negligible. However, if it is 1,
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then a crisis in one country always goes hand in hand with the downfall of the other country.
Therefore, our rst step, is to test H0 : CPJF = 018 from the asymptotic distribution of
the CPJF estimator (for details of this test, see de Haan and Ferreira, 2006). The results
(available upon request) conrm that for CPJF  0:2, we cannot reject the null hypothesis,
and can only conclude that these countries are tail independent. For CPJF  0:2, we accept
the alternative H1 : CPJF = 1, and conclude that these countries are tail dependent (see
appendix D for CPJF tables).
5.3.1 Asia
Table 5.15 (see Appendix D), shows the regular dependence among Asian countries, and
although a few negative numbers appear, they are quite close to zero. That is, the correlation
coe¢ cient between Asian economies is moderate at best, indicating a certain degree of
independence. For example, Pakistan in general, can be considered as independent from
the other countries, while Thailand can only also be considered independent from all other
countries, except with Malaysia. Some other bilateral relationships worth highlighting,
Singapore-Malaysia ( = 0:51), and Australia-Japan ( = 0:40).
Table 5.16 shows the tail dependence for the Asian economies. Compared to Table 5.15,
we can immediately detect quite some di¤erent results. For example, the afore-mentioned
relationship between Australia and Japan, now exhibits a much lower dependence (non-
signicant) level (CPJF = 0:15), indicating that these countries tend to be independent
during crisis periods. As far as Singapore-Malaysia, we can once again see a strong (highly
signicant) link during crisis periods (CPJF = 0:27); moreover, Thailand-India are actually
more dependent during crisis periods (CPJF = 0:27) than a standard correlation analysis
would indicate.
Therefore, if we solely relied on the standard correlation coe¢ cient, we would tend to
conclude that (on average) Asian economies would experience the same event with a high
probability. However, when we consider the conditional probability of joint failure, which
is a more precise measure of tail-dependence, then we see that some countries are more
dependent during crises times than others (and certainly when compared to the results
in Table 5.15). Therefore, what this analysis shows is that regular-dependence and tail-
dependence are independent.
18The signicance of the test is indicated in bold (see Tables 5.14, 5.16, 5.18, 5.19-5.21). We chose a
signicance level at better than 10%, since we do not want to underestimate the tail dependence.
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5.3.2 Western Hemisphere
The regular dependence measure (see Table 5.17) among western hemisphere economies,
indicates low level of dependence. For example, Brazil-Canada have a correlation of 0:11,
Brazil-Mexico have a correlation of 0:08, while Brazil-Venezuela have a 0:05 correlation
coe¢ cient. The only exceptions are Argentina-Brazil ( = 0:40), followed by Argentina-
Mexico ( = 0:18).
Table 5.18 exhibits the tail dependence in the western-hemisphere region. First of all,
compared to the Asia results, tail dependence is weaker in this region, and while these
economies continue to show (on average) a low level of dependence, these levels of tail
dependence are not signicantly di¤erent from zero. Some notable decreases in dependence
are Argentina-Brazil, who now experience a CPJF = 0:18. The pair Brazil-Canada now
shows a much lower level of dependence with a CPJF = 0:08, indicating that these two
economies are not very likely to experience extreme events at the same time (for all other
comparisons, the reader is referred to Appendix D). Therefore, statistically speaking, we
can only conclude that economies in this region are independent from one another.
5.3.3 Africa
Table 5.19 (in Appendix D), shows a very high regular dependence among African economies.
For example, Niger-Senegal have a correlation of 0.99, while Burkina Faso-Mali have a
 = 0:92. Moreover, Burkina Faso-Ivory Coast andMali-Ivory Coast experience a correlation
of over 0:70. Table 5.20 shows the tail dependence, with the CPJFs remaining extremely
high. For example, Burkina Faso, Côte dIvoire, Mauritius and Mali are highly dependent.
Niger and Senegal show the highest tail dependence in this region (CPJF = 0:91), while the
lowest CPJF (0:08) between South Africa, Mali and Burkina Faso. It is also wroth pointing
out that South Africa is in general independent from African countries in periods of crises.
Given the above observations, we can categorize the African economies into three groups:
group 1: Burkina Faso, Côte dIvoire, Mauritius and Mali; group 2: Niger and Senegal; group
3: South Africa. This classication shows that dependence during a crisis is (in general)
observed within groups; however, these groups can be considered independent from each
other.
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5.3.4 Global (in)dependence
One of the claims that is most often voiced in the literature (in the media) is that contagion
occurs across regions. That is, the crisis of the 1990s spread from Mexico to Asia during
the Mexican crisis in 1994, and from Asia to Latin America during the 1997-1998 Asian
crisis. Moreover, that market turbulence was transmitted to Latin America following the
1998 Russian default. Tables 5.21 - 5.23 show the tail dependence across the three regions
(Africa, Asia, and the Western Hemisphere), and the message stemming from these tables
is quite clear; in general, we observe high levels of independence across regions vis-à-vis
currency crisis, since all the CPJFs are rather low. Therefore, and contrary to popular
belief, we can only conclude that (currency) crisis are not very likely to spread from region
to region. In other words, currency crisis exhibit a localavor.19
5.4 Probit Estimation Results
5.4.1 Asia Sample
Results for Asia are presented in Table 5.1, and since probit coe¢ cients are not easily
interpretable, we also include the e¤ects of a one standard deviation percentage change
in the regressors on the probability of a crisis (mfx). The results for Asia are consistent
with the existence of a regional contagion e¤ect (as captured by the neighborhood dummy),
which is economically important and statistically signicant. That is, a speculative attack
elsewhere in Asia is associated with an increased probability of a domestic currency crisis
of around 9 percentage points. Moreover, the results support some of the predictions of the
rst generation models of speculative attacks. As was previously mentioned, according to
this type of models, a currency crisis stems from inconsistencies between macroeconomic
fundamentals and the exchange rate commitment. According to the results reported in
Table 5.1, the probability of a currency crisis increases with an increase in CPI ination,
and the government budget decit as a percentage of GDP (both signicant at the 1%), all
measured relative to the United States.
19However, a few exceptions can be discerned. For example, African economies found in group 1 (see
section 5.4.3) have a moderate level of tail dependence with Japan and Korea.
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Table 5.1: Asian Sample Panel Probit Results; 1978M1 - 2006M12
I mfx II mfx III mfx IV mfx V mfx
Di¤ in Dom. Credit 1.17 1.24 1.16 0.58 -0.53
(1.12) (1.15) (1.11) (1.26) (0.95)
Di¤ in Liquidity 0.97 0.83 0.99 0.88 1.00
(0.62) (0.61) (0.62) (0.58) (0.64)
Di¤ in GDP growth 0.91 0.7 1.18 0.8 0.94 0.7 0.93 0.6 0.57
(0.51)  (0.50)  (0.52)  (0.55)  (0.60)
Di¤ in Gov. Budget -3.51 -0.7
(1.24) 
Di¤ CPI Ination 0.09 1.4 0.07 1.1 0.10 1.4 0.09 1.2 0.09 1.2
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03) 
Di¤ Fin. Open. -0.02
(0.01)
Di¤ Trade Open. 0.02
(0.02)
Di¤ C.A. -0.43 -3.3
(0.12) 
FDI inows -0.03 -2.9
(0.01) 
Portfolio inows -0.03 -1.5
(0.006) 
Debt inows 0.001
(0.005)
Neighbor Dummy 0.58 9.6 0.58 9.5 0.59 9.7 0.51 8.2 0.48 7.5
(0.12)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.12) 
Observations 2854 2809 2861 2822 2402
McFadden R2 0.25 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.40
Notes: Dependent variable is a crisis dummy; model includes a constant
*, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% signicant levels; robust standard errors in parenthesis
Di¤ in liquidity = di¤ in M2/Int. Reserves
mfx = (marginal e¤ect*standard deviation)*100; not for dummy
5.4 PROBIT ESTIMATION RESULTS 141
This latter result shows that countercyclical scal policy20 in the form of slower growth in
government expenditure is strongly associated with lower exchange market pressure. More-
over, the current account variable enters negatively (also signicant at the 1%), implying
that an increase in the current account decit (i.e. lower reserves) increases the probability
of a currency crisis as predicted by theory. This latter result is interesting, because studies
previously mentioned were unsuccessful in linking current account decits to currency crisis
(see for example Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplozs, 1996).
The IMF (2007) has argued that episodes of very large capital inows are associated with
an acceleration of GDP growth. This suggests that for episodes of large capital inows ending
abruptly, it may take some time to recover fully from the economic slowdown associated
with a hard landing. Our results also show that Asian economies, which have enjoyed a
tremendous and steady growth in GDP should be careful of the upside risk (e.g. overheating)
associated with such prosperity. That is, our results show that as GDP growth increases,
then the odds of a speculative attack increase by 1%. As far as nancial integration
and the free movement of capital ows, Stiglitz (2000) for example, has argued in favor of
the capital inows problem; that is, that capital market liberalization is associated with
greater instability. One of his arguments (and he is not the only critic) is that not all capital
ows are created equal. That is, most critics of capital market liberalization are not as
concerned with FDI inows, as they are about short-term nancial ows (i.e. debt ows),
and they argue that it is the latter that many fear as particularly destabilizing. When we
look at "nancial integration" and at "trade openness", we do not nd any particular e¤ect
vis-à-vis currency crises. However, when we discriminate between capital ows (i.e. between
FDI, portfolio and debt), the results found in column V of Table 5.1, show that higher (and
sustained) levels of FDI and portfolio inows are associated with a lower probability of a
crisis (of about 2.5% given a one standard deviation shock), and that debt inows have no
e¤ect. This suggests that capital inows in-and-of-themselves do not seem to have insidious
side e¤ects; rather it is the sudden stop and quick reversals (see Montiel, 1999) that can
exacerbate the problem.
As far as the e¤ects for individual Asian economies, Table 5.2 shows that, for example,
a one standard deviation shock to the di¤erence in CPI ination will a¤ect Indonesia the
most, since it will increase the probability of a currency crisis for this economy by 2.3%.
When it comes to improvements in the current account balance, Singapore and Malaysia
benet the most from improvements in the current account balance vis-à-vis reducing the
probability of a speculative attack. We can also discern the importance of capital ows for
20Countercyclical in the sense of scal restraint during boom.
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some countries in reducing the probability of a crisis. When it comes to FDI inows, the
main beneciaries are Australia, Japan, and Singapore; while Japan and Australia benet
the most from portfolio inows.
Table 5.2: E¤ects to the probability of a currency crisis of a one standard deviation shock
to respective variables for Asian economies
di¤ (M2=Int:R) di¤ GDP di¤ CPI di¤ Gov. di¤ in FDI Portf.
growth growth ination budget C.A inows inows
Australia 1.4% 0.2% n.a -0.7% -1.7% -7.3% -1.1%
India 1.4% 1.5% 1.4% -0.1% -1.5% -1.4% -0.2%
Indonesia 1.6% 1.2% 2.3% -0.1% -0.8% -1.0% -0.2%
Japan 11.7% 0.3% 0.8% -0.1% -1.5% -3.0% -4.4%
Korea 1.4% 0.8% 1.1% -0.1% -1.5% -1.2% -0.4%
Malaysia 1.2% 0.7% 0.8% -0.7% -3.8% -0.7% -0.2%
New Zea. 2.7% 0.5% n.a -1.5% -1.8% -0.8% -0.2%
Pakistan 3.7% 0.8% 1.5% -0.1% -2.0% -0.3% -0.03%
Philippines 2.7% 0.8% 1.7% -0.1% -1.9% -0.3% -0.1%
Singapore 0.8% 0.7% 0.8% -1.5% -6.8% -2.5% -0.2%
Thailand 1.9% 0.7% 1.0% -0.1% -2.0% -0.9% -0.1%
5.4.2 Western Hemisphere Results
The results for the western hemisphere (see Table 5.3) also show that a speculative attack
elsewhere in the region is associated with an increased probability of a domestic currency
crisis of around 5 percentage points. Moreover, according to the results reported in Table
5.3, the probability of a currency crisis increases with an increase in CPI ination, and a
higher growth rate of M2-to-international-reserves ratio.21 Since this latter ratio captures
the extent to which the liabilities of the banking system are backed by international reserves;
then in the event of a currency crisis, individuals will start rushing to convert their domestic
currency deposits into foreign currency. Therefore, this latter result shows that a higher
ability of a central bank to withstand this demand pressure (i.e. a lower ratio) reduces the
probability of a crisis.
21When we exclude Canada from the sample and consider only the Latin American countries, the results
do not change. These are available upon request.
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Table 5.3: Western Hemisphere Sample Panel Probit Results; 1978M1 - 2006M12
I mfx II mfx III mfx IV mfx V mfx
Di¤ in Dom. Credit 0.95 0.92 0.76 0.89 1.85
(1.75) (1.73) (1.67) (1.73) (1.60)
Di¤ in Liquidity 3.91 8.3 3.87 8.2 3.92 8.3 3.94 8.4 5.42 9.6
(2.29)  (2.27)  (2.28)  (2.28)  (2.02) 
Di¤ in GDP growth -0.60 -2.0 -0.65 -2.1 -0.58 -1.8 -0.62 -2.0 -0.60 -1.6
(0.18)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.16)  (0.18) 
Di¤ in Gov. Budget -0.23 -0.27 -0.21 -0.23 -0.22
(0.19) (0.18) (0.20) (0.19) (0.26)
Di¤ CPI Ination 0.06 8.8 0.06 9.5 0.06 8.8 0.06 9.3 0.04 5.9
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.001)  (0.007) 
Di¤ Fin. Openz. -0.004 -1.7
(0.002)
Di¤ Trade Open. 0.002
(0.02)
Di¤ C.A. 0.01
(0.009)
FDI inows -0.03 -4.3
(0.008) 
Portfolio inows -0.003
(0.003)
Debt inows 0.0001
(0.003)
Neighbor Dummy 0.31 5.2 0.30 5.1 0.32 5.4 0.31 5.3 0.19 2.6
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.00) 
Observations 1409 1409 1403 1409 1232
McFadden R2 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.51
Notes: Dependent variable is a crisis dummy; model includes a constant
*, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% signicant levels; Di¤ in liquidity = di¤ in (M2/Int. Reserves)
Robust standard errors in parenthesis; z = coe¢ cient not signicant, but mfx is signicant
mfx = (marginal e¤ect*standard deviation)*100; not for dummy
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Furthermore, this e¤ect can be associated with greater exchange market pressure, be-
cause higher returns on domestic assets end up attracting more capital inows and fueling
upward pressures on the currency (ceteris paribus). In contrast to the Asian economies,
Western hemisphere countries have had a more turbulent time creating (sustained) GDP
growth, and accordingly, our results show that these economies need to grow in a more
steady and sustained fashion in order to decrease the probability of a crisis. That is, a one
standard deviation increase in GDP growth will decrease the probability of a crisis by 2%
on average for these economies.
Table 5.4: E¤ects to the probability of a currency crisis of a one standard deviation shock
to respective variables for WH economies
Argentina Brazil Canada Mexico Venezuela
Di¤ (M2/Int.R) growth 12.3% 7.3% 8.7% 10.9% 7.9%
Di¤ in CPI ination 35.1% 7.3% 0.2% 2.7% 6.1%
Di¤ in GDP Growth -2.5% -2.9% -0.05% -0.7% -0.6%
FDI inows -2.2% -3.7% -7.1% -3.1% -0.9%
As far as nancial integration, we nd that the marginal e¤ect on the probability of a
currency crisis is negative, implying a decrease of almost 2% (this runs counter to what the
nancial Globalizationcritics have long argued). Moreover, when we discriminate between
capital ows (i.e. between FDI, portfolio and debt), the results found in column V of Table
5.3, show that higher (and sustained) levels of FDI are associated with a lower probability
of a crisis (of about 5% given a one standard deviation shock), and that portfolio and debt
inows have no e¤ect. Table 5.4 shows the e¤ects of a one standard deviation shock for
each individual country. For example, a one standard deviation shock to the di¤erence in
M2 to international reserves growth between the various western hemisphere economies and
the USA will increase the probability of a crisis by around 10% on average, with Argentina
experiencing the largest e¤ect.
A similar one standard deviation shock to the di¤erence in CPI ination will increase the
probability by a dramatic 35% for Argentina and by less that one percent for Canada, while
the probability will only increase (for the remaining countries) by around 6% on average.
Once again, and similarly as to the Asian economies, the "more advanced" economies in
the region benet the most from capital inows. For example, Canada experiences the
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largest reduction in the probability of a crisis, given a one standard deviation increase in
FDI inows, followed by Brazil and Mexico. When it comes to GDP growth, Brazil and
Argentina benet the most from higher and sustained GDP growth, while the other three
countries experience a less that 1% reduction in the probability of a crisis.
5.4.3 Africa Results
As far as the African economies, the results in Table 5.5 once again conrm the neighbor-
hoode¤ect, which is associated with an increased probability of a domestic currency crisis
of around 20 percentage points (which is quite a dramatic and signicant e¤ect). Moreover,
the results show that the probability of a currency crisis increases with an increase in CPI
ination, and a higher growth rate of M2-to-international-reserves ratio. This latter result
(similar to the Western Hemisphere economies) shows that a higher ability of a central bank
to withstand excess demand pressure for foreign exchange reduces the probability of a crisis.
In other words, international reserve inadequacies can trigger a crisis. Interestingly, the
current account variable enters negatively and signicantly at the 1% ( mirroring the Asian
experience), implying that increases in current account decits increase the probability of a
crisis.
As far as scal policy, African countries can certainly benet vis-à-vis currency crisis
from slower growth in government expenditures (the probability of a crisis decreases by
around 5% on average, given a one standard deviation shock). However, in contrast to the
Asian and Latin American results, countries in Africa do not seem to su¤er (nor benet)
from an increase in GDP growth vis-à-vis a currency crises. As far as the di¤erent types
of capital ows, only FDI inows are associated with a reduction in the likelihood of a
speculative attack by about 3% (see column V of Table 5.5), which is a recurring theme
among the three regions that we have analyzed.
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Table 5.5: Africa Sample Panel Probit Results; 1979M2 - 2007M9
I mfx II mfx III mfx IV mfx V mfx
Di¤ in Dom. Credit 1.29 1.40 -2.59 1.37 1.14
(1.16) (1.21) (2.69) (1.08) (1.41)
Di¤ in Liquidity 0.91 4.2 0.91 4.2 1.50 8.5 0.91 4.1 0.89 4.2
(0.22)  (0.22)  (0.43)  (0.21)  (0.21) 
Di¤ in GDP growth 2.80 2.83 -5.49 2.53 3.20
(1.92) (1.87) (6.43) (1.89) (3.29)
Di¤ in Gov. Budget -0.91 -3.9 -0.88 -3.9 -3.40 -18.1 -0.96 -4.3
(0.24)  (0.27)  (0.54)  (0.25) 
Di¤ CPI Ination 0.04 1.1 0.04 1.1 0.12 3.7 0.04 0.9 0.05 5.9
(0.02)  (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Di¤ Fin. Open -0.06
(0.04)
Di¤ Trade Open. 0.000
(0.49)
Di¤ C.A. -0.95 3.2
(0.17) 
FDI inows -0.03 -2.7
(0.007) 
Portfolio inows -0.002
(0.006)
Debt inows 0.001
(0.002)
Neighbor Dummy 1.34 24.6 1.34 24.6 0.72 13.5 1.32 23.8 1.30 23.9
(0.24)  (0.24)  (0.33)  (0.23)  (0.23) 
Observations 1859 1859 400 1859 1724
McFadden R2 0.40 0.40 0.86 0.40 0.43
Notes: Dependent variable is a crisis dummy; model includes a constant
*, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% signicant levels; Di¤ in liquidity = di¤ in (M2/Int. Reserves)
mfx = (marginal e¤ect*standard deviation)*100; not for dummy
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Table 5.6: E¤ects to the probability of a currency crisis of a one standard deviation shock
to respective variables for African economies
di¤ (M2=Int:R) di¤ CPI di¤ Gov. di¤ in FDI
growth ination budget C.A inows
Burkina Faso 1.2% 1.4% -2.0% -2.3% -0.03%
Cote dIvoire 7.9% 0.9% -1.6% -2.9% -0.5%
Mali 2.9% 0.8% -1.7% -2.7% -0.2%
Mauritius 3.3% 0.7% -1.9% -3.4% -0.2%
Niger 2.4% 1.5% -1.7% -2.7% -0.07%
Senegal 5.0% 1.0% -1.6% -2.5% -0.2%
South Africa 1.8% 0.4% -9.3% -4.6% -6.2%
Table 5.6 analyses the e¤ects of a one standard deviation shock for each individual
country. A one standard deviation shock to the di¤erence in M2 to international reserves
growth between the various (individual) African countries and the USA will increase the
probability of a crisis; ranging from a minimum of 1:2% for Burkina Faso, to a maximum
of almost 8% for Cote dIvoire. Moreover, the same shock applied to the di¤erence in
CPI ination will increase the probability of a crisis by around 1% across the board. The
results also point out that those countries in Africa with current account decits are more
vulnerable to currency crisis; in other words, a one standard deviation improvement in
the current account balance will decrease the probability of a speculative attack by 2:3% for
Burkina Faso (the smallest decrease), and by 4:6% for South Africa. Finally yet importantly,
there is a clear message for policy makers in Africa that public expenditure restraint can
contribute positively to the reduction of crisis (especially for South Africa). Lastly, out the
African countries that we have analyzed, only South Africa seems to benet the most from
FDI inows, experiencing a 6.2% reduction in the probability of a currency crisis for a one
standard deviation increase in FDI inows.
5.5 Weighting Contagion
As discussed in Section 5.3.3, our weight captures the di¤erent links between economies
during crisis periods. Therefore, it can be argued that it also captures the expectations that
investors form vis-à-vis the value of their assets, given that there is a crisis elsewhere in
their (investment) region. In this view, our measure summarizes the macroeconomic risk
factor structure of asset values to the "global" economy. That is, it proxies for systematic
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macroeconomic risks such as regional business cycles, changes in discount factors, or in the
terms of trade, or changes in the price of vital inputs such as oil. For example, when specu-
lators expect the occurrence of a crisis across countries, they have an incentive to engage in
nancial market transactions that create links between otherwise separatemarkets (what
Kodres and Pritsker (2002) call "cross-market rebalancing"22). As these authors explain, if
investors expect that a crisis in a country (say country A) will be immediately followed by a
crisis in another country (country B), they have an incentive to be active in both currency
markets in order to "benet" from this joint correlation. If a crisis then occurs in A, it will
change the wealth levels of these speculators and, therefore, change their actions in country
Bs market in a way that increases the probability of a crisis there. The belief that contagion
will occur is entirely self-fullling; that is, if speculators expect there to be no correlation
between the outcomes of the two markets, they will have no incentive to rebalance their
portfolios, and therefore, contagion will not occur. This view leads naturally to a simple
theory of contagion in which a devaluation of one currency acts as a signal that coordinates
expectations on the crisis equilibrium in another currency market.23 The immediate source
of equilibrium contagion when it occurs in their model, is the fact that the same agents can
be active in both markets, which generates (at the very least) a wealth channel through
which crises are transmitted. In this way, the analysis herein relates to a number of papers
that study how nancial interdependence can lead to contagion (see Kodres and Pritsker,
2002).
5.5.1 Asia
Table 5.7 shows the results of substituting our new expectations weighted variable for the
unweighted (contagion) dummy variable. Weighting the contagion variable improves the
t of the equation. For example, while most results remain consistent with the previous
discussion, the contagion e¤ect remains strong and highly signicant. The positive sign of the
coe¢ cient on the contagion variable indicates that when a neighboring country experiences
22In our case, "cross-market rebalancing" only occurs within the same region, since as shown in section
5.4.4, currency crisis contagion is not very likely to jump across regions.
23If two countries are highly integrated, of course, (through trade, etc.) it is not entirely surprising that a
crisis in one would have strong e¤ects on the other. The importance of expectations is most often stressed
in cases where the two currencies are, at least in principle, not closely related.
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Table 5.7: Weighted Asian Sample Panel Probit Results; 1978M1 - 2006M12
I mfx II mfx III mfx IV mfx V mfx
Di¤ in Dom. Credit 0.80 0.86 0.83 0.41 -0.75
(1.15) (1.20) (1.13) (1.33) (1.03)
Di¤ in Liquidity 1.01 4.0 0.87 1.02 4.0 0.96 3.7 1.02 3.8
(0.59)  (0.59) (0.62)  (0.58)  (0.64) 
Di¤ in GDP growth 0.62 0.92 0.6 0.63 0.74 0.34
(0.51) (0.48)  (0.51) (0.57) (0.60)
Di¤ in Gov. Budget -4.22 -0.8
(0.87) 
Di¤ CPI Ination 0.12 1.7 0.11 1.4 0.12 1.7 0.12 1.7 0.11 1.5
(0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Di¤ Fin. Open. -0.03 -1.0
(0.01) 
Di¤ Trade Open. -0.07 -0.4
(0.02) 
Di¤ C.A. -0.28 -1.9
(0.08) 
FDI inows -0.02
(0.01)
Portfolio inows -0.003 -1.6
(0.0005) 
Debt inows 0.0007 0.3
(0.0004) 
W. Neighbor Dummy 1.59 6.7 1.60 6.6 1.61 6.7 1.51 6.2 1.42 5.7
(0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.14) 
Observations 2854 2809 2861 2822 2402
McFadden R2 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.44
Notes: Dependent variable is a crisis dummy; model includes a constant
*, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% signicant levels; robust standard errors in parenthesis
Di¤ in liquidity = di¤ in M2/Int. Reserves
mfx = (marginal e¤ect*standard deviation)*100
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a currency crisis, then the probability that the domestic economy will also experience a crisis
increases by 6% for a one standard deviation shock to the joint probability of a crisis. This
indicates that contagion seems to occur through cross-market rebalancing; that is, when
market participants are hit by an idiosyncratic shock in one country, they transmit the
shock abroad by "optimally" rebalancing their portfolios exposure to macroeconomic risks
through other countriesmarkets. Per individual country, this probability increase by 8.2%
for Malaysia, followed by Singapore (7.9%) and Japan (7.4%), with Pakistan experiencing
the lowest increase (5%).
Furthermore, the growth rate of M2-to-international-reserves ratio now enters with a
positive and signicant coe¢ cient, suggesting that countries with low reserves relative to
a broad measure of money are more likely to experience a currency crisis. This result
is consistent with the view, expressed in traditional models of currency crises, that reserve
inadequacy triggers a crisis. Referring back to Table 5.2, we see that a one standard deviation
shock to the di¤erence in M2 to international reserves growth between Japan and the USA
will increase the probability of a crisis for Japan by almost 12%. However, other economies
can also su¤er extensively with an increase in this di¤erence. Another improvement in
the equation relates to the nancial integrationand trade opennessresults, since they
now enter signicantly with the expected sign. For example, Singapore and the Philippines
benet the most from a higher degree of de facto "nancial integration" into world capital
markets, while Singapore and New Zealand enjoy a lower probability of a currency crisis,
due to further trade openness.
5.5.2 Western Hemisphere
When we weight the contagion dummy by the joint probability of a crisis for western hemi-
sphere economies, the results remain relatively similar to Table 5.3. Nonetheless, Table 5.8
indicates that when a neighboring country experiences a currency crisis in the western hemi-
sphere, then the probability that the domestic economy will also experience a crisis is around
2.5% (for a standard deviation shock). Therefore, the occurrence of contagion through cross-
market rebalancing in the Western Hemisphere, while still present, is certainly more subdued
as compared to Asia. However, this is not surprising to us, since earlier (see Section 6.4.2) we
found that western hemisphere economies are rather independent vis-à-vis currency crises.
That is, the conditional probability of joint failure does not add any additional information
to investors. Per individual country, this probability increase by 3% for Brazil, followed by
Argentina and Mexico (both experience an increase of 7.4%). Moreover, CPI ination and
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the lack of central bank liquidity still remain the largest contributors to an increase in the
probability of a currency crisis. FDI inows remain robust to this new specication, and
still contribute to a reduction in the probability of a speculative attack on the currency by
over 4%.
Table 5.8: Western Hemisphere Sample Panel Probit Results; 1978M1 - 2006M12
I mfx II mfx III mfx IV mfx V mfx
Di¤ in Dom. Credit 0.93 0.90 0.77 0.89 1.83
(1.75) (1.74) (1.67) (1.74) (1.60)
Di¤ in Liquidity 3.86 8.2 3.81 8.1 3.87 8.2 3.88 8.3 5.41 9.6
(2.30)  (2.28)  (2.30)  (2.30)  (2.03) 
Di¤ in GDP growth -0.60 -1.9 -0.66 -2.1 -0.59 -1.9 -0.62 -2.0 -0.60 -1.6
(0.18)  (0.15)  (0.16)  (0.17)  (0.19) 
Di¤ in Gov. Budget -0.24 -0.29 -0.23 -0.25 -0.23
(0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.25)
Di¤ CPI Ination 0.06 8.8 0.06 9.5 0.06 8.8 0.06 8.8 0.04 5.9
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.007) 
Di¤ Fin. Open. -0.003
(0.002)
Di¤ Trade Open. 0.004
(0.02)
Di¤ C.A. 0.00
(0.000)
FDI inows -0.03 -4.3
(0.008) 
Portfolio inows -0.003
(0.004)
Debt inows 0.001
(0.003)
W. Neighbor Dummy 1.63 2.5 1.59 2.4 1.70 2.5 1.63 2.4 0.94 1.2
(0.34)  (0.33)  (0.00)  (0.18)  (0.00) 
Observations 1409 1409 1403 1409 1232
McFadden R2 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.51
Notes: Dependent variable is a crisis dummy; model includes a constant
*, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% signicant levels; Di¤ in liquidity = di¤ in (M2/Int. Reserves)
Robust standard errors in parenthesis; mfx = (marginal e¤ect*standard deviation)*100
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5.5.3 Africa
As far as African economies are concerned, our new weight not only does it improve the t
of the equation, but it also continues to show strong tail dependence in relation to currency
crises.
Table 5.9: Weighted Africa Sample Panel Probit Results; 1979M2 - 2007M9
I mfx II mfx III mfx IV mfx V mfx
Di¤ in Dom. Credit 1.94 1.88 -2.62 1.94 2.00
(1.49) (1.39) (2.12) (1.52) (1.68)
Di¤ in Liquidity 1.45 5.1 1.46 5.1 1.94 9.2 1.45 5.1 1.45 5.2
(0.22)  (0.24)  (0.43)  (0.23)  (0.21) 
Di¤ in GDP growth 3.29 3.28 -0.84 3.26 4.23
(2.10) (2.13) (3.40) (2.06) (2.42)
Di¤ in Gov. Budget -0.08 -0.10 -1.77 -7.8 -0.21
(0.40) (0.42) (0.90)  (0.37)
Di¤ CPI Ination 0.05 0.9 0.06 0.9 0.11 2.8 0.05 0.9 0.05 1.1
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Di¤ Fin. Open -0.003
(0.10)
Di¤ Trade Open. 0.16
(0.42)
Di¤ C.A. -0.08
(0.13)
FDI inows -0.002 -1.3
(0.0004) 
Portfolio inows 0.0004
(0.0003)
Debt inows 0.000
(0.0009)
W. Neighbor Dummy 2.78 11.1 2.78 11.1 2.29 12.5 2.77 11.1 2.76 11.4
(0.39)  (0.39)  (0.56)  (0.38)  (0.38) 
Observations 1859 1859 400 1859 1724
McFadden R2 0.64 0.64 0.90 0.64 0.66
Notes: Dependent variable is a crisis dummy; model includes a constant
*, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% signicant levels; Di¤ in liquidity = di¤ in (M2/Int. Reserves)
mfx = (marginal e¤ect*standard deviation)*100
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With our new weight, this probability increases by over 11%, indicating that the increased
level of information available to investors, helps in creating a contagion e¤ect through "cross-
market rebalancing". As was shown in Section 5.4.3, African economies are highly depen-
dent, and therefore the occurrence of contagion is very likely to occur in this region. There-
fore, for African economies, when market participants experience an idiosyncratic shock in
one country, they transmit the shock abroad by "optimally" rebalancing their portfolios
exposure to macroeconomic risks through other countriesmarkets.
Individually, Mali experiences the largest increase (16%) in its probability of a crisis,
given a one standard deviation shock to our new contagion variable; while South Africas
probability only increase by 5.8%. However, the contagion e¤ect continues to be present; that
is, when a neighboring country in Africa experiences a currency crisis, then the probability
that the domestic economy will also experience a crisis now increases by 12%.
5.6 Conclusion
The paper has made two major contributions. First, it identies crises using a relatively more
objective method based on the extreme value theory. Secondly, we include the neighborhood
e¤ects channel using a new approach that takes into account the conditional probability of
joint failure (CPJF) of a crisis. By using monthly data for 23 emerging and developing
economies for the period 1978-2007, a battery of statistical and empirical tests fail to reject,
at high levels of condence, the hypothesis of contagion at the regional level. However,
at the global level (i.e. contagion across regions), we can only conclude tail independence.
The degree of within region dependency can be ranked, in the sense that Africa shows the
most dependence, followed by Asia. Interestingly, we show that the Western Hemisphere
economies are the most independent when it comes to the transmission of currency crisis.
Our probit estimation results conrm the above-mentioned story, in that the probability
of a currency crisis in a given country increases signicantly by a crisis elsewhere in its
own region. As far as Asia, we have seen that higher exchange market pressure is associated
with a stronger acceleration of CPI ination, and expansionary scal policy. Moreover, these
economies tend to experience high levels of exchange market pressure stemming from "too
much of a good thing"; that is they experience high levels of pressure from high levels of
GDP. This indicates that Asian economies should really be wary of "overheating". Western
Hemisphere economies, behave slightly di¤erent from Asian economies in relation to the
impact of GDP growth. These economies can reduce the probability of a currency crisis
by actually increasing their GDP growth in a more stable fashion. Furthermore, lack of
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international reserves and higher levels of CPI ination can have quite damaging e¤ects as
far as excessive pressure in their respective currencies. As far as African countries, we nd
that when it comes to ination, the government budget balance and international reserves,
African economies can certainly benet from improvements in these policy areas. The
major di¤erence between Africa the other two regions, is that GDP growth does not a¤ect
the probability of a currency crisis. When it comes to capital ows, we nd that all regions
benet from "persistent" FDI inows, and that Asia is the only region that benets from a
steady increase in portfolio inows.
This paper addressed three interrelated questions: (i) is the probability that a country
faces a speculative attack a¤ected by a crisis elsewhere? (ii) How does the conditional
probability of joint failure a¤ect the degree of contagion? (iii) Does nancial integration
into world capital markets increase the probability of a crisis? The answers to which are:
(i) yes it is, but only from neighbors; (ii) the CPJF helps in improving our understanding
of contagion. Furthermore, there is evidence that it helps to reduce contagion, by providing
more information (to investors), and thereby reducing "cross-market rebalancing"; (iii) No
it does not, nancial integration into world capital markets helps reduce the probability of
a currency crisis.
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5.7 Appendix Chapter 5
Table 5.10: Regions and Countries in Sample
Region Country Region Country
Africa Burkina Faso Asia Australia
Cote dIvoire India
Mali Indonesia
Mauritius Japan
Niger Korea
Senegal Malaysia
South Africa New Zealand
Western Hemisphere Argentina Pakistan
Brazil Philippines
Canada Singapore
Mexico Thailand
Venezuela
156 CHAPTER 5 JOINT CURRENCY CRISIS AND CONTAGION
Appendix B - Data Sources and Variables
 Period-average exchange rate: Local Currency Unit per US dollar (IFS line rf)
 Short-term interest rate given by money market rate (IFS line 60r) if available, or the
discount rate (IFS line 60) otherwise. However, for India we use the call money rate
(IFS line60b) and supplemented with the inter-bank lending rate (IFS line60p). For
New Zealand, we supplemented with the T-bill rate (IFS line60c). For Indonesia, we
use the call money rate (IFS line60b) and supplemented with the 3-month deposit rate
(IFS line60l). For Morocco, we supplemented with the discount rate (IFS line60).
 Total non-gold International Reserves in US dollars (IFS line 1L.D)
 Domestic credit in national currency (IFS line 32)
 M1 in national currency (IFS line 34)
 M2 in national currency (IFS, M1 plus line 35)
 GDP in national currency (IFS line 99b)
 CPI (IFS line 64)
 Current Account Balance (net) in national currency (IFS, line 78ALD) is the sum
of the balance on goods, services, and income, plus current transfers, credit
 Overall Budget Balance in US dollars (IFS line 78CBD) is the sum of the balances
on the current account, the capital account, the nancial account, and net errors and
omissions.
 Financial Assets (IFS line11) in national currency
 Financial Liabilities (IFS line16c) in national currency
 Merchandise Exports (IFS line70) & Merchandise Imports (IFS line71); both in US
dollars
 FDI Inows (IFS line78BED) this category includes equity capital, reinvested earn-
ings, other capital and nancial derivatives associated with various inter-company
transactions between a¢ liated enterprises.
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 Portfolio Inows (IFS line 78BGD) includes transactions with non-residents in nan-
cial securities of any maturity such as corporate securities, bonds, notes, and money
market instruments, other than those included in direct investment, exceptional -
nancing, and reserve assets.
 Debt Inows (IFS line 78BID) include all transactions not included in direct invest-
ment, portfolio investment, nancial derivatives, or other assets. Major categories are
trade credits, loans, transactions in currency and deposits, and other assets.
Table 5.11: Construction of Variables (in millions of USA dollars)
Variables Construction
Annual growth rate of domestic credit = Di¤erence in logs from IFS line32
Government Budget as % of GDP = (IFS line 78cbd) /
(IFS line 99b/IFS line rf)
Current Account as % of GDP = (IFS line 78ald/IFS line rf) /
(IFS line 99b/IFS line rf)
Ratio M2 to international reserves = ((IFS line 34+35)/IFS line rf) /
(IFS line .1ld)
CPI Ination = Di¤erence in logs from IFS line64
Financial Openness = [(assets + liab.)/IFS line rf] /
(IFS line 99b/IFS line rf)
Trade Openness = (exports + imports) /
(IFS line 99b/IFS line rf)
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Appendix C - Descriptive Statistics
Table 5.12: Descriptive Statistics for Asian Economies
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Di¤ in DomesticCredit Growth 3810 0.00 0.04 -0.73 0.71
Di¤ in MoneyGrowth 3804 0.01 0.25 -0.98 13.63
Di¤ in GDP growth 3660 0.00 0.04 -0.12 0.91
Di¤ in Current Account 3626 0.27 0.47 -0.76 2.81
Di¤ Government Budget 3658 0.00 0.01 -0.07 0.05
Di¤ CPI Ination 3122 0.14 0.88 -4.50 12.82
Di¤ in Financial Integration 3609 2.05 2.51 -0.02 12.18
Di¤ in Trade Openness 3703 0.25 0.49 0.00 2.61
FDI Inows 3305 232.47 723.85 -15344.37 10431.80
Portfolio Inows 3305 740.64 3225.17 -25597.57 40980.33
Debt Inows 3305 177.73 3492.77 -46444.67 21014.17
Neighborhood Dummy 3685 0.52 0.50 0 1.00
Weighted Neighbor Dummy 3685 0.21 0.27 0 1.95
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Table 5.13: Descriptive Statistics for West. Hemisphere Economies
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Di¤ in DomesticCredit Growth 1599 0.029 0.072 -0.231 0.818
Di¤ in MoneyGrowth 1658 -0.001 0.132 -0.975 0.807
Di¤ in GDP growth 1473 0.024 0.198 -0.111 3.303
Di¤ in Current Account 1470 -3844.09 32708.37 -359279.70 1367.98
Di¤ Government Budget 1470 -0.008 0.445 -5.220 1.252
Di¤ in Financial Integration 1463 15.014 28.014 -1.052 429.477
Trade Openness 1469 4.576 2.977 0.064 38.522
Di¤ CPI Ination 1671 3.787 9.795 -2.194 196.388
FDI Inows 1503 697.492 1106.335 -2230.440 10685.630
Portfolio Inows 1503 523.534 1301.050 -2985.433 13276.000
Debt Inows 1503 97.254 1365.877 -11040.330 8952.633
Neighborhood Dummy 1680 0.393 0.489 0 1
Weighted Neighbor Dummy 1680 0.062 0.093 0 0.477
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Table 5.14: Descriptive Statistics for African Economies
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Di¤ in DomesticCredit Growth 2399 0.00 0.05 -0.38 0.36
Di¤ in MoneyGrowth 2209 0.00 0.32 -3.07 3.22
Di¤ in GDP growth 2345 0.00 0.02 -0.18 0.33
Di¤ in Current Account 2177 0.27 0.24 -0.84 0.76
Di¤ Government Budget 2177 -0.02 0.30 -2.81 2.30
Di¤ in Financial Integration 2352 1.50 0.74 0.13 3.78
Di¤ CPI Ination 2294 0.14 1.75 -17.04 15.18
FDI Inows 2177 15.02 66.40 -37.72 605.86
Portfolio Inows 2033 40.80 201.77 -247.60 1817.85
Debt Inows 2177 11.46 80.07 -157.01 750.65
Neighborhood Dummy 2359 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00
Weighted Neighbor Dummy 2359 0.20 0.37 0.00 1.94
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Appendix D - Conditional Probability of Joint Failure
Table 5.15: Correlation within Asia; 1978M1-2006M12
Aus India Indo Jap Kor Malay New Z. Pak Philip Sing Thai
Australia 1 0.13 0.15 0.40 0.19 0.27 0.25 0.13 -0.02 0.30 0.12
India 0.13 1 0.11 0.18 0.16 0.26 0.05 0.00 0.15 0.24 0.19
Indon 0.15 0.11 1 0.22 0.29 0.32 0.10 0.00 0.16 0.19 0.18
Japan 0.40 0.18 0.22 1 0.37 0.32 0.24 0.15 0.08 0.39 0.09
Korea 0.19 0.16 0.29 0.37 1 0.38 0.13 0.17 0.16 0.40 0.11
Malaysia 0.27 0.26 0.32 0.32 0.38 1 0.20 0.13 0.29 0.51 0.33
New Z. 0.25 0.05 0.10 0.24 0.13 0.20 1 0.05 0.12 0.14 0.15
Pakistan 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.17 0.13 0.05 1 0.05 0.15 -0.01
Philip -0.02 0.15 0.16 0.08 0.16 0.29 0.12 0.05 1 0.15 0.06
Singap 0.30 0.24 0.19 0.39 0.40 0.51 0.14 0.15 0.15 1 0.11
Thailand 0.12 0.19 0.18 0.09 0.11 0.33 0.15 -0.01 0.06 0.11 1
Table 5.16: CPJF in Asia; 1978M1-2006M12
Aus India Indo Jap Kor Malay New Z. Pak Philip Sing Thai
Australia 1 0.10 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.13 0.08 0.17 0.13
India 0.10 1 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.11 0.07 0.14 0.23 0.27
Indonesia 0.18 0.10 1 0.22 0.15 0.11 0.22 0.11 0.08 0.15 0.08
Japan 0.15 0.15 0.22 1 0.22 0.25 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.22 0.18
Korea 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.22 1 0.18 0.10 0.08 0.14 0.15 0.14
Malaysia 0.17 0.18 0.11 0.25 0.18 1 0.17 0.13 0.18 0.30 0.27
New Z. 0.20 0.11 0.22 0.15 0.10 0.17 1 0.14 0.08 0.18 0.11
Pakistan 0.13 0.07 0.11 0.14 0.08 0.13 0.14 1 0.15 0.10 0.11
Philip 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.13 0.14 0.18 0.08 0.15 1 0.15 0.10
Singap 0.17 0.23 0.15 0.22 0.15 0.30 0.18 0.10 0.15 1 0.20
Thailand 0.13 0.27 0.08 0.18 0.14 0.27 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.20 1
Bold indicates tail dependence is signicant at better than 10%
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Table 5.17: Correlation in West. Hemisphere; 1978M1-2006M12
Argentina Brazil Canada Mexico Venezuela
Argentina 1 0.40 0.10 0.18 0.11
Brazil 0.40 1 0.11 0.08 0.05
Canada 0.10 0.11 1 0.08 0.05
Mexico 0.18 0.08 0.08 1 0.06
Venezuela 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.06 1
Table 5.18: CPJF in West. Hemisphere; 1978M1-2006M12
Argentina Brazil Canada Mexico Venezuela
Argentina 1 0.15 0.10 0.17 0.07
Brazil 0.15 1 0.08 0.18 0.14
Canada 0.10 0.08 1 0.11 0.08
Mexico 0.17 0.18 0.11 1 0.06
Venezuela 0.07 0.14 0.08 0.06 1
Table 5.19: Correlation in Africa; 1979M2-2007M9
Burkina F. Côte dIvoire Mali Maurit Niger Senegal S. Africa
Burkina Faso 1 0.73 0.92 0.35 0.08 0.09 0.01
Côte dIvoire 0.73 1 0.78 0.30 0.06 0.06 0.01
Mali 0.92 0.78 1 0.37 0.04 0.04 0.02
Mauritius 0.35 0.30 0.37 1 0.06 0.05 0.07
Niger 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.06 1 0.99 0.25
Senegal 0.09 0.61 0.04 0.05 0.99 1 0.25
South Africa 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.25 0.25 1
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Table 5.20: CPJF in Africa; 1979M2-2007M9
Burkina F. Côte dIvoire Mali Maurit Niger Senegal S. Africa
Burkina Faso 1 0.50 0.76 0.25 0.13 0.11 0.08
Côte dIvoire 0.50 1 0.58 0.23 0.13 0.11 0.11
Mali 0.76 0.58 1 0.25 0.14 0.13 0.08
Mauritius 0.25 0.23 0.25 1 0.11 0.11 0.10
Niger 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.11 1 0.91 0.20
Senegal 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.91 1 0.18
South Africa 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.20 0.18 1
Bold indicates tail dependence is signicant at better than 10%
Table 5.21: CPJF between Asia and Africa
Burkina F. Côte dIvoire Mali Maurit Niger Senegal S. Africa
Australia 0.14 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.13
India 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.06 0.07 0.11
Indonesia 0.18 0.17 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10
Japan 0.29 0.23 0.25 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.10
Korea 0.17 0.22 0.20 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.10
Malaysia 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.10
New. Z. 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.13
Pakistan 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.03
Philippines 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.07
Singapore 0.15 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.08
Thailand 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
Bold indicates tail dependence is signicant at better than 10%
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Table 5.22: CPJF between Asia and West. Hemisphere
Argentina Brazil Canada Mexico Venezuela
Australia 0.10 0.06 0.13 0.18 0.08
India 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.07
Indonesia 0.13 0.08 0.05 0.17 0.10
Japan 0.17 0.10 0.15 0.18 0.10
Korea 0.11 0.14 0.08 0.13 0.08
Malaysia 0.10 0.13 0.22 0.17 0.08
New. Z. 0.13 0.06 0.13 0.14 0.05
Pakistan 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07
Philippines 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.03
Singapore 0.11 0.11 0.20 0.14 0.13
Thailand 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.17 0.10
Bold indicates tail dependence is signicant at better than 10%
Table 5.23: CPJF between West. Hemisphere and Africa
Burkina F. Côte dIvoire Mali Maurit Niger Senegal S. Africa
Argentina 0.10 0.18 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.20
Brazil 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.10
Canada 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.06
Mexico 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.13 0.08 0.10 0.17
Venezuela 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.05
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Appendix E - Asia EMP Graphs
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Appendix F - Western Hemisphere EMP Graphs
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Appendix G - Africa EMP Graphs
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
The literature has shown that it is hard to nd unambiguous evidence that nancial openness
yields an improvement in economic performance, particularly at the macro level. One of
the major problems in empirical work is the bundling of nancial openness with a potential
host of other growth-friendly reforms, and the endogeneity of the liberalization decision
itself. Nonetheless, policymakers (in emerging and developing economies) have displayed
a remarkable revealed preference for nancial openness, and the trend is likely to continue
(Obstfeld, 2007). Accordingly, the underlying question this book has aimed to answer, is
why this revealed preference?
Regarding the appropriate macro-monetary framework, the World Bank (2006) puts it as
follows (see pg 140):
As developing countries become more open to international nancial mar-
kets, designing and building a sound regime of external nancial policy making
and regulation presents an urgent challenge. A consensus has formed around
the three core components of such a regime membership in a credible currency
union, such as the [euro zone], or an exchange rate that reects market forces;
gradual opening of the capital account; and a monetary policy framework that
favors price stability.
As this book has shown, and as Obstfeld (2007) writes
"Domestic nancial development is attractive from several perspectives; it
promotes growth, it can enhance welfare, allows easier government borrowing,
and eases the conduct of a domestically oriented monetary policy. Such domes-
tic nancial deepening, along with merchandise trade expansion, makes capital
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controls ever costlier to enforce. Furthermore, nancial openness is likely to pro-
mote a more competitive and resilient domestic nancial system, and ultimately
economic growth, through several channels. Domestic nancial development it-
self is likely to make external nancial liberalization easier to live with, but there
are other institutional reforms that ultimately are also helpful relating to the
rule of law, corruption, contract enforcement, corporate governance, and the like.
These reforms cannot be accomplished overnight, and in the process, a phased
and cautious piecemeal approach to nancial liberalization is in order".
It is important, though, that the approach does not exacerbate existing economic dis-
tortions or creates new ones, by for example, liberalizing short-term debt ows ahead of
long-term ows. The empirical record herein suggests that the benets arising from free
capital movements are most likely to appear when economies complement policies in order
to enhance nancial stability and growth.
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